




Session 1. Why is the Federal Government Involved in 
Agricultural Marketing? 
The purposes of this session are to introduce the concept of 
agricultural marketing policy and to examine three major 
marketing programs which are designed to facilitate the workings 
of the open, competitive marketing system. 
Leaflet 1. "Agricultural Marketing Policy in Perspective" 
Programs to Facilitate a Market-Oriented Agriculture. 
Leaflet 2. "Public Price Reporting" 
Leaflet 3. "Food and Agricultural Commodity Grading" 
Leaflet 4. "Generic Advertising, Research and Promotion 
Programs" 
Session 2. Programs to Strengthen Producer Influence in 
Marketing. 
This session is designed to explain and assess marketing pro grams 
which help farmers join together for the purpose of collectively 
influencing the markets for their products. 
Leaflet 5. "Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Orders" 
Leaflet 6. "Milk Marketing Orders" 
Leaflet 7. "Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Cooperatives" 
Session 3. Programs to Protect the Public Interest. 
This session is structured around those programs which are 
designed to minimize costs to both market participants and the 
public which could arise from unregulated market behavior, and to 
provide insights into how programs are established and 
altered. 
Leaflet 8. "Trade Practice Regulation" 
Leaflet 9. "Assessment of Food Safety Programs and Federal 
Policy Options" 
How Marketing Programs Are Established and 
Administered. 
Leaflet 10. "Agricultural Marketing Programs: Issues, Options 
and Strategies for Change" 
Federal Agricultural Marketing 
Programs 
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How To .Use These Leaflets 
These leaflets discuss eight different marketing programs that are authorized by federal laws and/or operated 
by agencies of the federal government, primarily the USDA. Also included are leaflets that explain the rationale 
for federal involvement in agricultural markets and methcxis that can be used to bring about desired changes. 
Each program leaflet includes an explanation of the current program, an evaluation of what it has 
accomplished, a list of key issues of contemporary concern, and a discussion of ways in which it could be 
mcxiified and the most likely consequences of such changes. If you wish to write an article, lead a discussion, 
answer questions, give a talk, or converse with people about the involvement of the federal government in 
agricultural markets, these leaflets help by providing background, evaluation and ideas. If you wish to conduct an 
educational program on these topics, you may find the following outline useful. 
Federal marketing programs establish the rules of the game for buying and selling farm products. Many of the 
laws authorizing these programs were enacted in the 1930s. Tremendous change has occurred since then in the 
structure of markets, the transactions, and the functions involved in marketing farm products. The purpose of 
these leaflets is to describe contemporary marketing issues, identify marketing policy options, and evaluate their 
consequences. No position is taken on either the need for change or the preferred options. 
Leaflet Number 1 
Texas Agricultural Extension Service 
Agricultural Marketing in Perspective 
Harold F. Breimyer, University of Missouri-Columbia 
The System 
The marketing system for farm products is big, 
complex and dramatic in performance. The system 
takes raw products from the farm to consumers in an 
almost infinite variety of processed and packaged 
forms. It does so day after day, with clockwork reg-
ularity. It generates $312 billion annual income in 
the marketing sector, which is nearly four times the 
value of farm products as they leave the farm. 
The system may also be identified by its institu-
tions: that is, by the firms and people engaged in it as 
well as by the policies, programs and agencies that 
regulate or service its needs. These begin with local 
and central assemblers of farm products and continue 
with processors, handlers, brokers, shippers, packers 
and eventually retailers and institutional buyers. 
For this review, however, the principal focus is on 
the rules, regulations and support services that shape 
the marketing system. The manifold operations in 
marketing are not bedlam. They are structured and 
synchronized. They take place according to p~tterns 
established partly by industry custom and partly by 
federal and state marketing programs and public 
policies. 
The nature of federal agricultural marketing pro-
grams, their origin, the pressures to change them, 
and options for change are subjects of the other nine 
leaflets in this series. 
Origins 
Many rules of trading originate with market firms. 
But state and federal governments have long had a 
voice in marketing. Policies date back as far as the 
early 1800s when help was given in building canals 
and roads to get farm products to market. 
The 1920s and 1930s were the most fertile period 
in marketing policy development. Among activities 
introduced or expanded were market news, grading, 
marketing agreements and orders, assistance to coop-
eratives, food safety rules and regulation of spot and 
futures markets. Most services to marketing since 
the 1930s have only built on what was in place. In 
fact, one of the criticisms heard today is that many 
policies are a half-century old and need review and 
possibly change. 
Current Uncertainty 
Reasons that public marketing policies are under 
fire in the 1980s may begin with the lower incomes 
received by farmers and by many market firms as 
well. Also, marketing is caught in the reexamination 
of government's role in the economy. But weightier 
issues also are being raised. Critics say the 
50-year-old marketing programs best fit the earlier 
decentralized system of country markets and small 
traders. Marketing is dynamic and changing, it is 
pointed out, and publi~ policy ought to be equally 
innovative. 
Another criticism is that market regulations are 
unnecessarily complicated and unwieldy. Charges are 
heard, too, that market policies are indifferent to 
consumers' interests or that they are not supportive 
enough of farmers' interests. 
Despite misgivings about the marketing system 
and a proper public role, the goals for the marketing 
system remain scarcely changed. The system is stiJI 
expected to get products from the farm to the con-
sumer efficiently and at relatively low marketing 
cost. It is also expected to accommodate product 
choice and provide market opportunities for a div-
erse group of producers and marketing firms. That 
is a big order. 
Policies to Be Examined 
This report is confined to public policies for mar-
keting -- policies related to rules, regulations and 
services in the marketing system which help facilitate 
a market-oriented agriculture, strengthen producers' 
influence in their markets and protect the public 
interest. It focuses mainly on federal policies admin-
istered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA). 
This is one of a series of articles on Federal Agricul.tural Marketing Programs developed by your state Extension Service as a compo-
nent of the Land Grant University System in cooperation with the Texas Agricultural Extension Service, the Farm Foundation, and 
the National Public Policy Education Committee. 
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Among topics reviewed in the several leaflets are: 
• Authority for farmers to market their products 
collectively, either in cooperative marketing or 
through collective bargaining. 
• Legal provisions for marketing orders. These 
allow producers of a commodity in a region to 
impose common rules of marketing upon them-
seives, subject to monitoring by the secretary of 
agriculture. Orders for milk and for fruits and 
vegetables are sufficiently different that they are 
discussed separately. 
• Grade standards and grading. These services are 
provided in order to establish uniform standards 
for product quality. 
• Price reporting and related market information 
provided by the USDA. Price reporting dissemi-
nates price data useful to producers, marketers 
and consumers, and reciprocally, aids in the pric-
ing process itself. 
• Economic regulation of business marketing prac-
tices and commodity markets, both spot and 
future. The object is to ensure. insofar as possible, 
their competitiveness and integrity. 
• Market promotion. A growing number of federal 
as well as state programs collect money from pro-
ducers or market firms for advertising, promotion 
and research. Their object is to expand demand. 
• Food safety programs. Various of these establish 
the· nutritional quality, safety and sanitation of 
foodstuffs. Some spark controversy over the gov-
ernment's role in protecting the health of con-
sumers. 
• The legislative and administrative process by 
which marketing policy and regulatory decisions 
are made. 
The Farm to Consumer Structure 
of Markets 
The marketing system that gets products from 
farmers to consumers is made up of firms of various 
sizes and functions that bear a systematic relation to 
each other. This orderly framework of marketing 
firms is called the structure of the system. 
Public policies for marketing are applied within 
the context of that structure. However, they also 
have a bearing on the kind of structure that prevails 
in the future. Thus, the structure of markets is a 
vital consideration in marketing policy. 
Figure 1 illustrates the contemporary structure --
the orderly sequence of firms, their various competi-
tive relationships and the heterogeneity of the system 
as well. 
In the chart: 
• Each rectangle is a firm. 
• Firms compete at each of five stages in marketing. 
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• The number and size of rectangles illustrate 
varying competitive relationships at each stage. 
Generally. firms are most numerous and smallest 
at first sale from the farm (local assembly). They 
are fewest and largest at processing. 
• Vertical relationships also are illustrated. In the 
absence of vertical integration, the product moves 
between stages by market exchange. An arrow 
represents contractual integration. A shaded band 
indicates integration by ownership. 
Even though various relationship patterns are 
found in the chart, the actual marketing system is 
more diverse than shown. Certainly there are some 
very large firms at the first stage and some very 
small firms in processing. The system is much more 
tightly linked for some commodities than it is for 
others. 
The traditional image of marketing for farm prod-
ucts is decentralized competition among firms that 
buy and sell on the basis of price. In the chart, this 
is represented by small firms (small rectangles) that 
engage in open trading (no band or arrow.) Much of 
marketing still conforms to that image. Independent 
small firms are scattered throughout the chart but 
are relatively scarce at some stages. Several of the 
marketing policies discussed in these leaflets were not 
only designed to fit a decentralized system but were 
intended to perpetuate it. This was true, for 
instance. of market information, grades and stan-
dards, and trade practice regulation. 
In spite of these policies, market structure has 
undergone change. How much change varies from 
commodity to commodity, and even from market to 
market. The modern broiler industry bears no 
resemblance to the live fryer market of yesteryear. 
On the other hand, grain markets have not altered so 
dramatically. 
Public policies and programs, and their associated 
rules and services, have not changed nearly so much 
as the marketing system. As previously indicated, 
many of the enabling laws date from the 1930s. To 
be sure, the regulations and services provided under 
those laws have been more flexible. 
Issues arising from market trends lace through the 
leaflets of this report. The issues may be grouped 
into: 
• vertical integration. 
• terms of competition. 
• pricing methods. 
Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration by contractual arrangements 
or ownership is the most clear-cut departure from a 
system of market trading.In it, product moves from 
stage to stage not by competitive buying or selling 
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exchange trans a ctions 
but under the terms of production contracts or 
through inter-division transfer within a large firm . 
Both contract prices and transfer prices are fre-
quently based on market prices. 
Production contracts are now the rule in broilers 
and are common in other poultry. They are the 
usual practice in production of vegetables for pro-
cessing, and for some processed fruits. Contracts are 
found in cattle and hogs, various seed crops, and 
even in grains and cotton. 
Approximately 20 percent of all farm products 
move from farmer to processor under some kind of 
production contract; and if production-delivery con-
tracts with farmer cooperatives are included, the fig-
ure runs well over 30 percent. This is almost twice 
the level of the 1960s. 
Some ownership integration is found at the farm 
level , as again, in poultry. At least 6 percent of U.S. 
farm products are transferred to the processing divi-
sion of an integrated firm at some agreed upon price 
or one tied to market prices. 
Vertical integration is found often at later stages 
in marketing. Retail food chains own most of their 
wholesaling facilities and may own or contract the 
production of private label foods. 
What vertical integration means to marketing is 
not understood well, in spite of its growing promi-
nence. The efficiencies, questions and complications 
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it introduces are touched on in several leaflets. For 
example, how can farmers , and market firms too , be 
protected as well against certain trade practices in 
contractual integration as in open market trading? 
In market information, can and should the terms of 
delivery contracts for hogs or cattle be reported 
comparably with the price of slaughter animals sold 
at Omaha or St. Paul? Do farmers who raise broilers 
under contract, like the independent producers of an 
earlier era, need the antitrust and unfair trade prac-
tice protections of the Packers and Stockyards Act? 
If they do, how can those protections be extended? 
In contractual production of fruits and vegetables 
for freezing or canning, producers often turn to col-
iective bargaining. Yet procedural rules for bargain-
ing are still in flux and often in dispute. How can 
they be clarified for efficiency and improved effec-
tiveness? 
Competition Among Firms 
The marketing system of yesteryear had many 
firms competing actively and visibly. Changes since 
have been illustrated in comments above. Vertical 
integration is common, firms are fewer and larger, 
and prices are not arrived at in open trading as often 
as before. 
Local markets are usually thought of as compara-
tively competitive. This is not always true. They 
often are characterized as "local oligopsony" -- a 
situation where, for example, only two or three ele-
vators are within trucking distance of a wheat or hog 
producer. They may become local monopolies as 
processors increase in size through buyouts. 
Comments on quality of competition run through 
almost all the leaflets. How to correct or compensate 
for unbalanced trading relationships has plagued 
agricultural marketing for generations! Cooperative 
marketing and collective bargaining are a recourse 
for small farmers that face big buyers or processors. 
Marketing orders for milk, and for fruits and vegeta-
bles, give producers a degree of control they would 
otherwise lack. Generic advertising of farm com-
modities is patterned after the brand advertising that 
food processors engage in. 
Big firrr.s can make it harder to publish marketing 
information if they are unwilling to cooperate with 
voluntary reporting programs; hence the call for 
innovation in informational techniques. In large 
measure, trade practice regulation exists in order to 
improve integrity, equity and competition among 
firms of uneven size and power. 
The state of competition has a great deal to do 
with policy for marketing. 
Pricing 
Wherever marketing takes place by buying and 
selling, a price must be determined. For commodi-
ties delivered under contract, price is determined by 
extending an offer, by negotiation or by a formula 
tied to some market price. The method of pricing is 
an important part of the marketing process. 
In older days, most pricing was done either in 
auction or private-treaty negotiation on open mar-
kets. The practice is followed still today for many 
livestock sales. Grain is priced on mercantile 
exchanges, but local elevators generally post a non-
negotiable price that is derived from those exchange 
prices. 
Historically, the first major departure from open 
market pricing was in direct sale from the farmer to 
the handler or processor. Such pricing is usually 
bid-and-acceptance. To this day, however, both par-
ties usually have used published prices as a starting 
point. As direct marketing grew it shrank the 
sources of published price information. A search for 
replacement data led to private market quotations 
(such as Orner-Barry's or the Yellow Sheet for poul-
try products and meats), futures market formulas, 
committee pricing systems and formulas for convert-
ing final-product prices back to the farm level. 
Another route taken, although still small in the 
aggregate, is computerized communication for "cen-
tral market" pricing without assembly of product. 
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An example is the Telcot system for marketing cot-
ton. 
Questions about pricing, like those about quality 
of competition, enter into a number of the leaflets 
that follow. One particularly sensitive issue is pri-
vate publishing of prices that essentially are estab-
lished by the publisher. 
Collective bargaining as a pricing system comes 
under scrutiny. It can substitute for open market 
pricing but it is most often turned to in contractual 
integration where the farmer's contribution is 
"priced" by the terms of the contract. 
Beneficiaries of Marketing Services 
In the early years of a public role for agricultural 
marketing, it is fair to say that farmers were seen as 
the principal beneficiaries. They were the small 
people in the system, the ones without knowledge or 
power they could bring to bear. Their interests were 
to be served and protected. 
Farm producers are still given the most considera-
tion when marketing policy is drawn up. for almost 
the same reasons. Yet farmers are not the exclusive 
target group they once were . Consumers interests 
count for more than they once did. Also, producers 
of some commodities have formed cooperatives or 
other organizations that belie the notion of farmers 
as uninformed and powerless. 
The question of who benefits from market rules, 
regulations and services can be viewed from several 
different perspectives. Many times, well chosen ser-
vices can be said in reality to help everyone. They 
make the whole system work better. This rather 
idealistic note ought not to be discounted. 
In other cases the effects are mixed and uneven. 
A great many regulations are applied to marketing 
firms. Those firms are forced to conform to rules 
that protect or assist the farm producer, the con-
sumer, or both. While some costs are incurred by 
the firms, the results also may carry a feedback ben-
efit to them. For example, standardization and qual-
ity-control of products build markets for both farm-
ers and market firms. 
Some rules protect marketing system participants 
against others in the system. They defend the eco-
nomically weak and ethical marketer against the 
more powerful and unethical. 
In recent years, consumers have spoken up more 
about marketing policy, particularly with regard to 
food safety. Consumers have also called for more 
consumer-oriented grade standards. However, except 
for grading of beef and a few other instances, most 
grading of farm products is still oriented to the 
farmer and wholesale trader. 
Consumers' influence on food labeling and food 
safety has led to reassignment of responsibilities 
among federal agencies. The stage has shifted away 
from raw farm products and their guardian in the 
USDA to food safety and labeling laws administered 
by the Food and Drug Administration, and laws 
related to competitive practices that are the province 
of the Federal Trade Commission or the Commodity 
Futues Trading Commission. 
Marketing rules, regulations and services 
designed to help facilitate a market-oriented agricul-
ture, strengthen producers' market influence and 
protect the public interest -- are not always highly 
selective in helping targeted parties or restricting 
certain activities. Yet the question of who benefits 
from marketing policy is important. 
Contemporary Concerns 
A climate that favors a reduced governmental role, 
and awareness of marketing's dynamic nature, can 
lead to several contemporary concerns. Most have 
already been referred to. In brief summary, those 
touched on in these leaflets fall under the headings 
of: 
• structural change. 
• trend toward deregulation. 
• public expectations. 
• conflicts of interest. 
• the political process. 
It is easy to enumerate the scruccural changes that 
are underway -- vertical integration instead of open-
market buying and selling; direct marketing as a 
bypass of assembly markets; formula pricing in place 
of pricing when title is transferred. Questions arise 
as to what types of government marketing programs 
are required or warranted to deal with the newer 
arrangements. Should participants be helped and 
protected as before, and what costs are involved? 
Some of the newer marketing techniques circum-
vent the intent of existing marketing policies. Is 
some modification of programs or policies needed or 
have the old policies become so obsolete they should 
be abandoned? 
We must recognize the deregulation attitude that 
has prevailed widely in the 1980s. The discipline of 
governmentally-imposed rules in trading is resisted. 
In the 1982 Economic Report of the President, the 
Council of Economic Advisers declared its outright 
opposition to a role for government in market regu-
lation and presumably in marketing services also. To 
what extent the Congress and citizens concur can 
hardly be known. 
Yet there is little evidence that standards have 
been lowered for what is expected in marketing. 
Ironically, if anything the standards have been raised. 
Consumer interest in food prices and food quality 
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has heightened. Consumer groups are showing more 
concern about marketing orders, grades and stan -
dards and the effects of cooperatives. 
Farmers too are sensitive but for a different rea-
son. If price and income supports are to be relied on 
less in future years to stablilize farmers ' incomes, 
more attention will center on how well the marketing 
system is performing. It is possible that farmers will 
consider more aggressive group action in marketing, 
including wider use of marketing orders. 
Even though conflicts of interest can be overstated, 
they run through much of the marketing system. 
What farm producers expect of marketing can differ 
from the interests of marketing firms and the goals 
of consumers. Marketing firms may believe they are 
being over-regulated for the benefit of farmers or 
consumers. 
Interesting but complex circularities can arise. As 
an example, pure food laws supposedly help con-
sumers most. They may also instill confidence and 
thereby benefit market firms and farmers . Nutrition 
information can be demand-building for some foods, 
even as it incurs the resentment of some producers 
and marketing firms by reducing demand for certain 
other products. In the formulation of marketing 
policy, potential conflicting interests among various 
groups cannot be sidestepped. 
How marketing policy integrates with the political 
process is often neglected. It ought not to be. Tra-
ditional decentralized marketing fits with a decen-
tralized, dispersed process of government. Whether 
coincidental or not, the trend toward larger firms in 
marketing was accompanied by centralization in gov-
ernment. 
Both the climate and tactics of political action 
have been affected. Power struggles can emerge in 
the making of marketing policy. The possibility of 
coercive dominance by firms or organizations hold-
ing both economic and political power is now a fact 
of life. Some producer groups have activated them-
selves in the same big-organization setting. Milk 
producers have done so. Benefits can be gained, but 
political contests can be costly. 
By the same token, the more traditional marketing 
programs and services such as information, grading 
and trade practice regulation enjoy a less organized 
base of support. Producers may be less attentive to 
the political viability of these services than their 
long-run interests justify. 
Criteria for Evaluation 
Marketing rules, regulations and services can be 
evaluated only if criteria -- standards of performance 
-- are held in mind. Criteria can be explicit or 
implicit, but they are never absent. 
Four explicit criteria have been applied in the 
leaflets to evaluate how well federal marketing poli-
cies and programs have: 
• facilitated market operations. 
• eliminated unfair marketing practices. 
• improved efficiency. 
• redistributed costs and benefits. 
Does a given rule, regulation or service facilitate 
market operations, or induce changes in market 
structure? The simplicity of this question disguises 
the impact of its answers. So many marketing activi-
ties have side or feedback effects that reach beyond 
their immediate significance. 
Pricing policy involves not only how fairly buyer 
and seller are treated, but how well the resulting 
price conveys market signals from consumer to pro-
ducer. Grade standards help sell products without 
costly personal inspection, but they can also enable 
small processors to stay in business alongside bigger 
ones. Food safety rules sometimes have an opposite 
effect: if they require elaborate and expensive food 
handling equipment, they favor large firms at the 
expense of small ones. Many other illustrations of 
interaction consequences of marketing policies could 
be cited. 
The equity issue -- protection of weaker market 
participants from abuse or exploitation by eliminating 
unfair marketing practices -- runs deeply throughout 
marketing policy. Farmers and consumers, the "little 
people" at opposite ends of the marketing sequence, 
are usually seen as deserving protection. Food safety 
regulations protect consumers from harmful foods. 
Farmers are shielded from trade practices such as 
price fixing or buyers' default. 
Protection often extends to market firms them-
selves. Small firms may be offered defense against 
big ones that employ predatory tactics. Sometimes 
roles reverse: big firms may be willing to uphold 
product identity or other industry-wide standards that 
smaller ones debase. 
Manifestly, marketing programs should help 
improve efficiency in marketing. Trading rules ought 
to facilitate technical efficiency in marketing, or at 
least not impede it by adding unduly to costs. 
Equally important is the effect a rule, regulation or 
service may have on pricing efficiency and the com-
munication system. 
Often a major object is to improve competition. If 
that is achieved, marketing margins will be narrowed. 
In a well-functioning marketing system, the price of 
a product to farmers ought to reflect accurately the 
product value at later stages. Of course marketing 
firms will also be compensated for value added. 
Also, the price to farmers should be aligned well 
geographically, differing between areas only 
proportionately with transfer costs that include 
transportation, storage and related merchandising 
costs. 
One of the more sensitive aspects of any market-
ing policy is its effect in redistributing costs and ben-
efits; that is, how it affects costs paid, and prices and 
incomes received, by each participant in the system. 
Costs of marketing services such as grading are paid 
by the market firm , but an analytical question of 
"incidence" arises -- who ultimately bears the cost? 
Authority for group action by farmers is obviously 
intended to help farmers obtain a larger share of the 
ultimate value of products marketed. 
Just as perplexing is the choice between private 
versus public financing of governmental services. To 
what extent can taxpayers be expected to assume the 
obligation? Can the regulator be objective and even-
handed if the regulated is paying for the cost? Gen-
erally, where the benefits of a service diffuse broadly 
among producers, marketers and consumers the case 
is clearer for citizen-financing through taxes. 
Equally significant is distribution of decision 
authority. What voice does each interest group have 
in the political process? Group action by farmers 
may redistribute decision-making as fully as income. 
How fairly can a marketing rule be enforced, and 
how readily can a marketing service be provided? 
Operational feasibility is a vital consideration in 
making and administering marketing policy. This 
criterion may be capstone to the others and yet the 
most difficult to apply. Hence it is not an explicit 
criterion employed in the leaflets. It is not easy to 
predict how well a policy can be carried out. 
In addition, costs and benefits must be carefully 
and objectively evaluated. There is risk that the costs 
of a program, which are fairly visible, are overem-
phasized while the benefits, which are often less 
readily seen, are underappreciated. Even so, costs 
and benefits must be weighed, irrespective of how 
approximate and fallible the weighing may be. 
The Decision Process 
In the final analysis, rules, regulations and services 
which affect the marketing of farm products are an 
outcome of the decision process. The nature of the 
complex process is sketched in a somewhat simplified 
form in the last leaflet of this series. 
Educational programs conducted by the Texas Agricultural Extension Service serve people of all ages regardless of socioeconomic level, 
race, color, sex, religion, handicap or national origin. 
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Economics, Acts of Congress of May 8, 1914. as 
amended, and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture, Zerle L. Carpenter, Director, Texas 
Agricultural Extension Service , The Texas A&M University System. 
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Leaflet Number 2 
Texas Agricultural Extension Service 
Public Price Reporting 
Dennis R. Henderson, Ohio State University 
Lee F. Schrader, Purdue University 
V. James Rhodes, University of Missouri-Columbia 
This leaflet reviews the public price reporting 
(PPR) program for agricultural products. It encom-
passes price reports issued by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, sometimes in cooperation with state 
departments of agriculture. Objectives are to 
describe how PPR currently functions , to delineate its 
accomplishment as well as its limitations, and to 
identify and analyze alternatives for improvement. 
USDA reporters were not the first to report prices 
in markets for agricultural commodities. The 
Urner-Barry service, which still reports prices in 
poultry and egg markets. was begun in New York 
City in 1858. The "Yellow Sheet" report on meat 
prices was launched by a private publisher in 1923 at 
the behest of packers. Numerous private reporting 
firms, with varying reputations, served other markets. 
PPR was initiated on a small scale in 1916 to provide 
objective market information to farmers. 
Price information was first disseminated primarily 
through the mail and farmer-oriented newspapers. 
Radio soon became an additional medium. Later, a 
leased telegraph wire system became the primary 
means of information delivery to local market news 
and mass media offices, followed by computer net-
works. 
Terminal wholesale markets were the source of 
information on prices for most of the early PPR 
reports. As t.rading decentralized, price quotations 
from terminal markets became the base for settling 
prices in other markets. For a generation, arguments 
flourished about the dangers of pricing a large num-
ber of direct market transactions on an increasingly 
small volume of terminal market sales. This resulted 
in efforts by price reporters to expand their coverage 
to country markets and even to direct trading. 
PPR began with the objective of rescuing isolated 
farmers from exploitation by more knowledgeable 
traders, at a time when farmers had meager tele-
phone service and no radios. Within a quarter cen-
tury , most farmers had both. This reduced concern 
about exploitation and led to the current emphasis on 
providing information that facilitates trade. 
The Current Program 
The type of information gathered, collection pro-
cedures and methods for disseminating price infor-
mation vary among the several commodities covered 
by PPR. This discussion represents the typical situ-
ation, although it may make generalizations that do 
not apply everywhere. 
Market Reporting 
Public price reports are issued for most categories 
of agricultural commodities. Prices are typically 
reported at each level of distribution in which a 
farm-produced commodity retains its identity. For 
example, while livestock, grain and oilseed prices are 
reported at the processor level, prices for other pro-
cessed products are not. Prices are reported for fresh 
fruits and vegetables but not for most processed 
fruits and vegetables or processed fruit and vegetable 
products. Where trade in a farm-produced com-
modity is not reportable due to producer-processor 
integration. reporting generally focuses on the point 
of the first sale of processed products. 
Quoting Prices 
The general policy is to report only prices which 
are negotiated on spot trades and are verifiable by 
both buyer and seller. There are important excep-
tions. Bids for grains and offers of turkeys are regu-
larly reported. 
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The least complex report is on the range of prices 
at an organized public market. When trades are pri-
vately negotiated, the reporter's role is expanded to 
find the trades and to evaluate the validity of the 
information received. When trading is decentralized, 
the dispersed locations further complicate the task. 
'PPR has long resisted reducing price data to a sin-
gle number, in general arguing that to do so would 
change its role from price reporter to price maker. 
Nonetheless, the exchange of information necessary 
to obtain cooperation from buyers and sellers often 
involves the reporter in the price establishment pro-
cess. For example, a price reporter is likely to pro-
vide some "tone of market" information to traders 
contacted while compiling information. This may 
affect subsequent pricing decisions by those traders. 
Obtaining Price Information 
Collecting price information is the least difficult at 
public auction markets where prices for each trans-
action are observable. Where private trading pre-
dominates, prices must be obtained directly from 
buyers and sellers on a voluntary basis. For compet-
itive markets with relatively large trading volumes, 
voluntary reporting generally results in accurate 
reports. But in markets with few transactions or 
traders, participants are sometimes less willing to 
cooperate. 
When gaps exist in prices that can be quoted on 
the basis of negotiated trades, prices from other 
locations or for related products may be adjusted to 
construct a particular price quote. For example, 
wholesale trade in beef now occurs largely in the 
form of boxed beef; that is, retail, subprimal and pri-
mal cuts in various boxed combinations, rather than 
in the form of swinging beef (carcasses). Yet, carcass 
price quotes are still considered important. Thus, 
carcass equivalent values have been constructed from 
boxed beef prices. 
Gaps in reportable prices can also be filled by 
reporters' estimates. PPR procedures discourage 
this. However, it is probably not possible to elimi-
nate some interpretation of non-price market infor-
mation by reporters in instances where there are few 
confirmable sales. 
Commercial news services are another source of 
price information on some commodities which are 
reported publicly as well as some which are not. In 
general, PPR does not use private reports as a source 
of information. An informal linkage does exist, 
however, in that questions about accuracy quickly 
arise when a public price report deviates substantially 




The methods used by PPR to assure accuracy vary 
by commodity. In some cases PPR representatives 
audit the records of cooperating market participants 
after the fact. Being voluntary, this does not include 
all transactions. In other cases, reporters ask for the 
identity of the other party to a trade and verify price 
with that person. This also depends upon voluntary 
cooperation. Acceptance by or complaints from 
users are important indicators of quality. Experi-
enced reporters learn to ascertain which traders pro-
vide reliable information. This assessment may be 
more important than any formal procedure. 
Disseminating Price Information 
PPR encourages extensive dissemination of its 
price reports by both public and private means. 
Interaction with traders by reporters while gathering 
data is an important means of information distribu-
tion. Also, PPR uses a network system to provide 
information to general news services, television and 
radio stations, commodity news services and print 
media. Printed reports are mailed, and recorded 
verbal summaries on automatic telephone answering 
devices have also become popular. 
What the Program Has Accomplished 
Public price reporting was born out of c01icern 
over unfair treatment of poorly informed farmers. It 
evolved in response to opportunities for improving 
efficiency in the distribution of farm and food prod-
ucts and in response to perceptions of the public 
good. It has co-existed with private price reports, but 
has not displaced them. It has responded to changes 
in marketing practices. It has attracted adamant 
supporters and equally adamant detractors. To some 
it represents an essential public service for the main-
tenance of a competitive agriculture; to others it rep-
resents unwanted government intrusion into private 
enterprise. 
Actual impacts and consequences are not easy to 
assess: attributing the performance of agricultural 
markets to public price reporting presumes a unique 
importance to market information that does not exist. 
Nonetheless, market performance is influenced by 
PPR. Because market performance is influenced by 
many factors in addition to PPR, it is easier to iden-
tify the types of effects stemming from PPR than to 
measure their magnitudes. This assessment high-
lights the major consequences. 
Facilitating Market Operations 
One rationale for public price reporting is to 
maintain competitive markets. Market information is 
essential to the long-term survival of any firm. 
Consequently, PPR reduces information search costs 
for all market participants, thus putting smaller firms 
closer to an information parity with larger firms. On 
a per unit of sales basis, search costs are reduced 
more for the small firm than for the large firm. This 
helps to maintain a competitive market structure. 
However , large firms enjoy the advantage of spread-
ing the benefits of improved market information 
over a larger volume of sales. Therefore, reducing 
information search costs for everyone diminishes but 
does not eliminate size advantages in the collection 
and use of market information. 
PPR has also affected the extent to which agricul-
tural products are exchanged through organized 
markets , by private negotiation or by vertical inte-
gration. PPR reduces differences in the amount of 
market information that is available to all traders. 
This , in turn increases the willingness of some to 
enter the market, thus helping to maintain open 
markets for agricultural com modities. 
It is less clear what impact PPR hJs had on the 
transition from the predominant use of organized 
markets to private negotiations. Private trading and 
direct selling evolved in response to technological 
developments, such as truck transportation and tele-
phone communications, and to reduced transaction 
costs resulting from elimination of commissions, 
more rapid and direct product shipment and reduc-
tion of overhead associated with central markets. 
This transition has made PPR more complex, par-
ticularly in terms of price collection and reliability. 
Wouid the transition have occurred more or less 
rapidly in the absence of PPR? A reasonable argu-
ment is PPR has facilitated but not caused it. The 
existence of public price reports has increased will-
ingness by buyers and sellers to enter into private 
negotiations. To the extent that publicly reported 
prices are used as reference prices in private trading, 
the transition has been assisted. To the extent that 
the public price reporter aids the price establishment 
process by interacting with traders, private trading is 
also facilitated. Private trading is assisted even fur-
ther to the extent that public price reports serve as a 
check on the accuracy of private price quotes used in 
private trading. 
Eliminating Unfair Marketing Practices 
The record seems clear: prior to establishment of 
PPR there were many price distortions for farm 
commodities. By reducing information inequality, 
small traders are put on more equitable ground with 
large traders, which limits the ability of dominant 
traders to exploit others. 
Today, however, public price reports are not as 
representative of an "alternative buyer" for a farmer 
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as they were when reports originated at central mar-
kets. Some price quotes are constructed from trading 
in adjacent markets and do not represent actual trad-
ing, while others are based on private trading that 
may not be open to outside traders. Thus. public 
price reports may be less useful for identifying a 
specific pricing alternative to that offered in private 
negotiation. The extent to which dominant traders 
exploit this by offering "unique" or incomparable 
terms of trade is speculative; it likely occurs but less 
so than without PPR. 
Where few traders exist, the traders may signifi-
cantly influence private price quotes by threatening 
to withhold financial support for the private report-
ing organization. As a publicly financed and admin-
istered service, PPR is less subject to this type of 
economic pressure, which helps assure objectivity. 
Improving Efficiency 
Providing information to the marketplace 
increases economic efficiency. Other things equal, 
the addition of information reduces trading and 
transport costs and reduces the amount of negotia-
tion necessary to complete exchange. This has 
encouraged direct selling which often has lower 
transac!ion costs than do organized markets . 
The process of allocating resources to their most 
valuable or "best" use (allocative efficiency) is 
improved by using price reports to identify supply 
and marketing alternatives. Unbiased public price 
reports lower barriers to market entry, which 
improves allocative efficiency in the long run. On 
the other hand , formula-priced contracts make 
resource allocation decisions without negotiating 
product values. This may result in prices that do not 
always reflect the best use of resources. As formula 
trading thins the remaining market where prices are 
negotiated , the quality of price reports necessarily 
declines. This results in less accurate, less beneficial 
reports. 
Redistributing Costs and Benefits 
Market information will be generated, if not by 
the public, then privately. If the information is gen-
erated privately, access is controlled by the firms 
generating it. Clearly, access to market information 
is more equitable with PPR than without. 
But neither does the impact of PPR fall evenly. 
Large firms often can afford the cost of accessing 
public information by tapping directly into the 
USDA's network, or by subscribing to a commercial 
wire that rapidly transmits public reports. Large 
volume traders generally have more frequent contact 
with reporters, in part because their large volume 
affords the reporter a broader view of the market, 
with fewer contacts. If even reasonably subtle, this 
gives the large trader some ability to influence a 
market quote. One can argue that accurate informa-
tion placed into the market by anyone will be noted 
quickly. But few would choose to be last rather than 
first to know. 
The Key Issues 
The above assessment reveals three broad issues of 
contemporary concern: 
The Public Interest 
The public interest is served by PPR. but the full 
value of this service is not known, hence little gui-
dance is available for evaluating program costs. 
Price reporting yields public benefits. These include 
increases in economic efficiency. equity and fairness. 
However. the benefits are spread throughout the 
marketing system, which makes them difficult to 
measure relative to program costs. Furthermore. 
direct and complete attribution of these benefits to 
PPR cannot be shown either empirically or theoreti-
cally. The public benefits are real, but the magnitude 
is less certain than sometimes suggested by program 
advocates. 
The Private Interest 
Public price reporting was conceived in an era 
when most agricultural trading occurred in central 
public markets. Over time , private trading and direct 
marketing have become predominant. This has 
resulted in substantial reduction of transaction costs 
but raises questions about the equality of market 
access and the accuracy with which resources are 
allocated in the market to various uses. PPR has 
facilitated this transition. But the change has also 
made it difficult for PPR to remain only as an 
observer -- in order to find reportable prices it has 
had to interact more with traders, thus becoming an 
actor in the pricing process. Price establishment is 
viewed by many as an inherent task of private indus-
try. Yet the viability of the private trading system 
could be seriously threatened without some public 
role for assuring objectivity and fair play. 
The Public vs. Private Reporting Dilemma 
Firms involved in commerce have a private inter-
est in price information. so there exists a willingness 
to pay. Established, private price-quoting services 
supply such information for a fee and many traders 
pay that fee. Then why maintain a public system 
that subsidizes such information users? Could the 
task be turned entirely to the private sector. or at 
least put on a "pay-as-you-go" basis in the public 
sector? Unresolved questions include: 1) What 
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would happen to the reliability of private reports in 
the absence of public reports? 2) If al1 users had to 
pay the full cost for price information, would infor-
mation inequalities occur which drive smaller and 
more remote traders from the market? 3) Are there 
changes that could be made in PPR which would 
increase both its public benefits and its service to 
private industry? 
The following potential modifications and alterna-
tives to PPR are examined in light of these questions, 
issues and concerns. 
Should the Program Be Modified? 
Alternatives to public price reporting range from 
elimination to mandatory public trading in order to 
create a reportable base of observable prices. The 
consequences of any given modification are some-
what speculative. Nonetheless. past experience and 
analysis of 70 years of public price reporting offer 
insight into some likely re~ ults. 
Curtailment or Termination 
In a period of federal budget stringency, it is 
appropriate to consider cuts in any federal program. 
One uncertainty regarding cuts in PPR is the extent 
to which private news services would fill the gap. It 
is considered likely that commercial substitutes would 
arise and provide many of the same services in most 
national and regional markets but probably not in 
many local markets. Whether these private enter-
prises would provide services of a similar quality is 
more problematic. 
Hence, a cautious program of reduction could be 
tried. If results are satisfactory at each step, then the 
succeeding step could be taken. The following order 
may be reasonable: 
Step 1. PPR could be scaled down to a "public 
monitoring" service wherever a commercial service is 
now used by many market participants. A public 
monitoring (archive/checkpoint) function would pro-
vide historic or archive information necessary for 
both public oversight of market behavior and private 
evaluation of commercial opportunity, and provide a 
check on accuracy of private reports. 
Step 2. PPR could be reduced to an archive/ 
checkpoint function for all markets beyond the 
farmer-first buyer level. 
Step 3. In an area of highly specialized produc-
tion, PPR could be scaled back to an archive/check-
point function if and when commercial interests pro-
vide an acceptable substitute. 
Consequences of this option are projected only for 
two possible outcomes: 1) adequate replacement and 
2) a void of any price reporting. Obviously, stages 
between these extremes are possible. 
Replacement 
Private funding would substitute for public fund-
ing. Larger producers and buyers would be affected 
little -- they would simply purchase reports that had 
previously been free. Their cooperation in providing 
information might be improved if the commercial 
service made such cooperation a prerequisite for 
access to its reports. 
Effects on smaller producers and buyers are more 
debatable. Because collection costs are much higher 
than dissemination costs, a commercial service could 
profit by price discrimination (lower charges to 
smaller customers) . This could be of some help to 
smaller farmers and businesses. However, small-vol-
ume traders would likely have less information avail-
able and find their information costs on a per-unit-
of-sales basis to be higher despite such a measure. 
A Void in Price Reporting 
It is difficult to imagine many markets existing for 
long without price reports of some kind. In many 
markets the price reporter is a vital link to the price 
establishment process. More phone calls would be 
the substitute for some traders, while others might 
choose to operate with less information. Generally, 
the greatest disadvantages would fall on the smaller 
and less specialized market participants. 
If many expressed dissatisfaction with pncmg 
behavior as a result of PPR curtailment, the USDA 
would seek remedies, including reinstatement of 
public price reporting. However, it can be very dif-
ficult to reinstate public expenditures after a program 
has been cut. If PPR were re-established, legislation 
requiring response to inquiries by public reporters 
would need to be considered. 
It can be argued that there is a public responsibil-
ity for assuring some minimum level of reliability in 
private reports, particularly if they are encouraged as 
replacements for public reports. At a minimum, the 
public monitoring function seems essential. Discus-
sion of other public oversight functions, such as 
licensing private reporters and periodic auditing, 
should be part of any decision to eliminate PPR. 
Emphasis on Public Trading 
Concerns about accurate sampling of prices in 
private sales and the price establishment role of 
reporters suggest the possibility of limiting public 
price reports to prices that result from organized, 
public trading. The basic idea is to restrict public 
reporting to those markets where there is open com-
petition and observable trading. In livestock, for 
example, this would focus on terminal and auction 
markets and eliminate direct trading from the 
reported price base. There are different approaches: 
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report only where a .sufficient amount of public trad-
ing occurs, or mandate public trading in order to 
generate a reportable volume of transactions. A 
third option, requiring traders to respond to price 
inquiries by public reporters, could also reduce con-
cerns regarding biased reports. 
Only Report Existing Public Market Transactions 
!n most cases, this variation would restrict public 
price reports to a minority of all transactions. For 
most commodities, no report could be issued due to 
the lack of any organized public trading. For other 
commodities, price reports would be based on a rela-
tively small portion of all transactions. However, 
there would be little room to question the accuracy 
of the reports due to the visability of trading on 
organized markets, and the reporter's role would be 
no more than that of reporter. 
Mandatory Public Trading 
Given that organized, public trading eliminates 
two major concerns about PPR -- accuracy of its 
reports and its role in price establishment -- this 
alternative would mitigate these concerns by requir-
ing public trading. Such a requirement would be a 
substantial intrusion of public policy into the mar-
ketplace and has received little serious consideration 
as a public policy alternative in the past. But it 
could generate enough public trading to provide a 
very dependable source of information for public 
price reporting. Development of new organized 
exchange mechanisms such as electronic markets 
could help in implementing this policy. Substantial 
resistance would be expected from traders who have 
developed skills of private negotiation. 
Accept Price Establishment Function 
Recognizing both the public good aspects of price 
information and the use of price quotations to settle 
trades, PPR can be directed toward an active role in 
price establishment. This includes reporting base 
price quotes that can be used for pricing formula 
trades and other off-market transactions. It requires 
identification of key trading points and product defi-
nitions. Trades, bids or offers can be adjusted to the 
quoted base point using appropriate adjustment fac-
tors. Reporters could also make trade references. 
That is, they could suggest trading opportunities to 
those with whom they converse. In many regards 
this would be taking on some of the trade-facilitating 
functions now performed by private services such as 
Urner-Barry and the "Yellow Sheet." 
Advantages of this approach include increased 
trading efficiency due to direct efforts by reporters to 
facilitate trading, and provision of the kind of price 
interpretation desired by market part1c1pants. This 
discourages the use of fragmentary pri,:ate reports 
which may be subject to bias. Assuming that the 
market's pricing needs are served, it may be that 
public involvement is the preferred means for assur-
ing reasonably equitable treatment of all interested 
parties. lt would be a serious disadvantage if this 
created thin markets by encouraging formula trading. 
This kind of an activist role for PPR can generate 
controversy. Operating procedures are of m'Jch 
greater interest to market participants than the pro-
cedures for reporting only. 1f go\'ernment proce-
dures are not sufficiently flexible, this would be best 
left to the private sector. 
Create Price Committees 
Committee price quoting may be a viable alterna-
tive in highly concentrated markets or in situations 
where the price quote involves a great deal of judg-
ment. Avoiding conflict of interest is a major prob-
lem. Those who possess the most knowledge of 
market conditions, and thus the factors affecting 
product values. are trade participants who also have a 
direct interest in the price outcome. Persons outside 
the trade typically do not have the knowledge neces-
sary to do the job well. 
A committee system is unlikely to duplicate the 
fine adjustment process of a competitive market. It 
will tend to under-compensate for change and delay 
the process of adjustment. Using the committee sys-
tem to generate a spot price quote is tacit recognition 
that, in some commodities. a spot market is an ana-
chronism. 
Report Quantity Information 
In situations where very few transactions are based 
on negotiated prices. prices that are negotiated may 
represent such a limited share of the total volume 
traded that they are relatively meaningless as indica-
tors of actual product values. But this does not mean 
there is a shortage of information about \'alue and 
changes in value. Information on quantity flows such 
as receipts from producers. processor inventories, 
movement of product to various markets and changes 
in inventories are examples. Such information can 
be used to assess the value of products to suppliers 
and users and thus, in the absence of viable price 
information , may be usefui in lieu of price reports. 
Report Contract Terms 
This option also is addressed in situations which 
lack a sufficient base of negotiated prices for price 
reporting purposes. In this case. however, the lack of 
price data is due to extensive use of grower-handler 
contracts. But the terms of grower-handler contracts 
include much value-related information , such as 
schedules of premiums and discounts, profit-sharing 
arrangements, quantity guarantees, timing of deliv-
ery, cost- and risk-sharing and the like. Under this 
option, information on the terms of individual con-
tracts would be collected, compiled and disseminated . 
Such an approach presumes that the terms of any 
specific producer-handler contract are useful indus-
try-wide and that there is enough similarity among 
contracts to allow for meaningful reports. Essen-
tially, the purpose is to increase competition in set-
ting contracts by reporting contract terms, including 
factors that affect settlement prices. 
Educaiional programs conducted by the Texas Agriculmral Extension Service serve people of a.Li ages regardless of socioeconomic level_. 
race, color, sex. religion, handicap or national origin . 
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension Work in Agriculture and Home Ecouomics, Acts of Congress of May 8. 1914. as 
amended, and June 30. 1914. in cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture, Zerle L. Carpenter, Director. Texas 
Agricultural Extension Service, The Texas A&M University System. 
IM-2-88, New ECO 2,8 
Leaflet Number 3 
Texas Agricultural Extension Service 
Food and Agricultural Commodity Grading 
John P. Nichols, Texas A&M University 
Kenneth E. Nelson. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 
Lowell D. Hill, University of Illinois 
Agricultural commodities have a wide range of 
quality characteristics because they are biological 
rather than industrial in origin. Quality obviously 
affects the value of commodities and often the use to 
which they are put. It enhances the process of trade 
to have a set of descriptive terms and standards 
which all buyers and sellers agree upon. Most mar-
keting systems have informal and formal terminology 
generally referred to as grades and standards. For 
food and agricultural commodities in the United 
States, grades and standards have evolved over the 
last century from privately instituted efforts to highly 
organized programs fostered and managed by the 
federal government. 
Descriptive terms were often developed to identify 
unique characteristics thought to have value to 
potential buyers. As individual efforts in states and 
regions proliferated, it became obvious that confu-
sion and inefficiency resulted when trading occurred 
across state, regional or national borders. These 
problems were the primary motivation for develop-
ing uniform, national grades for several commodities. 
Federal grades and standards for other commodities 
were established so uniform price reporting and 
market news services could be created. 
Several definitions have been adopted to aid the 
discussion of grades and standards programs. Grades 
are numerical or descriptive categories which have 
specific, common characteristics and are used to 
classify commodities. Standards are the values, the 
limits and measurement procedures which determine 
the grade of a product; i.e. the cr iteria by which a 
product is divided into its various grades. Inspection 
or grading is the monitoring and evaluating of prod-
uct quality according to established standards at a 
particular point in the system in order to assign an 
appropriate grade. 
Generally, grades and standards provide a basis for 
uniform product groupings that aid in establishing 
use characteristics and value. 
More specific objectives of grades and standards 
include: 
• facilitate trading by providing a limited number of 
homogeneous categories so that lots within each 
can be substituted readily at equal values in the 
market; 
• facilitate information flows in the market system, 
including information on preferences. practices, 
values and costs; 
• facilitate discovery of price-value relationships 
among various lots and qualities of product. 
Evaluating the success of these programs is diffi -
cult and confusing because the different objectives 
are not always recognized nor explicitly stated . 
Current Grades and Standards Programs 
Federal involvement in grades and standards 
began in the first half of this century primarily in 
response to the needs of producers and traders. In 
the case of many fruits , vegetables and some specialty 
products, the intent was clearly to provide assistance 
to producers. Grades and standards were frequently 
used as part of supply control and orderly marketing, 
as with marketing orders. In cases such as grain , the 
primary influence came from marketing firms. For 
livestock, cotton and tobacco, grades and standards 
were developed in part to aid in price reporting. 
Consumers, in general, were not primary motiva-
tors in establishing present grades and standards. 
However, benefits from grades and standards often 
are thought to be spread among all parties in the 
industry, from producer to consumer. This suggests 
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a means by which costs are also distributed to most 
of the beneficiaries. A government program fre-
quent!_ is een as an appropriate method of accom-
plishing this. 
The grading of food and agricultural commodities 
is administered primarily at the federal level by the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and the Fed-
eral Grain Inspection Service (FGIS) of the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA). The National 
Ma:-ine Fisheries Service (NMFS) is delegated 
responsibility for grades and standards on fish, 
shellfish and seafood products. These agencies are 
responsible for administering programs but may have 
cooperative agreements, licenses or other administra-
tive relationships with state governments or private 
entities which, in many cases, actually perform the 
grading function. The cost of grades and standard 
programs has been quite low, generally less than 
$150 million annually, with most of the cost borne 
by grading service users. Public costs of approxi-
mately $10 million per year are expended for pro-
gram supervision. 
The primary legislative support for federal grades 
and standards programs is found in the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1946 as amended. Other authority 
is found in the 1923 V .S. Cotton Standards Act, 193 7 
Smith Doxy Amendment, 1935 Tobacco Inspection 
Act and 1976 Federal Grain Standards Act. 
Activities typically performed may be described in 
two broad groups -- standardization and grading ser-
vices. Szandardizazion includes a variety of monitor-
ing and testing activities required to establish stan-
dards for new products or amend existing standards 
in response to changing commodity or industry con-
ditions. 
Grading consists primarily of the actual classifica-
tion of commodities or products. Federal agencies 
may be responsible for organizing and supervising 
grading activities of state or privately employed per-
sonnel for some commodities, especially grain, poul-
try, fruits and vegetables. 
Most grading service is provided voluntarily, with 
the important exception of grain for export, which 
has mandatory grading. The coverage of other com-
modities ranges from less than 10 percent for seafood 
to nearly 100 percent for cotton and tobacco. 
What the Programs Have Accomplished 
Federal grades and standards programs, having 
developed to serve a variety of needs for producers 
and marketing firms, do not lend themselves to easy 
analysis or evaluation. While there is general 
acknowledgement that such programs enhance trade 
and distribution, their specific benefits have not been 
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estimated often. In an increasingly complex market-
ing system with greater emphasis on individual 
brands and specification buying, it is easy to overlook 
the broader, diffused benefits of an organized, pub-
licly sponsored grades and standards program. These 
benefits are discussed below in four general areas: 1) 
facilitation of marketing operations, 2) elimination of 
unfair practices, 3) increased efficiency and 4) distri-
bution of costs and benefits. 
Facilitating Marketing Operations 
The primary benefit of grades and standards pro-
grams is their impact on the availability and quality 
of information for marketing firms and producers. 
Grades provide a universal language in the market-
place, and facilitate the collection and dissemination 
of accurate market information. Improved commu-
nications in buying and selling increases the accuracy 
and efficiency of price discovery . Consumer prefer-
ences can also be communicated better through the 
market system. 
Grading systems, while often the center of contro-
versy, are not generally attacked as being totally use-
less or unworkable. Rather, specifics of the classifi-
cations, standards or nomenclature bear the brunt of 
cnt1c1sm. This suggests broad agreement on the 
value of and need for grading systems even though 
controversial changes are sometimes recommended. 
The success of a grading scheme depends on enlight-
ened selection of the character and number of attri-
butes to be included. Systems which are used widely 
without constant adjustment or controversy are suc-
cessfully accomplishing at least some of their objec-
tives. Many federal grading programs fall in this 
group. All grading programs require periodic review 
and adjustment as the market evolves and changes. 
To the extent this is provided for, the system as a 
whole can continue to be successful. 
Better communication in marketing has facilitated 
cross-country sale of fresh fruits and vegetables. 
Therefore, existence of grades can facilitate develop-
ment of production in the most efficient location. 
Eliminating Unfair Marketing Practices 
Grades and standards programs can be traced to 
early efforts to protect buyers and sellers from unfair 
or abusive trade practices. The function of providing 
a common language and independent third party 
grading has certainly contributed to that goal. Buy-
ers have recourse to the system which provides an 
impartial evaluation where needed. Isolated or small 
buyers are less vulnerable to unfair treatment or 
monopolistic practices in the marketplace. 
Increased Economic Efficiency 
Well-defined systems of grades and standards 
facilitate transmission of price signals through the 
marketing channel. In this way, grades and standards 
contribute to improved efficiency in the use of pro-
duction and marketing resources. Price, quality and 
quantity information on particular lots and grades 
are conveyed to potential buyers and sellers. 
Transaction costs are reduced as a result of buying 
by description, searching less for products of the 
right quality, and rapid settlement of quality disa-
greements. Grades also improve production effi-
ciency by providing growers with accurate price 
information to guide future decisions. Some criti-
cisms exist where grades foster an orientation toward 
minimum quality standards. 
Distribution of Benefits and Costs 
The existence of a well-functioning system of 
grades and standards insures that individuals in the 
market receive a return for their product that is 
commensurate with product quality. Along with 
more price information and better description of 
available supplies, there is less opportunity to gain 
excess profits in one level or area of the market 
channel. 
The distribution of product qualities with respect 
to a given attribute may vary regionally. Because of 
this. the impact of changes in grade standards may be 
distributed unequally among producers on a regional 
basis. The result often is strong resistance to changes 
in grades even where warranted. 
Hardly any request for a noticeable change in 
grade standard goes unchallenged. While those pro-
posing change would be expected to gain. others may 
lose, particularly in the short-run. Successful admin-
istration of grades and standards programs requires 
careful weighing of unequal effects and the overall 
judgment of total public benefit. 
The Key Issues 
Several issues stem from recent administration and 
performance of government grades and standards 
programs for food and agricultural commodities. 
Some relate to the basic role of government, while 
others relate to the system's responsiveness to chang-
ing technology and the underlying nature of supply 
and demand relationships. 
Selection of Grade Criteria 
The question of which criteria or attributes to 
include in grade standards is the central issue in dis-
cussions about more consumer-relevant grading. 
Criteria selection depends on what information the 
grades are intended to carry and the marketing 
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system level at which they are directed. For the most 
part, grades were instituted primarily to facilitate 
wholesale trade or marketing of unprocessed com-
modities. However, extending grading systems to the 
consumer level, or more accurately reflecting con-
sumer preferences in grade standards, has often been 
discussed. To be valuable to consumers, different 
criteria might need to be selected. Consequently. 
adoption of additional grade criteria raises the issue 
of relative benefits to different market participants. 
For example, a d.ange may enable consumers to bet-
ter identify product quality, but may cost retailers in 
terms of greater product waste. 
As products are traded more widely, particularly 
in international channels, market requirements may 
be expressed in different terms. For important 
export commodities such as grains, the adequacy of 
U.S. grade standards for maintaining a competitive 
quality product in foreign markets has been ques-
tioned. Another aspect of this issue is whether 
grades accurately reflect the value-in-use of a given 
commodity. This is particularly important in indus-
tries where processing utilization technology changes 
rapidly. It is also an area where instrumentation or 
measurement technology has improved significantly. 
However, end-use value is an elusive concept. Some 
fear that arbitrary changes in grade standards will 
disadvantage some individuals and reduce the grading 
system's total benefit because of a general loss in 
predictability or confidence. 
Confusion in Nomenclature 
Another important issue is the disparity in names 
used to describe grade designations -- names such as 
choice, grade A, U.S. No. 1 and so forth. Wholesale 
terminology is often the basis for existing grade 
names. Wholesalers know the terminology because 
they work with it regularly. However, conveying this 
grade information beyond the wholesale level may 
cause confusion among individuals who are not reg-
ularly involved in trade. 
Another dimension of this nomenclature is the use 
of a sequence of letters or numbers which imply rel-
ative values. Some argue that this is inappropriate; 
that the forces of supply and demand should deter-
mine relative values free of the implied bias of grade 
names. 
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Grading 
For the most part, grading of food and agricultural 
commodities is voluntary. Whether these programs 
should be made mandatory to insure greater avail-
ability of grade information has sometimes been an 
issue, particularly in discussions of consumer grades. 
While useful in consumer decisions, mandatory 
grades could reduce the responsiveness of markets to 
changing demand and technology. In addition, for 
many products it is very difficult or impossible to 
assure that products graded fancy at the wholesale 
level will remain of equal quality while sitting on the 
supermarket shelf. 
Who Should Pay the Costs? 
While grading services for many food products 
have been paid for by industry groups since their 
inception, others have not. There are also basic 
administrative costs which are born by the public in 
general and these costs are sometimes called into 
question. The trend in recent years has been to shift 
as much direct costs for grading and inspection ser-
vices as possible to those who use the grading servi-
ces. 
Should the Programs Be Modified? 
Depending on what are perceived to be significant 
issues and the appropriate role of the federal gov-
ernment, many alternati\e public policy approaches 
to grades and standards are possible. Some represent 
major departures from past policies. Others involve 
modifications or evolutionary steps which could be 
taken to address key issues. Alternatives discussed 
here represent a range of approaches and are not 
intended to be an exhaustive list of possibilities for 
administering grades and standards programs. 
Establish Scheduled Review Procedure 
Considering grade changes has an ad hoc appear-
ance. The process of changing grades is initiated 
formally only when requested by a producer or trade 
group. This typically happens when some threshold 
of need for change has been reached. For various 
reasons, this threshold may be different among com-
modities or across levels of the marketing system. 
One administrative alternative which could make 
the system more responsive wouJd be to institute a 
regularly scheduled review process for all grade stan-
dards. This review would occur according to a 
schedule, whether there were pressures for change or 
not. Specific procedural rules would ensure that all 
relevant data and comments were obtained. Such a 
review system is in place for grain standards and 
regulations. It could be expanded to other commod-
ities. 
With this review system, grades and standards 
more likely would reflect the attributes of greatest 
importance to facilitating exchange. New technology 
in grading would be reviewed regularly and adopted 
more rapidly. Termination of out-dated grades and 
standards would be facilitated. To the extent that all 
market participants were involved in the review 
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process, a more equitable system of grades and stan-
dards could be ensured. 
There would be costs of instituting and maintain-
ing such a mandatory review procedure. Because 
information flow is enhanced through the use of 
consistent, predictable grade standards. the frequency 
of review would need to be carefully analyzed. If the 
current grading system is performing effectively and 
in the public interest, mandatory review procedures 
should be unnecessary. 
Create Uniform Grade Nomenclature 
This alternative has been examined in detail by 
USDA. Initially the names given to each grade were 
derived from common usage and have become estab-
lished over many years. It is within the federal gov-
ernment 's authority to adopt a policy to make grade 
names uniform across all commodities. 
This action would reduce confusion in purchase 
decisions for several commodities. It also would 
reduce the appearance of grade name "inflation" 
where all the names have a connotation of very high 
quality, such as Grade A and Grade AA. It makes 
little sense to have the lowest of three grades desig-
nated as No. 1 or Grade A. 
Many have argued, however, that no real benefits 
would be derived unless these grades were made 
available to , and used by, consumers. The primary 
objection is that the transition would cause confusion 
in wholesale trade where these grades have provided 
a vital "common language" for years. A USDA 
study concluded that the costs of imposing such a 
system would be greater than the benefits. However, 
a policy was adopted to guide future grade name 
changes in the direction of a more uniform system. 
Develop Consumer Grades 
If one accepts the idea that grades and standards at 
the wholesale level have improved economic effi-
ciency, then it could be inferred that additional gains 
would result from extending the concept to consum-
ers. More information would then be available to 
assist consumers in their purchase decisions. 
However, the switch to consumer grades would 
disrupt existing wholesale grading systems and 
potentially discourage innovation by adding rigidity 
to the system. Advantages would be counteracted to 
the extent that consumers base purchases on physical 
product inspection, product brand names or the rep-
utation of the product maker. 
However, for many fresh commodities and pro-
cessed food products, consumers may not be able to 
judge quality by physical inspection. The addition of 
internal quality, palatability indicators and similar 
modifications of existing grades, where information is 
available, could facilitate con~umer use of grades 
without significantly changbg the usefuiness of 
grades to the wholesale trade. 
The federal government could adopt a policy 
encouraging development of consumer grades just as 
it encourages name uniformity. Consideration of 
consumer-oriented criteria could be required when-
ever grade changes are reviewed. However, this 
could discourage review of needed grade changes. 
Make Grading Mandatory 
The benefits of improved information from grades 
and standards could be extended more broadly if a 
mandatory system were adopted. For some uses. 
such as grain exports, grading is already mandatory. 
·where price reporting at the producer level was 
desired, such as for cotton and tobacco, extensive use 
of grades was mandated legislatively and initially fos-
tered by making the service free to the user. 
Under existing legislation, USDA does not have 
the authority to initiate mandatory grading of many 
commodities or foods. Imposition of such an alter-
native would have a significant cost impact. This 
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cost would be incurred directly by the user and par-
tially passed on to the consumer. It is not likely that 
tax revenues would be used for this purpose. 
Summary 
Grades and standards have been a function of the 
federal government for more than half a century. 
They were developed and used most for the whole-
sale level of trade. Their benefits and impacts extend 
to both producers and consumers. 
Recent adjustments in the system and the 
broadening of user fees have helped meet the needs 
of changing industry conditions, technology and 
political considerations. However, there is a 
continuing need for regular review of all specific 
grade standards and their associated grading systems. 
Emphasis could be placed upon development of 
more meaningful grade information for consumers. 
Mandatory grading systems would change 
substantially the traditional nature of voluntary 
grading systems and the role of government in 
markets for farm products. 
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This paper explains federal programs for generic 
advertising and promotion of agricultural commodi-
ties, examines program accomplishments, identifies 
key program issues and explores program alterna-
tives. The information and analysis will be helpful to 
producers involved in or considering such programs 
to promote their commodity, as well as to partici-
pants in private and public policy decisions about 
generic advertising and promotion programs. 
Advertising and promotion play an important role 
in the marketing of agricultural products. The major 
purpose of advertising and promotion is to increase 
product demand by encouraging existing consumers 
to consume more and by attracting new consumers. 
The terms advertising and promotion carry spe-
cific meanings. Advertising is any paid form of non-
personal presentation, generally using print or 
broadcast media to call attention to the ideas, goods 
or services of an identified sponsor. Promotion 
includes marketing activities, other than personal 
selling or advertising, that stimulate dealer effective-
ness and consumer purchases. 
Advertising and promotion may be either brand-
oriented or generic. The primary objective of brand 
advertising is to gain market share for the advertised 
brand. Generic programs promote the general com-
modity -- eggs, milk, potatoes, etc. -- with no ref er-
ence made to specific brands. 
Generic food advertising and promotion are 
designed to achieve long-term market expansion for 
processed and fresh agricultural commodities, in both 
domestic and foreign markets. Advertising and pro-
motion are seen as an effective means to strengthen 
the long-run demand for a commodity. They are 
viewed as an attractive means for producers to have 
more direct effect on the marketing of their 
products. 
Generic advertising and promotion are often 
funded in conjunction with provisions for research. 
Research programs may involve processed product 
improvement and development projects, analysis of 
market demand, improvement of the delivery system, 
or development of improved commodity characteris-
tics. Basic research sponsored on an industry basis 
may then be extended or adapted to specific brands 
or company use. 
The role of government vis-a-vis generic advertis-
ing, promotion and research for agricultural goods 
varies with the commodity and specific enabling leg-
islation. 
Government-enforced marketing orders and other 
laws facilitate generic advertising and promotion 
programs by providing a funding support base, often 
referred to as a "check off" since funds are withheld 
at the point of first sale to a handler. Federal 
involvement in agricultural promotion evolves from 
industry requests. On the other hand, international 
programs such as those of USDA's Foreign Agricul-
tural Service (FAS) represent direct federal partici-
pation through partial funding from taxes. 
" One may ask why producers should be given spe-
cial authority to mandate support of advertising and 
promotions through marketing orders and check off 
programs, and why the federal government should be 
involved. First, the programs are facilitative -- they 
enable producers to pool their financial resources to 
develop programs which expand markets. This con-
tributes to the "orderly marketing" concept underly-
ing marketing orders and other government pro-
grams which help agricultural producers strengthen 
their role in the agricultural marketing system. In 
voluntary programs, "free riders" who benefit but do 
This is one of a series of articles on Federal Agricultural Marketing Programs developed by your state Extension Service as a compo-
nent of the Land Grant University System in cooperation with the Texas Agricultural Extension Service, the Farm Foundation, and 
the National Public Policy Education Committee. 
not contribute present an important equity problem. 
The role of government then becomes one of assur-
ing that all potential beneficiaries help pay program 
costs, thus eliminating "free riders." 
The Current Program 
Most federal involvement in the generic advertis-
ing, promotion and research of agricultural products 
falls under one of three mechanisms: research and 
promotion acts, marketing orders and joint promo-
tion ventures for international market development. 
While state involvement is substantial, this paper 
focuses only on federal programs. 
The federal policy toward generic programs has 
varied from outright opposition to a generally favor-
able attitude. USDA's goal to increase farm income 
through greater sales does not necessarily encompass 
programs that increase U.S. per capita food con-
sumption, and consequently, consumer expenditures. 
This conflict is more likely to cause trouble for 
domestic promotions than for international promo-
tions which benefit U.S. producers without necessar-
ily creating costs for U.S. consumers. Generally, 
research funded under check-off programs is per-
ceived as positive and is unopposed by government. 
Research and Promotion Acts 
Federal research and promotion acts are designed 
to provide specific agricultural sectors with collective 
authority to develop and support advertising, promo-
tion and research programs for their products. 
While the details of each commodity act differ, they 
all collect funds from producers via a "check-off 
program," and refund provisions are outlined for 
each. The secretary of agriculture may terminate or 
suspend any activity authorized under the legislation 
if he finds it does not serve the declared purpose of 
the act. Commodity programs are implemented 
through industry administrative boards. 
Research and promotion acts are currently in 
effect for wool and lamb, cotton, potatoes, eggs, and 
dairy. A 1977 act for wheat and wheat foods which 
focused on nutrition education was terminated 
December 1, 1986. Authority for a floral industry 
program was established in 1981, but a proposed 
program failed in a 1986 referendum. An act in 
1984 authorized a honey program which was acti-
vated in early 1987. A beef research and promotion 
program was authorized under a 1976 act, but pro-
posed programs failed twice in national beef pro-
ducer referenda. As part of the Food Security Act of 
1985, popularly known as the Farm Bill, national 
advertising and research programs have been acti-
vated for beef and pork, and authorized for water-
melons. 
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In 1986, a total of $110 million was collected 
under these programs, 79 percent of which was spent 
for advertising and promotion. Though relatively 
small compared to sales of the commodities involved 
and to advertising expenditures on branded products, 
the dollars available for generic advertising continue 
to increase. Between 1974 and 1980, cotton assess-
ments have more than doubled. The dairy program 
established in 1984 collected $79 million of the $110 
million 1986 total. Under the programs activated 
late in 1986, projected collections for the beef pro-
gram are $60 million dollars annually and $20 mil-
lion for pork. 
Marketing Orders 
A marketing order is a legal mechanism allowing 
the secretary of agriculture to issue regulations which 
bind all handlers of a product in a specific geo-
graphic area. Federal authorization for marketing 
orders was included in the 1937 Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act to establish and maintain 
orderly marketing conditions as well as achieve parity 
prices for farmers. 
Marketing orders are much broader in scope than 
promotion acts. Orders can directly or indirectly 
influence product quality and quantity, and provide a 
number of market support functions. While research 
and promotion acts pool resources nationally, mar-
keting orders give producers within a designated 
region some power over the marketing of their prod-
ucts. 
Some marketing orders provide refunds to indus-
try members who do not wish to support generic 
advertising. For example, under the milk marketing 
orders, refunds are made only if income exceeds 
expenses. For fruit and vegetable orders, no refunds 
are permitted. 
Under milk marketing orders, each advertising and 
promotion program is governed by a board com-
posed of elected milk producers and representatives 
designated by producer cooperatives. Assessments 
are collected by market administrators who set aside 
an amount equal to the total advertising and promo-
tion assessment for all producers when computing 
the minimum price to be paid producers under the 
orders. In 1987, five of 47 federal milk marketing 
orders contained advertising and promotion provi-
sions, down from 16 in 1980. These five orders act 
as collecting agents for the national programs under 
the National Dairy Promotion and Research Board. 
Under fruit and vegetable marketing orders, 
assessments more than doubled from $3.9 million to 
$8.5 million between 1974 and 1980. Approximately 
61 percent of the funds were allocated for advertising 
and promotion in 1980. Expenditures for advertising 
and promotion totaled $14.5 million in 1986 and for 
research $1.7 million. In early 1987, the USDA 
administered 4 7 fruit and vegetable marketing agree-
ments and orders, 17 of which have advertising and 
promotion programs. Only ten lack some form of 
research and development emphasis. 
Export Promotion and Market Development 
The rationale for federal non-brand promotion 
programs for agricultural products in export markets 
is similar to that for domestic markets. Export mar-
ket development provides the added incentive of U.S. 
government financial participation. Benefits of 
international promotion accrue to those directly 
involved in export and to the U.S. economy in gen-
eral through an improved balance of payments. 
The FAS implements the Foreign Market Devel-
opment Program as a cooperative effort with indus-
try to develop new export markets for existing and 
newly-developed products, and to provide the sales of 
products in existing markets. Nonprofit producer 
organizations work with FAS to plan, finance and 
implement development activities overseas. Qualify-
ing organizations must enter a cooperative agreement 
with the FAS to participate in this program. These 
agreements currently involve some 50 organizations 
and specify the obligations of both FAS and the par-
ticipants, as well as the specific market development 
activities that will be performed. Approximately 35 
percent of all market development funds come from 
importers, trade associations and foreign "third-party 
cooperators," such as governments, who were likely 
to benefit from increased trade. 
The FAS also cooperates with private U.S. firms 
through its Export Incentive Program. The major 
objective of the Export Incentive Program is to pro-
mote the sale of branded, rather than generic, U.S. 
agricultural products. The financial contribution of 
the cooperator in the Export Incentive Program must 
be at least equal to the FAS portion. Unlike the 
Cooperator Program, the Export Incentive Program 
is generally short-term. 
What the Programs Have Accomplished 
There is a range of opinions on what generic 
advertising and promotion programs have accom-
plished or are capable of accomplishing. Some agri-
cultural commodity groups such as the Florida Citrus 
Commission have a long history of support and use. 
Several commodity groups have initiated programs in 
recent years, while others have rejected proposed 
programs or turned down assessment increases in 
referenda. 
The evaluation of research, advertising and 
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promotion program effectiveness is incomplete. 
Many of the programs are relatively new or the level 
of expenditures quite low. In addition, the promo-
tional activities often occur simultaneously with other 
authorized functions, making measurement of the 
impact of each component extremely difficult. Mar-
keting orders, for example, may allow quality 
improvement, quantity control and promotional pro-
grams to be conducted simultaneously. 
In addition, evaluation requires definitions of per-
formance criteria. However. the dimensions of per-
formance are numerous; they differ in importance 
with each affected group; and they may conflict with 
each other. For producers and the industry, 
increased sales and returns are the major criteria for 
evaluating advertising and promotion effectiveness. 
For consumers, food prices and product availability 
are major concerns. 
Despite problems associated with program evalua-
tion, a number of analyses have been undertaken. 
Most analyses of federal marketing orders have 
addressed the effects of order activities on available 
supplies. One study revealed some increase in 
demand as a result of generic advertising and pro-
motion under federal fruit and vegetable marketing 
orders. The study also suggested that considerable 
time may be required for the effects of such promo-
tions to be realized. 
Generic program information and product quality 
improvements or innovations attributable to check-
off funded research may lead to increased consumer 
demand. Generic promotion and advertising pro-
grams that increase domestic consumption of a given 
food commodity may accomplish that gain at the 
expenses of other food items. When another com-
modity group is affected, it is reasonable to expect 
the group to avail itself of the self-taxing authority 
available to offset its losses. From a public policy 
perspective, therefore, analysis of these substitutions 
is important. 
The issues of inter-commodity substitution and 
effects on U.S. society from generic food commodity 
promotion in export markets are different, but also 
difficult to evaluate. Public policy questions about 
generic promotion of fibers revolve around the abil-
ity of individual producers to compete with large 
firms in the marketing system. In this case, substitu-
tion occurs between agricultural fibers and heavily 
advertised synthetic fibers. 
While criteria for evaluating effectiveness are not 
universally agreed upon, some general analyses are 
possible of program effects on facilitating market 
operation, eliminating unfair market practices, 
improving efficiency and redistributing costs and 
benefits. 
Facilitating Market Operation 
Theoretically, generic programs enhance the com-
petitive process in domestic markets by reducing 
brand differentiation. Most often, generic advertising 
and promotions emphasize product characteristics, 
uses and attributes, thus increasing consumer infor-
mation and helping consumers evaluate advertised 
and non-advertised brands. However, ineffective 
generic programs, can increase costs without provid-
ing such benefits. 
Producers and the general public are both likely to 
benefit from international promotion act1v1t1es. 
Expanded foreign demand usually leads to more 
trade and more favorable trade balances. However, 
if foreign market expansion forces domestic prices 
up, the program causes a direct cost to domestic 
consumers. The potential gains and likely price 
effects of direct USDA contributions to foreign mar-
ket development are not easily measured. 
It is possible for producers to promote generic 
agricultural commodities through cooperatives or 
voluntary trade organizations. However, those who 
do not join also benefit from any gains achieved. To 
the extent that federal government involvement 
eliminates the "free rider", it leads to more effective 
market power for commodity producers. The pro-
grams thus affect the marketing process. 
Government-sanctioned programs transfer author-
ity to make spending decisions about advertising, 
promotion and research activities from individual 
producers to producer groups. Decision authority 
also is created for USDA, which is given administra-
tive responsibility over the programs. In some cases 
the specific authority of an administering board is 
spelled out in the legislation. In others, USDA is 
given discretion to establish operational ground rules 
for the administering boards. The question of where 
USDA authority ends and commodity group author-
ity begins is frequently .unclear and occasionally con-
troversial. 
Eliminating Unfair Market Practices 
Generic advertising may reduce the potential for 
market abuse resulting from product differentiation. 
The generic advertising message is developed to 
cover a broad range of interests. Generic promotions 
usually are developed in conjunction with industry 
quality standards. Frequently, the advertising mes-
sage includes a seal of quality approval (e.g., the 
Florida sunshine tree). Such indications of quality 
help consumers. However, branded products which 
are heavily advertised by private companies are often 
perceived to have superior qualities. 
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Improving Efficiency 
Advertising and promotion are a form of non-
price competition, especially among brands, and 
result in a less economically efficient market out-
come than for markets with competitively-deter-
mined prices. During periods of weakening demand 
or excess supplies, advertising and promotion pro-
grams may substitute partially for price promotions. 
Strong generic programs help offset brand advertis-
ing, thus reducing the brand price differential to the 
benefit of consumers. And market entry by potential 
competitors should be less difficult since generic 
advertising tends to weaken strong brand identities. 
Research funded under mandatory programs could 
have collective benefits, such as improved production 
and marketing efficiency, for individual producers 
and marketing firms that alone could not capture the 
same benefits. How much funding collected under 
generic programs could be directed profitably toward 
new product research or improved marketing meth-
ods instead of advertising and promotion is a q ues-
tion that has not been widely studied. That question 
should be of interest to any commodity group col-
lecting check off funds. 
Redistributing Costs and Benefits 
The effect of advertising on substitution of one 
commodity for another and demand for food needs 
empirical analyses. The effects of advertising on 
prices, profits and total sales have been studied, but 
not in a manner that identifies the general social 
benefit of food advertising. This is particularly true 
for generic food advertising. Does the price inflation 
caused by advertising force lower-income consumers 
to substitute less desirable products? Is the potential 
for more consumption of nutritious foods offset by 
the addition of promotion costs to food prices? Is 
greater funding of such programs desirable for the 
general economy or even the aggregate agricultural 
community? Does the availability of advertising 
reduce consumers search cost? 
Questions remain unanswered about the effects at 
the farm level from expending private money and tax 
funds to develop export markets which may ulti-
mately raise the price of a commodity for domestic 
consumers. Economic analyses of the relative effects 
of advertising programs on small versus large pro-
ducers, small versus large handlers, and high versus 
low income consumers are also lacking. One merit 
of mandatory generic programs is the sharing of 
costs among those who receive program benefits. 
The Key Issues 
Four key issues follow explicitly or implicitly from 
the preceding discussion of generic advertising 
research and promotion programs. 
Economic Benefits 
Economic benefits obtained from generic advertis-
ing are a prime concern for affected producers, com-
peting producers and consumers. In several eco-
nomic analyses, some positive short-run producer 
gains have been attributed to advertising and promo-
tion programs limited in scope of time and geo-
graphic area. But few studies have been done 
regarding the effects of program proliferation across 
agricultural commodities, the distribution of program 
benefits among producers within a commodity group, 
and the redistribution of income between producers 
and consumers. In the absence of such analyses, 
establishing programs is tantamount to granting pub-
lic policy authority to specific groups without 
accountability even to those who provide funding. 
An alternative policy could require that analyses be 
conducted and made available for use in policy deci-
sions and by individuals voting in referenda. The 
Dairy and Tobacco Adjustment Act of 1983 con-
tained such a requirement. 
USDA Supervision 
Because USDA is charged with administering gen-
eric promotion and advertising programs, the appro-
priate level of USDA supervisory authority and 
commodity group autonomy also deserves attention. 
There is a public responsibility associated with such 
transfer of power to private groups. 
Whether the role of USDA supervision should 
vary among generic commodity programs deserves 
close scrutiny. Commodity groups generally favor 
less government authority over program manage-
ment, and some legislation has granted near auton-
omy to the commodity board involved. It may be 
appropriate for USDA supervisory responsibility and 
authority to be reexamined in light of past experience 
and an increasing number of programs. Particular 
attention should be paid to whether some criteria can 
be applied to all programs for refund procedures, 
referendum procedures, economic analyses and per-
missible activities to be funded under the generic 
promotion programs. In the case of separately 
authorized programs, specific requirements could be 
included. Alternatively, areas of USDA authority 
could be identified generally to clarify that normal 
rule-making procedures would develop specific 
requirements and authority. 
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Domestic Versus Export and Food Versus Fiber 
Programs 
With export promotions the main issues are price 
increases in domestic markets due to increased 
exports, and redistribution of income between con-
sumers and producers. Detailed analysis of the sales 
potential in a country and its effect on the U.S. mar-
ket is important before a commodity is promoted in 
an export market. 
It is entirely plausible that export promotions have 
greater benefits with fewer trade-offs in the domestic 
market than do domestic promotion programs. The 
same may be said of promoting agricultural fibers 
rather than food commodities. 
Amounts Spent for Advertising Versus Research 
Research provides different public benefits than 
advertising. The allocation of funds collected under 
generic promotion and advertising programs varies. 
Some programs fund substantial research to improve 
product quality or marketing system operations, 
whiie others use all available funds for advertising. 
Recent studies have found high rates of return for a 
variety of such research expenditures at land grant 
universities. 
Public policy authority for programs carries with 
it certain responsibility. For generic advertising, 
research and promotion programs, it could insure 
that a certain amount of research be conducted to 
benefit the public welfare through improved products 
or marketing efficiencies. Since an industry is likely 
to fund less than socially optimal levels of research, 
particularly if it cannot capture all the resulting ben-
efits, guidelines could be established by USDA. 
Should The Programs Be Modified? 
A number of modifications are possible to deal 
with these key issues. Each would have different 
effects on the agricultural sectors involved in generic 
advertising, research and promotion programs and on 
society generally. While other approaches may exist 
and even be preferable from various perspectives, 
some options for dealing with the key issues are dis-
cussed in this section. The unstated option in all 
cases is to continue along existing lines. 
Require Economic Analysis and Periodic Review 
An economic analysis of benefits and costs which 
conforms to specific guidelines relating to content, 
scope and objectivity, could be conducted on all pro-
posed generic promotion and advertising programs 
before USDA takes a position. Effects on competing 
agricultural commodities, on consumers and on dif-
ferent sizes of producers and marketing firms could 
be included. Such analysis could be made public 
record before a referendum to better inform voting 
producers. While analytic difficulties would preclude 
definitive results , the information would provide an 
improved base for both public an<l private decisions 
regarding generic programs. 
The economic analysis could be renewed once at 
least every five years and a continuation referendum 
held . The economic analysis and supporting research 
could be funded from program receipts. Following 
program initiation, USDA could be reimbursed for 
the initial economic assessment. This could apply 
equally to all generic promotion programs, whether 
authorized by free-standing legislation or marketing 
orders subject to renewal referenda under current 
USDA guidelines. This would provide an opportu-
nity for contributing program participants to reeval-
uate their position and provide a more informed 
basis for public policy decisions. 
Define USDA Supervisory Authority 
USDA supervisory authority could be standardized 
rather than varying for each commodity program. lt 
could require prior approval of a market or promo-
tion plan, based on compliance with established 
guidelines. Procedures for establishing programs; 
conducting referenda; carrying out economic analy-
ses; providing refunds; and allocating funds among 
research, advertising, promotion and economic 
impact analysis, could be required to meet guidelines 
established by USDA in consultation with interested 
parties. This would assure more equitable treatment 
of producers under various programs and provide a 
better basis for judging private and public impacts of 
the programs. 
Limit Promotion to International Markets or Fibers 
Limiting federal programs for generic advertising 
and promotion of food commodities to foreign mar-
ket development is a viable public policy option. 
This would largely eliminate the difficu lty of deter-
mining intercommodity producer trade-offs and con-
sumer/producer trade-offs related to domestic adver-
tising and promotion programs. The effects of 
exports on availability and price of domestic com-
modities would still need attention, but the implica-
tions are less complex. 
Similarly, domestic programs could be limited to 
items such as fibers, for which competition occurs 
between agricultural and non-agricultural commodi-
ties , or for which consumer/producer transfers of 
wealth are of minimal concern. 
Specif)· Minimum Research Expenditures 
Benefits from research expenditures are diffused 
among producers and consumers, as well as over 
time, while promotion and advertising benefits 
accrue primarily to the involved producer group. 
Since producers traditionally have spent less than 
socially optimal amounts on research, public policy 
could specify minimum percentages of collected 
monies to spend on research or education, in relation 
to that spent on adveni~ing or promotion. 
Conclusion 
Generic advertising, research and promotion pro-
grams have become more pervasive as producers seek 
to improve their incomes. Yet benefits derived from 
funds expended under the programs are not well 
documented. The allocation of funds among author-
ized uses might be improved with better information 
about relative gains from research versus advertising. 
The question of whether expenditures on foreign 
market development offer greater benefits to pro-
ducers and domestic consumers than expenditures on 
domestic programs has been addressed only in a lim-
ited way. The extent of USDA's responsibility is not 
always clearly defined. The preceding alternatives 
deal with important issues associated with the pro-
grams. Other issues and alternatives may exist, but 
adopting the alternatives discussed here, either as 
presented or in modified form, would deal with the 
issues focused on in this paper. 
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Fruit and Vegetable Marketing Orders 
Walter J. Armbruster, Farm Foundation 
Edward V. Jesse, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Federal marketing orders were created by Con-
gress to help farmers maintain orderly marketing 
conditions and achieve parity prices. Marketing 
orders are legal mechanisms under which regulations 
issued by the secretary of agriculture bind all han-
dlers of a product in a specified geographic area to 
specific marketing practices. These orders are estab-
lished only after approval by affected growers, but 
their mandatory nature distinguishes them from 
other forms of collective marketing. 
The Current Program 
Fruit, vegetable and specialty crop sales are regu-
lated extensively by marketing orders, which restrict 
the quality and quantity of product that may be mar-
keted. Orders may specify package and pack stan-
dards, minimum grades and sizes, quantity limits on 
shipments to certain markets or during certain mar-
keting periods, and limits on products flowing to the 
market. Handler fees are assessed to pay administra-
tive costs and to finance authorized research and 
promotion. 
In 1987, there were 4 7 federal marketing orders 
covering production in 34 states. In terms of crop 
value, more than half of U.S. fruits and tree nuts and 
15 percent of vegetables are covered. The estimated 
farm value of commodities marketed under these 
orders was $5.2 billion in 1980, representing 8 per-
cent of total farm receipts from crop sales and about 
$23 per U.S. citizen. 
Though some state marketing orders exist, this 
report deals with federal orders, which generally 
employ stronger controls. Legislative authority for 
federal marketing orders is provided by the Agricul-
tural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937, as 
amended. Over time, the AMAA has been strength-
ened modestly and extended to cover additional 
commodities, but its basic provisions remain practi-
cally unchanged. 
Marketing orders create various tradeoffs among 
and between producers, handlers, distributors and 
consumers. Because the tradeoffs are usually diffi-
cult or impossible to evaluate, it cannot be said with 
certainty whether marketing orders are good or bad 
for "society." However, their general effects can be 
identified. 
The types of provisions used and the nature of the 
commodities covered determine the effects of the 
various marketing orders. Three broad categories of 
provisions are authorized: 1) quality control, 2) 
quantity control, and 3) market faciiitating. Quality 
controls restrict shipments of a commodity to certain 
sizes, grades and maturities. Quantity controls regu-
late either the volume sold in certain markets or the 
seasonal flow to market. Market facilitating provi-
sions regulate packaging requirements and establish 
"checkoff" programs to finance research and adver-
tising. 
Quality Control 
Quality provisions permit an industry to set mini-
mum grades, sizes and maturity stan<lards enforced 
through mandatory federal inspection. Some form of 
quality control is used in most federal fruit and veg-
etable marketing orders. Methods of employing 
quality standards vary considerably among orders and 
within the same order over time. 
Quality standards affect both supply and demand. 
Consumer demand may be increased by imposing 
minimum standards to prevent poor quality ship-
ments which diminish a commodity's image. Mar-
keting costs and margins also may be reduced when 
minimum standards lead to consistent quality, fewer 
rejected shipments and less marketing channel spoil-
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age and waste. Standards also can reduce commodity 
shipments and thus increase price, possibly encour-
aging subsequent excess production. 
Quality standards which remain unchanged over 
several marketing years, apparently are intended to 
maintain minimum levels of product quality. Stan-
dards which change from season to season, or within 
the shipping season, may indicate an intent to man-
age the total quantity sold, to make the best of an 
off-grade crop or to promote quality improvements 
over time. 
A team of economists appointed by the secretary 
of agriculture to review federal marketing orders 
concluded that the grade, size and maturity standards 
under fruit and vegetable marketing orders generally 
have not affected total supplies significantly. Stan-
dards may reduce the range of consumer choice, 
since some consumers might be willing to purchase 
restricted fruit if they could buy it at a discount. 
However, growers may not find it profitable to ship 
all their production. regardless of whether a market-
ing order exists. 
Section 8e of the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act requires that, for specified marketing 
orders containing quality, size or maturity control 
provisions, imports must meet the same or compara-
ble quality standards. In 1987, such import regula-
tions applied to six fruits, three vegetables and five 
nut and specialty crops. 
To efficiently regulate markets, orders cannot 
specify a minimum grade and size standard for 
domestic production while ignoring imports. At the 
same time, import standards may constitute nontariff 
trade barriers which affect importers, exporters and 
foreign governments, as well as the domestic produc-
tion, marketing and consumption sectors. 
Import standards do prevent some lower-priced 
produce from reaching consumers, just as domestic 
quality minimums do. However, current research 
does not tell how substantial a trade barrier market-
ing order import standards represent, how costly the 
standards are to foreign suppliers, or how much 
wholesome produce is kept from U.S. consumers. 
Nor does research quantify the benefit which pro-
ducer and consumer derive from less uncertainty 
about product quality. 
Quantity Control 
Quantity control provisions include 1) volume or 
sales management, and 2) market flow regulation 
specifying maximum shipments permitted in a given 
week. These two strategies are designed to obtain a 
higher and more stable price than would exist in the 
absence of the order. They are used for commodities 
with demand characteristics which bring producers 
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greater total revenue from reduced primary market 
sales, and where revenue instability is viewed as 
detrimental to the long-run supply stability of a 
commodity. Volume management provisions are 
designed to influence price by reducing the quantity 
sold on the primary market in a marketing season. 
Market flow provisions regulate the within-season 
pattern of sales in the primary market, rather than 
controlling total quantity sold. 
Volume Management 
Three methods of volume management are 
authorized under the AMAA: 
• producer marketing allotments 
• market allocation, and 
• reserve pools. 
Producer marketing allotments raise farm prices by 
restricting the total amount of commodity sold. 
Currently, only the marketing orders for Florida cel-
ery and spearmint oil use producer allotments. 
¥/hile authority exists, allotments have never been 
used for cranberries. The order for hops, which also 
included allotments, has been terminated. Individual 
producer allotment bases are determined by sales 
during a previous period. The total quantity to be 
sold is based on the projected market. Each produc-
er's sales allotment is then a percentage of the base 
period sales. 
Producer allotments can impede new entrants or 
prevent ex1stmg producers from expanding in 
response to price signals. The two active producer 
allotment orders permit transfer of allotments. But 
the cost of purchasing or leasing allotments, reflect-
ing the capitalization of higher prices received, 
sometimes is high and the creation of new allotments 
is limited. Hence, there is evidence that producer 
allotments periodically restrict supply, raising prices 
above levels that would otherwise prevail. Allot-
ments tend to set lower bounds for prices and pro-
ducer incomes, but producers are still subject to price 
and income variability associated with weather 
effrcts. 
In contrast to allotting a predetermined amount to 
sell, market allocation programs specify maximum 
sales in one of two or more different market seg-
ments for the same commodity. Such programs can 
raise producer returns when prices in the separate 
markets respond differently to changes in sales. 
Market allocation typically is used to divide the total 
supply between the preferred or primary market and 
the less lucrative or secondary market -- for example, 
between domestic and export markets, or between 
fresh and processed markets. 
Market allocation programs are used for storable 
crops like nuts and dried fruit. A form of market 
allocation also is used in three California/Arizona 
citrus orders (naval oranges, Valencia oranges and 
lemons), with weekly fresh market "prorates" on 
handlers during most or all of the marketing season. 
Other marketing orders set sea~onal marketing quo-
tas for handlers , usua1ly a percent of producer deliv-
eries to handlers that may be marketed without 
restriction. To be effective, market allocation 
schemes must be applied to market segments where 
natural or program-created barriers to arbitrage exist. 
Market allocation can stabilize growers' prices and 
returns, thus reducing risk. This may lead to a larger 
product suppiy at the same price. On the other 
hand, such provisions may effectively tax consumers 
to subsidize producers. Further , initial high prices to 
producers may quickly be built into the costs of land 
and other fixed production assets. thereby taking 
away any long-term gains. Benefits from reduced 
price instability relative to increased costs from 
resource misallocation probably vary markedly 
among orders and over time. 
Other effects of market allocation are less direct. 
For example, orders that aJlocate handler marketing 
allotments on a regional basis may prevent produc-
tion from shifting to lower-cost locations. Assigning 
marketing allotments to handlers may reduce com-
petition among them, may prevent achievement of 
scale economies and may penalize lower cost han-
dlers by slowing their rate of growth. 
f\1arket allocation may cause some edible com-
modities to go into nonfood uses which are specified 
as noncompetitive outlets. However , even unres-
tricted , secondary food outlets such as food process-
ing, cannot always fully utilize available quantities. 
Hence it is impos~ible to determine whether food 
waste is induced directly by marketing orders. 
Reserve pool programs are similar in principle to 
market allocation programs. They differ in that 
restricted portions are set aside as a reserve pool 
rather than diverted to secondary markets. Like 
market allocation programs, reserve pools are used 
for storable crops. Crops in the reserve pool can be 
sold to the primary market if demand conditions 
improve or supplies fall short of injtial expectations. 
Reserve pools also may be sold in primary markets in 
later years, diverted to secondary markets or disposed 
of in nonfood outlets. 
Depending on how reserve pools are used ulti-
mately, they may benefit consumers as well as pro-
ducers. If reserve pools are used to remove produc-
tion from the market during large crop years and 
then to supplement short supplies, they may create a 
net economic gain. On the other hand, if reserves 
are directed to secondary markets or nonfood uses, 
then the provision has the same effect as market 
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allocation . 
Periodic product destruction and diversion to 
nonfood uses associated with some marketing order 
reserve operations waste resources and represent a 
net social cost. But economic abandonment occurs in 
all fruit and vegetable crops. If reserve pools did not 
facilitate temporary storage, normal abandonment 
could be even larger . 
Market Flow Regulation 
I\farket flow regulation is the second form of 
quantity control authorized under marketing orders. 
With market flow control, even if a!I production is 
sold, producer returns may be increased by managing 
the amount sold each week to avoid low prices 
caused by seasonal gluts and high prices caused by 
seasonal shortages. Market flow regulations are used 
primarily in the citrus industry in the form of han-
dler prorates and shipping holidays. Handler pro-
rates specify the maximum quantity of a fruit or veg-
etable a handler may ship to the fresh market during 
a stated period of time, normally one week. A han-
dler must hold excess supplies for later shipment or 
divert them to secondary markets. 
While marketing order shipping limits are not 
always highly restrictive, use of prorates throughout 
most or all of a marketing season may force process-
ing of fruit suitable for fresh domestic sale. Such 
intensive use can make prorates have some of the 
same effects as market allocation. 
Shipping holidays prohibit commercial snipping 
during certain periods. Individual orders establish 
conditions under which shipping holidays may be 
declared, the maximum holiday length and the mini-
mum period between holidays. Shipping holidays are 
a weak method of controlling market flow, generally 
set only around calendar holidays. 
Neither shipping holidays nor prora~s . when used 
for only part of the marketing season, appear to have 
substantially restricted seasonal supplies. However, 
they may smooth product flow over the season, 
potentially allowing more efficient use of marketing 
facilities. 
Market flow regulations originally were intended 
to prevent temporary gluts in supply channels and 
the resulting low prices. There was a stronger 
rationale for their use when most produce was sold 
through consignment. In recent years, more produce 
has been sold direct to chain buyers and others, 
somewhat diminishing the reason for using this 
approach. 
Market Facilitating Provisions 
Standardizing packs and containers to promote 
uniformity is a widely used market-facilitating 
act1v1ty. Specifications on containers and the 
arrangement of pack within containers prevent inef-
ficiently large numbers of package variations. Such 
mandatory uniformity may improve marketing infor-
mation and reduce handling costs and waste. Con-
tainer costs may be lower where economies in manu-
facturing containers are passed on to handlers. 
However, cost-cutting packaging innovations may be 
stifled by order requirements if the orders are slow to 
adjust to new developments . 
Some commodity producers raise funds for adver-
tising promotion and research through assessments 
under marketing order authority. Such research may 
be directed at production problems, new variety 
development, yield improving cultural practices, 
post-harvest handling problems and ways to improve 
marketing efficiency. These funds permit 
longer-term re~earch than that which individual firms 
could undertake profitably. 
Assessments for advertising and promotion are 
relatively new to federal marketing orders. They are 
used to fund generic programs intended to increase 
demand for a commodity. This may help consumers 
make better informed decisions, but it may also 
merely raise overall marketing costs if producers of 
substitute commodities also advertise. Researchers 
have yet to determine the net effect of generic 
advertising and promotion. 
The Effects of Marketing Orders 
Fruit and vegetable marketing orders may be 
evaluated using a variety of criteria. Four explicit 
criteria have been applied in evaluating the effects of 
fruit and vegetable marketing orders: 
• Do orders improve efficiency in marketing by 
encouraging greater output for the same use of 
resources or by improving pricing within the mar-
keting system? 
• How do orders affect the costs paid and the prices 
and incomes received by each participant in the 
market? 
• Do marketing orders facilitate market operations 
or induce desirable changes in market structure? 
• Do marketing order provisions eliminate unfair 
marketing practices? 
Improving Efficiency 
Given society's productive resources, if efficiency 
is defined in the broad sense of social welfare, fruit 
and vegetable orders contribute both positively and 
negatively to efficiency. Orders that establish mini-
mum quality standards can increase efficiency by 
promoting quality control, thereby preventing 
rejected shipments and product deterioration. But 
efficiency may be reduced if standards preclude the 
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sale of wholesome produce. 
Quantity control provisions (producer allotments, 
market allocation and reserve pools) that limit price 
declines in years of large crops can dampen cycles in 
production and prevent associated cyclical disinvest-
ment and reinvestment. Similarly, packing facilities 
can be utilized more efficiently if wide swings in vol-
ume can be avoided. Market flow provisions (pro-
rates and shipping holidays) may also contribute to 
more efficient plant utilization. But seasonal and 
intraseasonal constraints on individual sales may 
penalize handlers by preventing exploitation of fav-
orable sales opportunities. A particular handler 
structure may be "locked in" by order regulations. 
Quantity controls may also result in chronic surplus 
or deficit p:-oduction with associated resource misal-
location. 
Market facilitating provisions, on the whole, 
appear to improve efficiency. Preventing package 
proliferation allows standardization of receiving 
facilities and reduces buyer confusion. Research 
assessments allow producers to jointly fund research 
to improve both production and marketing effi-
ciency. The net effects of advertising and promotion 
have not been fully analyzed. 
Redistributing Costs and Benefits 
In addition to other effects, marketing order regu-
lations influence the distribution of income among 
consumers, handlers and producers. Orders also 
alter the distribution of decision-making authority. 
Some quantity regulations and some quality stan-
dards achieve their intended purpose of raising 
prices, at least in the short run. Producers thus 
obtain short-run total revenue gains at consumers 
expense when demand conditions are favorable to 
such actions. However, prices raised higher than 
sustainable by underlying economic conditions may 
stimulate production, which eventually pushes price 
back toward the competitive level. Producers with 
allotments or with land, special skills or other assets 
especially suited for producing a given crop may gain 
in the long run as increased demand or restricted 
supply cause those assets to appreciate in value. 
Since handler income is at least partially tied to vol-
ume, handlers can suffer short-run losses in markets 
where volume is restricted, and enjoy gains where 
volume is increased. Market allocation provisions 
transfer benefits from consumers in the primary 
market to consumers in the secondary market. 
Quality standards transfer benefits from consumers 
who prefer lower quality produce to those who pre-
f er higher quality. 
All marketing order provisions limit certain 
choices available to either growers or handlers. The 
industry advisory board, in conjunction with govern-
ment, attains a greatu role in the marketing decision 
system through monitoring and issuing marketing 
order regulations. The majority of producers under 
an order agree, through referendum, to limit their 
independence and to transfer some prescribed deci-
sions to the administrative process of the marketing 
order structure. Though individuals maintain con-
siderable influence over decision-making authority 
through the elective process, requirements for board 
composition and length of term may greatly reduce 
their prerogatives. While individuals give up some 
decision authority, the administrative committee 
attains more power than its members would have as 
individuals. 
Handlers lose some individual decision-making 
ability under marketing orders. However, the orders 
do not specifv in detail who must market what or 
where. 
Facilitating Market Operation 
Some features of fruit and vegetable marketing 
orders make markets work better by increasing the 
amount and quality of information available to mar-
ket participants. Detailed shipping information is 
collected from handlers for order administration. 
Much of this information is made available publicly 
in the form of end-of-season statistical reviews. 
Quaiity control through marketing orders also repre-
sents a form of improved information. Buyers are 
more confident about the quality of purchases, and 
shippers of poor quality or immature produce are 
prevented from diminishing a product's image to the 
detriment of all growers and shippers. 
On the other hand, some features of marketing 
orders can delay or prevent changes that would 
improve market operation. In particular, marketing 
quotas applied to handlers or producers tend to 
institutionalize the status quo. 
Eliminating Unfair Marketing Practices 
Marketing orders are initiated by producers, yet 
bind handlers to order terms. This ability of pro-
ducers to influence handler behavior represents con-
siderable countervailing power. To the extent mon-
opsonistic power is present, marketing orders help 
hold it in check. 
The order administration procedure itself guards 
against unfair marketing practices. In particular, 
data obtained by order administrative committees 
may make it possible to monitor potentially discrimi-
natory or abusive behavior. 
Finally, orders may specifically prohibit trade 
practices and methods of competition specified as 
unfair in a particular industry. They may also 
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require price posting. 
Costs of Marketing Orders 
Monetary costs of marketing orders include han-
dler assessments for order administration, grower 
funding of research and advertising, USDA adminis-
trative costs, and direct costs plus compliance costs of 
handlers and growers. Handler assessments and 
USDA costs are quite small in proportion to produce 
value. 
In some cases. substantial direct costs of storage 
and other marketing activities may enter into the 
industry decision process on whether to use or con-
tinue marketing orders. Compliance costs are diffi-
cult to measure since they include the cost of paper-
work added by regulation, in addition to direct costs. 
However, industry views support the conclusion that 
customary business records provide most of the 
information required for order administration. 
The KeJ Issues 
In summary, the effects of orders depend on both 
the types of provisions employed and the nature of 
markets for the commodities covered. To varying 
degrees, fruit and vegetable marketing orders may: 
• maintain farm-level season-average returns above 
levels that would otherwise prevail. 
• provide price floors in years of large supplies. 
• reduce seasonal and intraseasonal price instability. 
• provide quality assurance and consistent packaging 
to buyers. 
• finance research and generic advertising and pro-
motion programs. 
• facilitate collecting and disseminating market 
information. 
Public concerns about marketing orders relate 
both to the level of benefits, especially price and 
quality levels, and the manner in which the benefits 
are achieved. Many concerns are specific to certain 
provisions, primarily those involving quantity con-
trol. Other concerns involve perceived problems 
with order administration. Some legitimate concerns 
about marketing orders involve actual and potential 
costs and other problems. To varying degrees, orders 
may: 
• contribute to food price inflation and penalize 
low-income consumers. 
• cause inefficient resource allocation. 
• reduce price competition among handlers. 
• restrict growth and progressiveness. 
• penalize foreign suppliers. 
• allow inadequate public oversight. 
• permit inequitable or undemocratic representation 
of interested parties. 
Policy Options 
Given these benefits and concerns, the key public 
policy question is whether the value of marketing 
orders exceeds the costs implied by concerns. Such a 
net assessment is impossible without applying con-
siderable subjective judgment. However. it is possi-
ble to outline the likely effects of terminating the 
marketing order program, including development of 
voluntary and state-sponsored programs likely to 
replace federal order provisions. Certain changes 
within the existing program can be identified to 
alleviate concerns, and alternative federal programs 
are possible to achieve some of the same goals. 
Terminate Order Provisions 
Congress could remove authority for the fruit and 
vegetable orders by repealing the AMAA. Alterna-
tively, the secretary of agriculture could suspend or 
terminate individual orders which do not accomplish 
the declared policy of the Act. This has been done in 
only one case, for hops in 1986. Since most com-
modities covered by marketing orders are perennials, 
the short-run and long-run effects of terminating 
orders may very well differ. While production would 
not drop immediately, in many cases prices would. 
In the longer-run , the opposite may occur. The net 
results would depend on the initial shock and adjust-
ments over time as well as the amount of total pro-
duction that is covered by an order. 
Terminating quantity controls would remove con-
straints that limit total sales or the allocation of sales 
over time or among alternative markets. In situ-
ations where producer allotments had been restric-
tive, growers would likely increase production in the 
long run. Where market allocation had been restric-
tive, growers would likely decrease production in the 
long run due to narrowing price differentials among 
markets. Short-run grower returns would be 
expected to decrease and become more variable, at 
least until producers adjusted to revised conditions. 
Long-run resource allocation would respond to mar-
ket signals, but effects on product prices, land values 
and consumers would depend on gains from 
improved allocation of resources, compared to losses 
from increased market instability. 
Where marketing orders have encouraged over-in-
vestment, their termination could cause severe finan-
cial pressure on growers and handlers. Those poss-
essing the most attractive balance sheets would likely 
survive. Where producer allotment marketing orders 
have led to under-investment, termination would lead 
to production expansion and lower prices, and even-
tually some less efficient allotment holders likely 
would be replaced. Termination of some quantity 
control programs would reinforce shifts toward fewer 
6 
and larger firms. 
Ending marketing orders that involve market allo-
cation would redistribute consumers' incomes. Pri-
mary market prices would be lower and consumption 
higher, while secondar_ market prices would be 
higher. However, the effect on individual consumers 
would be small. 
Lacking federal authority for industry-wide quan-
tity controls, some producers likely would attempt to 
initiate similar programs under state legislation . 
However, their inability to regulate interstate com-
merce generally would limit their success. Major 
cooperatives might institute quantity control pro-
grams, but few possess a market share large enough 
to avoid problems associated with nonmembers 
receiveing benefits but not sharing program costs. 
Private storage and futures markets might also 
substitute for some marketing order quantity con-
trols. However , some commodities covered by orders 
are highly perishable, and few involve long enough 
seasons or high enough dollar volume to support 
futures markets. 
Eliminating marketing order quality controls 
would permit handlers greater latitude with respect 
to size, grade and maturity composition of shipments. 
Consumers might occasionally be able to purchase 
less expensive, lower quality produce. But product 
quality would be more variable, overall produce 
image would likely diminish and spoilage losses could 
increase. 
Without marketing order quality controls, handlers 
would have greater incentives to differentiate the 
quality of their products. Trade associations and 
cooperatives probably would attempt to implement 
quality standards in some cases. More state commis-
sions likely would be instituted to promote quality 
improvement. 
Elimination of pack and container standardization 
would have effects similar to elimination of quality 
controls. Handlers would have more flexibility, but 
buyers would be confronted with a broader and pos-
sibly more costly array of package sizes and contents. 
Private firms, trade associations and state-sponsored 
institutions would eventually play a more important 
role in promoting packaging consistency and stan-
dardization. 
Without marketing order authority to fund indus-
try-wide generic advertising and promotion, brand 
advertising by private firms might increase. And 
generic promotion through state marketing programs 
might also increase to offset some of the lost assess-
ments. Growers also would likely seek state author-
ity to fund research if federal authority were 
removed. But research by individual firms and vol-
untary organizations likely would not increase, again 
because all industry members would benefit without 
sharing the costs. 
Replace With Other Federal Programs 
In addition to possible use of voluntary organiza-
tions and efforts to institute mandatory state pro-
grams, some existing federal programs might be 
strengthened and new programs initiated if market-
ing orders were terminated. These programs could 
be used to achieve some of the marketing order 
objectives deemed socially desirable. 
Variations of federal price support and stabilization 
programs now used for major commodities might be 
employed for some fruits and vegetables. However. 
many fruits and vegetables covered by marketing 
orders are perishable, precluding use of long-term 
storage programs. Many commodities are small 
enough in volume that such programs likely would 
be costly compared to the crop value, at least relative 
to currently supported commodities. The diversity of 
products and marketing systems involved imply con-
siderable complexity in tailoring individual programs. 
In the absence of m<!. rketing orders, voluntary 
producer efforts to control volume would likely be 
frustrated by free riders. Federal legislation could 
authorize marketing boards or exclusive agency bar-
gaining. However, marketing boards function simi-
larly to marketing orders, and hence, would be sub-
ject to similar concerns. Exclusive agency bargaining 
would permit a single farmer bargaining association 
to serve as the sole bargaining agent for both mem-
bers and nonmembers. Depending upon the latitude 
permitted in specifying negotiable terms, supply con-
trol powers of the bargaining agent could exceed 
those permitted under orders. Producer and handler 
independence also could be more restricted depend-
ing on specific program implementation. 
Mandatory grading and labeling could be used to 
attain some of the desirable features of marketing 
order quality control and container standardization 
provisions without imposing minimum standards. 
This would eliminate the possible use of quality stan-
dards to control supply and allow market conditions 
to determine whether wholesome but lower quality 
produce would be available to <:onsumers. Trading 
based on specified quality attributes would be facili-
tated, as more information would be available to 
buyers. Mandatory grading and labeling would 
require special federal or state legislation. Any addi-
tional handler costs would be borne ultimately by 
producers and consumers. 
If marketing order authority were not available to 
fund research and promotion, individual commodity 
groups could seek federal research and promotion 
acts similar to those in place for several commodities. 
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Or they could seek blanket legislation that would 
apply to all such "check off" programs. Compulsory 
programs prevent free riders in the funding of 
research and promotion that has industry-wide ben-
efits. Voluntary and cooperative-sponsored efforts 
are feasible but unlikely to achieve full industry par-
ticipation in cost-sharing. 
Mandawry reporzing of sales and prices could be 
instituted by law to obtain information comparable to 
that presently available through some marketing 
orders. Handlers likely would oppose such reporting 
and collection costs could be high. 
Modify the Current Program 
Another public policy strategy is one that would 
retain the current order program and its associated 
benefits with modifications to alleviate certain 
effects. 
Concerns about potentially higher food prices, 
inefficient · resource allocation, reduced price compe-
tition and restricted firm growth stem mainly from 
provisions regulating the timing or magnitude of 
handler shipments. Concern about inflation might 
be alleviated by replacing the parity price goal, which 
has been largely ineffective, with a new price objec-
tive, perhaps tied to the Consumer Price Index or 
some other measure. Or guidelines might be estab-
lished to ensure that quantity control provisions are 
used only to prevent periodically depressed prices 
and not to consistently elevate price. 
Any tendency of marketing order quantity controls 
to misallocate resources could be lessened by limiting 
their frequency and imensicy of use. Producer allot-
ments could be increased regularly to reduce their 
lease or purchase values. Weekly prorates could be 
made less binding by restricting the number of weeks 
they are applied. Or the seasonal total of weekly 
prorates might be required to exceed total crop size 
to prevent their use as a market allocation device. 
Such changes would increase periods of unres-
tricted competition and thus reduce the incentive for 
surplus or deficit production, alleviate resource mis-
allocation tendencies and at least partially retain the 
benefits of stable markets. Administrative commit-
tees would thus need to consider their recommenda-
tions to USDA more carefully. Restrictions or pro-
portional shares imposed under quantity control 
programs also might be required to be fully transfer-
able to permit more aggressive or more efficient 
firms greater sales opportunities within a season. 
This would also promote more rapid inter-regional 
shifts in production. 
Major concerns about order quality standards 
relate to effects on low-income consumers and for-
eign suppliers. One way to assure the availability of 
wholesome but lower quality produce would be to 
faciliiaic charitable contribu1ions. Current restric-
tions generally prevent charitable organizations from 
recovering their costs of distributing donated com-
modities. Relaxation of these restrictions would 
require monitoring to prevent "donations" from 
eroding normal commercial channels. 
Alternatively, orders might be changed to prohibit 
quality standards that exceed specified minimum Lev-
els. This would restrict changes in standards that 
might control supply. However, it would not assure 
the availability of low-priced commodities to low-in-
come consumers; availability would be contingent 
upon the profitability of sales. Since foreign suppli-
ers of commodities covered by U.S. marketing orders 
face the same quality standards as domestic produc-
ers, such changes also would reduce restrictions on 
imports. 
Concerns about order administration relate gener-
ally to public oversight, voting procedures and 
administrative committee representation. Presently, 
oversight responsibility is mainly with the Agricul-
tural Marketing Service, USDA. This could be broa-
dened by requiring review of regulatory recommenda-
tions within other USDA agencies and approval by 
the secretary of agriculture. This might increase 
public confidence in order decision-making, but at a 
cost of less timely decisions, which could be critical 
for highly perishable commodities. Alternatively, 
complete administrative responsibility could be trans-
ferred to USDA. This would increase public cost and 
diminish the self-help nature of orders. 
Another alternative for strengthening public over-
sight would be for USDA to specify performance cri-
teria which all marketing orders were required to 
meet. In 1986, in response to a GAO report, AMS 
created a task force to identify performance criteria 
for evaluating fruit and vegetable marketing order 
performance. 
Increased industry involvement in order adminis-
tration could be encouraged by requiring individual 
producer voting on major regulations -- an expensive 
and slow procedure. Periodic referenda on continua-
tion of orders would assure that the orders not out-
live their support. Prohibiting bloc voting by coop-
eratives would place cooperative and independent 
producers on more equal terms, allowing all individ-
ual growers to express their preference on order 
issues. 
Many order administrative committees have added 
public or consumer representatives in recent years, as 
encouraged by AMS guidelines. However, others 
have fought this policy. Requiring public representa-
tion could increase the range of information upon 
which committee recommendations are made and 
help alleviate the concern that committees ignore the 
public interest. 
Representation could be broadened by Limiting the 
terms of committee members. This might promote 
more rapid adjustment to change in production and 
marketing practices. 
Industry Support 
No matter which set of options an individual or 
industry group prefers, support by a majority in the 
industry is necessary. Changes in marketing order 
regulations require public hearings and opportunities 
for written comments followed by a referendum. 
Thus, options that are to receive serious considera-
tion must be well thought through and their impacts 
analyzed. Only with substantial industry support can 
marketing orders and their individual provisions be 
used to improve the marketing of fruits, vegetables 
and specialty crops. 
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A milk marketing order is a legal document 
embodying rules and regulations which govern the 
marketing and pricing of Grade A (fluid grade) milk. 
Virtually all Grade A milk and about 85 percent of 
total U.S. milk production fall under the regulation 
of either 43 federal orders or nine state orders. 
Each order governs the pricing and marketing of 
raw milk in a specific geographic area ranging in size 
from several counties to several states. An order is 
initiated and terminated by a vote of the farmers 
affected by the order. Marketing orders are tailored 
to the marketing conditions they regulate; however, 
the basic design and functions of milk marketing 
orders are essentially the same. The four principal 
functions of milk marketing orders are classification, 
pricing, pooling and auditing. 
Under federal marketing orders, milk purchased 
by a regulated processor is classified according to the 
type of product made from it, and a minimum price 
is es 'ablished for each use class. Raw milk used to 
produce fluid or beverage milk products is identified 
as Class I and commands the highest minimum price. 
All other milk is identified and priced as Class II or 
Class III. Processors must pay at least the minimum 
prices for milk used in each class, but farmers receive 
a blend price based on a weighted average for the 
entire order area referred to as pooling. The blend 
price equals the total minimum payment required of 
all processors regulated under an order, divided by 
the total volume of raw milk delivered in the market 
area. Administrators of the order audit the monthly 
records of processors to make sure that the proces-
sors pay at least required minimum prices. 
Rules and regulations set forth under milk mar-
keting orders are complex. However, the following 
objectives have guided program administration: 
• promote orderly marketing in fluid milk markets; 
• stabilize milk prices and improve dairy farm 
income; 
• supervise terms of trade in milk markets to 
achieve more bargaining equity between producers 
and milk processors; and 
• assure consumers of adequate supplies of quality 
milk at reasonable prices. 
Th€ Current Program 
Over time, the dairy industry has exhibited differ-
ent levels of inequality in bargaining power between 
farmers and processors, as well as marketing prob-
lems associated with imperfect competition. 
Dairy farmers' early efforts to enhance their com-
petitive position by marketing milk cooperatively 
were only partially successful and were doomed by 
the Great Depression. The federal government and 
many states adopted legislation in the 1930s to 
increase farm incomes and maintain the productive 
capacity of dairying. The Agricultural Marketing 
Agreement Act of 193 7, together with prior legisla-
tion, authorized the secretary of agriculture to issue 
milk marketing orders based on administrative hear-
ings and producer referenda. A major objective of 
the act's dairy provisions is "to establish and main-
tain such orderly marketing conditions ... as will pro-
vide in the interests of producers and consumers, an 
orderly flow of the supply to market...to avoid 
unreasonable fluctuations in supp!ies and prices." 
Moreover, the secretary is instructed to consider 
"economic conditions which affect market supply and 
demand for milk ... [and] fix such prices as he finds 
will reflect such factors and insure a sufficient quan-
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tity of pure and wholesome milk and be in the public 
interest.'' 
The basic purposes and mechanisms underlying 
federal milk marketing orders have remained 
unchanged since 1937; however, specific provisions 
of orders have evolved in response to changes in 
dairy industry structure and market conditions. 
The dairy industry is affected by a variety of regu-
lations and policies. Besides federal and state milk 
marketing orders, the principals of these are 1) dairy 
price supports, 2) import restrictions on dairy prod-
ucts, 3) antitrust exemptions affecting agricultural 
cooperatives, 4) school lunch, special milk and other 
domestic and international food aid programs, and 5) 
health and product quality standards. 
Dairy price support and milk marketing order 
programs are closely linked. The price support pro-
gram influences all farm milk prices because the 
changes it causes in manufactured milk prices lead to 
corresponding changes in minimum federal order 
milk prices. 
Although their major objectives are very similar, 
these two programs have evolved to serve different 
functions. Price supports are used primarily to affect 
farm prices, enhance farm income and influence 
aggregate supply. . Compared to the macro-market 
orientation of the support program, marketing orders 
focus more on pricing equity among producers and 
processors; they also deal with problems of local and 
inter-regional trade. Marketing orders alone do not 
set overall milk price levels, but they do influence 
regional price differences. 
During the 1980s, special programs to reduce sur-
plus milk supplies have been used in conjunction 
with traditional price-oriented mechanisms of the 
support program. These special programs include 
the milk diversion program, which operated in 1984 
and the first quarter of 1985, and the dairy termina-
tion program, a five-year program which began April 
1, 1986. 
Dairy import quotas are an important adjunct to 
the price support program. Import quotas make it 
feasible to support domestic dairy product prices at a 
level significantly higher than world prices. Without 
import restrictions, the U.S. government would be 
forced into the costly business of supporting world 
dairy product prices in order to maintain domestic 
• prices. 
The Capper-Volstead Act permits farmers to mar-
ket their goods cooperatively and bargain collectively 
without challenge under the Sherman Act and other 
antitrust legislation. However, while permitting 
farmers to gain market power through a cooperative 
organization, the Capper-Volstead Act does not 
shield cooperatives from abuse of market power. In 
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addition, dairy cooperatives are granted special privi-
leges under the marketing order program. For 
example, cooperatives can vote as a unit for their 
members on producer referenda (bloc voting), which 
enhances their influence upon order provisions. 
They also are not usually required to pay federal 
order minimum blend prices to their members. Pro-
prietary processors contend that this gives an unfair 
advantage to cooperatives that process and sell milk 
in competition with them. 
Other programs also affect dairy markets and 
prices. For example, food aid and demand enhance-
ment programs have helped reduce surpluses gener-
ated by the price support program, thereby facilitat-
ing price support objectives. On the other hand, 
changes in one program may be inhibited by the 
requirements of another. For example, proposals 
have been made to revise marketing order provisions 
governing the classification and pricing of reconsti-
tuted milk products, but the product identity stan-
dards for milk complicate such a revision. Some 
states do not accept reconstituted milk as a beverage 
milk product. Thus a change in federal orders that 
would encourage the use of reconstituted milk would 
run afoul of regulations which discourage or prohibit 
reconstituted milk. 
What the Program Has Accomplished 
Since the passage of the J 937 Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act, federal marketing orders have 
adapted to the changing needs and structure of the 
dairy industry. These adjustments frequently have 
been the subject of considerable controversy . among 
various industry segments. 
Improving Efficiency 
Encouraging orderly, efficient marketing practices 
was an original objective of the federal order pro-
gram and it remains a frequently cited justification 
for federal orders. Prior to widespread adoption of 
marketing orders, buyers often engaged in practices 
which enhanced their bargaining position relative to 
producers or improved their competitive position 
relative to other buyers, at the expense of efficiency. 
For example, buyers have been known to move milk 
unnecessarily long distances to discipline nearby pro-
ducers. Federal orders align prices and establish 
rules that encourage production of fluid milk prod-
ucts from the nearest sources of raw milk. 
Stable, secure markets are generally believed to be 
in the long-run best interests of all market partici-
pants. Without reliable markets, transaction costs 
and dairy product prices could rise. While marketing 
orders do not guarantee farmers a market, they do 
help provide a stable and orderly pricing system 
which offers producers more security. Marketing 
orders work with the dairy price support program, 
state bonding requirements and strong milk market-
ing cooperatives in most regions to help provide 
secure markets for dairy farmers. 
Information is a key ingredient in smoothly func-
tioning markets. Without good market information, 
resource misallocation may occur. Federal orders 
generate market information and distribute it to pro-
d ucers1 processors and the public. The system of 
announcing in advance minimum Class I and II 
prices also reduces uncertainty in milk markets. 
While orders have promoted orderly marketing, 
they also may have discouraged some practices or 
adjustments that could lead to long-run improve-
ments in the marketing system. Marketing orders 
have the flexibility to accommodate changes induced 
by improved technology or economic incentives. 
However, the inertia inherent with any bureaucracy 
may have slowed the adjustment process in regulated 
markets. For example, the market order system may 
now be impeding adoption of on-farm ultrafiltration 
technologies, multiple component pricing and 
reconstituted milk. 
Reducing Unfair Trade Practices 
Milk marketing orders have alleviated not only 
lost markets and low prices, but also the abusive 
effects suffered by dairy farmers from other unfair 
practices. Three examples include: nonpayment for 
milk delivered· inaccurate reports from handlers on 
the volume, butterfat content and utilization of milk; 
and the general lack of fairness inherent when the 
bargaining power of buyers and sellers is unequal. 
The federal milk marketing order program helps 
ensure timely payment and protects farmers from 
handlers' failure to pay for milk. While federal milk 
marketing orders do not require handlers to post a 
cash bond or to pay in advance, they do specify par-
tial and final payment dates each month. Farmers 
and farmer cooperatives are thus warned reasonably 
quickly if a handler finds it difficult to pay. In some 
orders, a schedule of charges on delinquent payments 
is specified. Yet full payment in the event of bank-
ruptcy is not assured. 
Transfers and payments for milk offer many 
opportunities for inaccurate reporting. Periodic 
audits of handler records by marketing order person-
nel ensure that milk marketing transactions are accu-
rate and honest. 
Redistributing Costs and Incomes 
Federal order provisions make the distribution of 
market returns more equitable among producers by 
establishing a minimum blend price, and among 
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processors by setting mm1mum class prices for raw 
milk. Other equity issues involve sharing costs and 
benefits of maintaining efficient markets. 
Dairy farmer cooperatives perform several func-
tions such as negotiating prices and balancing milk 
supplies with demands, which also benefit nonmem-
bers. Although part of the cost sometimes is charged 
to the cooperative's processors, the cost of providing 
these services may be borne disproportionately by 
cooperative members. Equity among producers is 
difficult to attain when all producers are not mem-
bers of the same cooperative. Similarly, the costs of 
supply balancing and surplus disposal have not 
always been shared equitably between cooperatives 
and processors. 
The Food Security Act of 1985 authorizes federal 
orders to collect money from those who do not bear 
marketwide service costs and remit it to cooperatives 
and proprietary firms which provide marketwide ser-
vices . In the initial decision regarding this authori-
zation, USDA decided not to implement a proposed 
system of marketwide service payments. 
Orders benefit all sizes of dairy operations. If 
orders had not helped equalize bargaining power 
between producers and handlers, the exit of the 
smaller dairy farmer may have been hastened. 
Pricing provisions also may have favored smaller 
handlers. Without minimum prices, the larger pro-
cessor may have been able to procure milk supplies 
more cheaply. 
Therefore, milk marketing orders distribute 
income among market participants in a different pat-
tern than would exist without orders. This was a 
primary objective of the legislation. Nevertheless, it 
is reasonable to question whether the redistribution 
caused by marketing orders today could be improved 
significantly. This raises a difficult corollary question 
-- how does one decide what is a better, good or 
equitable distribution of economic benefits? 
The answer to this question is difficult and varies 
depending upon one's values and market position. It 
is not surprising then that different observers and 
analysts of marketing orders have come to different 
conclusions regarding the distribution of benefits 
from marketing order regulation. Some contend that 
marketing orders raise farm prices to the benefit of 
farmers and the detriment of all others. Some argue 
that charging higher prices for raw milk used in fluid 
products (Class I) is an obvious case of classical price 
discrimination. This means that consumers of Class l 
products pay higher prices and subsidize producers 
and consumers of manufactured dairy products. No 
attempt is made here to be conclusive or to reconcile 
conflicting arguments. but some observations are 
offered. 
First, economists have criticized orders because 
orders cause economic results that differ from what 
one would expect under perfect competition. The 
problem with such criticisms is the implication that 
perfect competition would exist if marketing orders 
were abolished. This would most surely not be the 
case -- large processors and large cooperatives would 
prevail. The norms of perfect competition provide 
many good targets for the administrators of market-
ing order policies, but marketing orders should be 
judged against the imperfect competition that would 
prevail in their absence. 
Second, one must distinguish between faults in the 
system and faults in the administration of the system. 
For example, some would say that prices are too high 
because of federal orders. If that is true, it probably 
reflects more on the administration of the system 
than on the structure of the system. 
Third, milk marketing orders have existed for 
almost half a century and orders may have become 
venerable because of their longevity. Marketing 
orders, as any other policy tool, may be good, but 
not because they are old. Because of their longevity, 
marketing orders and their specific provisions should 
be examined periodically and measured, as best they 
can, against a changing economic environment and 
changing technologies. Federal orders have not cre-
ated equality; rather they have tried to create more 
equitable conditions than existed previously. 
The Key Issues 
Significant changes have occurred in the U.S. dairy 
industry during the last several decades. Federal 
milk orders appear to have adjusted to these changes, 
although important challenges remain to be 
addressed. Some of the key issues are new, others 
have faced us for some time. Most involve more 
than the federal milk marketing order system alone. 
Major issues are discussed below. 
Classified Pricing 
One of the major cnt1c1sms of milk marketing 
orders relates to price discrimination -- charging dif-
ferent prices for an identical product based on how it 
is used. Classified pricing discriminates between 
markets but this should not automatically connote 
inequity. The original objective of classified pricing 
was to reward producers for the extra cost associated 
with Grade A milk production. Dispute now focuses 
on whether this extra cost exists or warrants special 
compensation. There is evidence that differences in 
size, management ability and other factors may make 
the average cost of Grade B production higher than 
for Grade A. Thus attention has returned to the 
price discrimination issue. The controversy was 
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fueled by 1985 farm bill legislation. which considera-
bly widened the price differential between Upper 
Midwest markets and distant markets to the south 
and east, which is discussed further in the next sec-
tion. 
Of particular concern has been the consumer cost 
of paying higher prices for milk used for fluid pur-
poses. While some income is transferred from con-
sumers to producers through classified pricing, the 
amount is debatable. The prices and type of price 
system that would exist in the absence of classified 
pricing is hard to predict. Elimination of classified 
pricing would not necessarily eliminate price dis-
crimination between inelastic fluid milk markets and 
the more responsive manufactured product markets. 
Due to the difficulty of matching daily production 
levels with fluctuating processor needs, there prob-
ably would be more than one price paid to producers 
in most markets, with differences related to how milk 
is used. Extra milk not needed for fluid use on any 
given day likely would be priced at a lower, surplus 
value. In addition, if classified prices were elim i-
nated from federal orders, the income gains from 
price discrimination might simply be transferred 
from producers to processors and retailers, who 
could discriminate among product markets. How-
ever. in the absence of classified pricing, market 
forces would have greater influence. 
Distance and Geographic Differentials 
Historically, federal orders priced Class I milk 
with an increasing price differential relative to dis-
tance from key basing points in the Upper Midwest, 
centering on Eau Claire, Wisconsin. The current 
rationale for the Class I differential in a particular 
area is primarily to reflect transportation costs. For 
years this differential was $0.15 per cwt. per 100 
miles. This was less than the cost of transportation 
after energy prices increased in the 1970s. As a 
result, cooperatives, primarily in southern markets, 
negotiated premiums over federal milk order prices. 
These premiums tended to increase when milk sup-
plies in the South required supplemental shipments 
from northern markets. 
In 1984, during the milk diversion program, sev-
eral southern markets experienced substantial milk 
shortages. As a result, these markets secured tempo-
rary increases in the Class I price to ease the problem 
of moving milk into these markets. Class I price 
increases were mandated for a two-year period by the 
1985 farm bill for 33 specific federal order markets. 
Very small increases were granted in the Upper Mid-
west, with much larger increases in the South and 
East. Midwest dairy interests and legislators disputed 
the 1985 Food Security Act Class I price increase as 
favoring producers in eastern and southern markets. 
Continuing controversy can be expected over both 
the appropriate level of the Class I differential and 
criteria for establishing the differential. 
Over-Order Payments 
Some argue that over-order payments are incon-
sistent with objectives of the milk marketing order 
program, and that order prices should be the effec-
tive prices. Others, including administrators of the 
order program, maintain the existence of over-order 
payments is compatible with the minimum price sta-
tus of the orders' classified prices. 
Cooperatives have argued that over-order pay-
ments are cost-justified and permit more timely 
response to changing market conditions than does the 
order mechanism. Research suggests that most over-
order payments are explained by service cost factors 
and geographical price misalignment under federal 
orders. Over-order payments clearly were not the 
major cause of the current over-supply situation, 
since they account for only about a one percent 
increase in milk production between 1970 and 1980. 
Market Service Charges and Payments 
One of the incentives for over-order payments has 
been the so-called free-rider problem in which pro-
ducers who are not members of cooperatives benefit 
from cooperative services but do not pay for those 
services. It likewise is asserted that processors who 
do not purchase milk from major cooperatives serv-
ing their market receive market supply balancing 
benefits but do not. pay the costs. Some cooperatives 
have strongly advocated service charge provisions to 
deal with these issues. 
While the free rider problem is very real, there is 
lack of agreement on an appropriate solution. As 
with many complex problems, there may be no per-
fectly equitable solution. The USDA traditionally 
took the position that authority for service charge 
provisions in marketing orders was unclear, that such 
provisions would put USDA in the business of public 
utility-type rate regulation, and that the free rider 
problem was being dealt with effectively by over-or-
der payments. 
Except for some nominal marketwide service 
charges in a few orders, USDA refused to consider 
the payments issue. However, the 1985 farm bill 
specifically authorizes marketwide service payments 
and mandates USDA to hold hearings on the issue. 
As indicated previously, the initial marketwide ser-
vice charge proposal has been turned down. The 
major question is how to structure an equitable pay-
ment system where cooperatives and some proprie-
tary processors perform varying degrees of balancing 
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functions and related marketwide services. 
Reconstituted Milk 
New technoiogies have improved the quality of 
dried milk and milk concentrates. This makes it 
possible to produce a commercially acceptable bever-
age milk reconstituted from concentrated fluid or 
powdered milk. This could reduce the need to trans-
port milk in its bulky form and permit storing milk 
from the heavy production season in the form of 
powder for use in the short season of the year. The 
potential cost difference of marketing fresh milk 
versus reconstituted milk is not agreed upon. How-
ever, there is no question that current federal order 
pricing provisions sharply restrict incentives to 
reconstitute milk. 
Federal order pricing provisions could be revised 
to ease the economic penalty imposed on handlers 
for producing reconstituted beverage milk. Almost 
certainly, the effect of such change would be to 
reduce Class I differentials and increase relative 
prices for Midwest dairymen. Price benefits would 
accrue to consumers of fluid milk. Any substantial 
change in these order provisions, however, would 
likely diminish reliance on fresh milk to satisfy fluid 
consumption. Therefore, eliminating the price pen-
alty on reconstituted milk could redistribute income 
among processors, producers and consumers and 
affect milk transportation patterns as well as costs. 
Marketing Quotas 
Surpluses frequently plague the dairy industry. 
Lower prices are not a politically popular means of 
controlling surpluses. Voluntary supply controls 
such as the milk diversion and dairy termination 
programs provide temporary relief but by themselves 
do not provide a long-run solution. Proposals to 
implement direct controls on production marketings 
are becoming more common. 
Marketing controls could be instituted as part of 
federal orders by amending the Agricultural Market-
ing Agreements Act. In addition to authority for 
quotas, authority for orders would have to be man-
dated to provide national coverage of both Grade A 
and Grade B producers. The marketing order 
administrative structure could be used effectively to 
implement mandatory milk supply management pro-
visions, although not all regions are currently cov-
ered by market orders. The cost of quotas would be 
borne by consumers and new milk producers who 
would be required to purchase marketing rights in 
one way or another. Windfall gains in asset values 
would accrue to dairymen in production at the time 
quotas are imposed. Government cqsts for dairy 
programs would decline. 
Although the administrative structure of 
marketing orders offers an excellent tool for imple-
menting and monitoring a mandatory supply contrql 
program, other agencies are possible and probably 
more likely. Voluntary programs initiated in 1984 
and 1986 were administered by the Agricultural Sta-
bilization and Conservation Service. Much data and 
assistance was required from market order adminis-
trators. One wonders if mandatory controls, or for 
that matter the entire dairy pricing programs could 
be more efficiently and effectively administered by a 
single USDA agency. 
In any event, two things should be clear: 
• Marketing orders could be adapted to mandatory 
supply controls, but such a program could be 
administered in various ways. 
• Although there has been much grass roots discus-
sion of mandatory supply controls, acceptance of 
such a program is by no means a foregone conclu-
sion. 
Coordination of Price Support Levels and Federal 
Order Prices 
Sound practice calls for USDA to consider the 
combined effect of milk orders and price support 
levels in appraising the appropriateness of milk 
prices, given the close relationship between fluid and 
manufacturing milk markets. EstabHshing appropri-
ate prices for the two programs may become more 
difficult during the next few years. Further widening 
between prices for fluid milk and milk used in man-
ufacturing would intensify antagonisms between pro-
ducers in manufacturing and fluid processing regions. 
Thus, careful coordination of the two milk pricing 
programs will be necessary to avoid this development 
and the equity issues it raises. 
Should the Program be Modified? 
The impact of federal orders on dairy marketing 
diminished during the 1970s. Changes in federal 
orders during that period were mainly of the 
housekeeping or fine-tuning variety. In the 1990s, 
federal order regulation could be changed to 
accommodate shifts in emphasis among purposes of 
regulation and changes in dairy marketing. This 
could mean either more regulation or less. The 
direction charted by the 1985 Farm Bill seems to 
point to further regulation and greater involvement 
by Congress in establishing regulatory parameters. 
Five alternatives to current federal orders are pre-
sented below in increasing order of public interven-
tion. Each alternative is briefly described, then the 
possible effects of each alternative on the current 
program are summarized for 12 objectives (see Table 
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1 ). These impacts should be interpreted as likely 
rather than unequivocal fact. The appraisals in Table 
1 probably best point to directions of change; the 
magnitude of change is more difficult to ascertain. 
Deregulate 
All federal milk orders could be terminated. 
Prices and terms of trade would then be determined 
by negotiation between processors and producers or 
their cooperatives or by new institutional arrange-
ments. Income would be redistributed among market 
participants with lower ·prices prevailing for fluid 
milk. Any verification of a trade would be left to the 
parties of the transaction. Equity in pricing milk to 
producers and processors would decline. 
Deregulate Prices Only 
Orders could be limited to the auditing of receipts 
and uses of milk. All prices would be established by 
negotiation between producers and processors, and 
orders could be a mechanism for reporting prices. A 
continuing flow of reliable public information would 
be a check on market inequities and potential abuses. 
This would be similar to the "marketing agreement" 
mechanisms which briefly preceded marketing orders 
during the 1930s. 
Simplify Orders . 
Orders could be reformulated in a number of ways 
to simplify regulation. A variety of options could be 
used to improve geographic price alignment, reduce 
differences among order provisions, simplify pooling 
criteria and the like. The consequences of these 
alternatives may not be greatly different from current 
regulation, but there could be an increase in equity 
problems under order simplification. 
Set Effective Prices 
Step~ could be taken to bring actual prices paid by 
processors and received by farmers closer to order 
prices. This might provide greater assurance that 
market prices were in the public interest. However, 
changing administered prices to fully account for 
market service costs or to reflect market conditions 
better would be difficult to do in a timely and precise 
manner. Both the cost of order administration and 
complexity of regulation would increase. If pricing 
procedures are altered only slightly, then the conse-
quences of this alternative might not be much differ-
ent from current regulation. 
Reduce Equity Problems 
Attempts to enhance equity could include pncmg 
systems that account for the cost of maintaining and 
balancing market reserve supplies or that allocate 
returns from Class I markets more uniformly. It is 
difficult to assess the consequences of changes 
designed to improve equit)'._ Equity involves com-
peting individual interests. As with attempts at 
administering effective prices, regulation which 
would cure all perceived equity problems may not be 
practical. 
Table 1. Expected Impacts of Alternative Levels of Milk Regulation on Affected Groups and Policy Objectives 
Producers 
Price and income level 




Promote family farm 
Consumers 
























































































* Impacts on objectives are represented as differences from present system of federal milk market orders as 
follows: + 2 = moderate increase, + 1 = small increase, 0 = no change, -1 = small decrease, and -2 = 
moderate decrease. 
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Historically, cooperatives have been considered as 
institutions which could deal with family farm equity 
and survival issues in an increasingly industrialized 
agricultural setting. Cooperatives allow moderately 
sized farmer members to realize lower input costs 
and higher product prices enjoyed by large-scale 
farmers who frequently integrate on their own. In 
addition, added efficiencies, improved marketing and 
above normal profits may be gained to the benefit of 
cooperatives' members. Where proprietary agribusi-
ness firms are already in a dominant market position 
through contract integration, bargaining associations 
may be formed to countervail the firm's dominance. 
This leaflet discusses alternative policy issues that 
evolve out of a cooperative's efforts to acquire mar-
ket influence on behalf of its producer-members. 
The Current Program 
The Clayton Act states that nothing in antitrust 
law forbids existence and operation of agricultural 
and horticultural orgainzations instituted for "pur-
poses of mutual help." Therefore, cooperative 
members are allowed to lawfully carry out legitimate 
marketing objectives as long as prices are not unduly 
enhanced. However activities allowed under the 
exemption are not specified. The Capper-Volstead 
Act adds more guidance, allowing farmers to com-
bine for "collectively processing, preparing for mar-
ket. handling and marketing." 
The courts have interpreted these functions 
broadly. One court defined "marketing" as the 
aggregate of functions involved in transferring title 
and in moving goads from producer to consumer, 
including, among others, buying, selling, storing. 
transporting, standardizing, financing. risk bearing, 
and supplying market infonnazion. Relying on the 
"plain meaning of the term," the court concluded 
that bargaining and price agreements were coopera-
tive marketing activities exempt from the antitrust 
laws. Table 1 lists activities permitted or prohibited 
according to legal decisions involving cooperatives 
over the years. 
USDA Enforcement of Capper-Volstead 
The Capper-Volstead Act forbids cooperatives 
from unduly enhancing price. Since 1959, responsi-
bility for enforcement of the undue enhancement 
provisions has generally been given to a committee 
of administrators from the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. The committee makeup changes periodi-
cally, but generally the committee has consisted of 
the assistant secretary of economics, the general 
counsel and the assistant secretary for marketing and 
inspection services. 
The USDA operates today much as in the past, 
acting on complaints concerning possible undue price 
enhancement. Complaints are referred to the com-
mittee, which authorizes analysis and makes recom-
mendations to the secretary on further action. The 
committee delegates responsibility for analysis within 
the department. It is possible that personnel who 
promote cooperative activity may be involved in 
investigation, which has raised questions of conflict 
of interest. 
If a basis is found for moving ahead on a com-
plaint, further administrative procedures are set 
forth. However, the department has yet to bring a 
This is one of a series of articles on Federal Agricultural Marketing Programs developed by your state Extension Service as a compo-
nent of the Land Grant University System in cooperation with the Texas Agricultural Extension Service, the Farm Foundation, and 
the National Public Policy Education Committee. 
Table 1. Cooperative activities permitted and prohibited under antitrust laws. -
Permitted 
Processing 
Preparing for market 
Handling 
Marketing 
Bargaining and shipping 
Fixing prices 
Acquiring monopoly power through growth and 
combination of agricultural cooperatives 
Forming marketing agencies in common, federations 
and other inter-cooperative arrangements and con-
tracts, including mergers 
Acquiring, exchanging, interpreting, and disseminat-
ing crop, market, statistical, economic and similar 
information 
charge of undue price enhancement since the Cap-
per-Volstead Act was passed. Eight cases have been 
subjected to inquiry, all since 1969. 
Seven of the cases involved milk and were related 
to over-order payments. The other concerned pota-
toes for processing in Idaho. In each case, the exam-
iner reviewed supply-demand conditions in the mar-
ket affected and searched for prices that were out of 
line with those conditions. While conducting these 
investigations, the USDA never explicitly defined the 
term undue price enhancement; nor is the term 
defined in the law. 
Enforcement of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act 
The 1967 Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) 
prohibits handlers from discouraging producer mem-
bership in or contracts with a cooperative, and from 
discriminating between cooperative and 
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Prohibited 
Picketing and harassment 
Boycotting 
Coercing membership 
Unjustified price discrimination with the intent to 
eliminate competition 
Engaging in "predatory" tactics 
Exercising monopoly power to stifle or smother 
competition by interfering with shipments, boycot-
ting or exerting improper financial pressures 
Monopolizing or restraining trade to the extent that 
prices are unduly enhanced thereby 
Monopolizing or restraining trade through agree-
ments with non-cooperative organizations 
Creating a joint venture or merging with a non-co-
operative organization where the effect may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition or create a monopoly 
Permitting nonproducers or mere "contract integra-
tors" to become members of a cooperative associa-
tion 
noncooperative producers on trade terms. The sec-
retary has delegated authority for enforcement to the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) administrator. 
The AFPA's usefulness has been limited. Produc-
ers hesitate to complain of AFP A violations because 
of potential discrimination against them by buyers 
once their complaint becomes public. An Agricul-
tural Cooperative Service (ACS) study found only 26 
cases of producers seeking AFP A protection between 
1968 and 1978. Of those, most were filed shortly 
after the act became effective. Only seven com-
plaints resulted in favorable rulings to producers. 
Only one reported court case dealing extensively 
with alleged violations of AFP A has occurred. The 
court pointed out that the act was considerably 
weakened by inclusion of the so-called "escape 
clause." This clause declares that handler activity 
which might be a violation will not be considered as 
such if it is part of "normal dealing." 
Government Support for Cooperatives 
For more than 70 years USDA has provided direct 
assistance for organizing and strengthening coopera-
tives. Today, the ACS and the Extension Service 
(ES), acting through the land grant universities, pro-
vide cooperative research and information. Inside 
USDA. varying degrees of cooperative involvement 
also occur within the Economic Research Service, 
Commodity Credit Corporation, the Office of Trans-
portation, Agricultural Marketing Service, Foreign 
Agriculture Service, Farmers Home Administration 
and Packers and Stockyards Administration. Outside 
USDA. federal agencies involved with cooperatives 
include the Farm Credit Administration, Internal 
Revenue Service, Department of Justice, Federal 
Trade Commission and the Small Business Adminis-
tration. 
The focal point of USDA's direct cooperative 
involvement is the ACS. Technical assistance to 
farmers' cooperatives has been a major thrust over 
the years. ACS frequently works closely with state 
Extension personnel on cooperative projects. 
Land grant universities, with partial funding from 
the federal level, perform cooperative research and 
conduct Extension educational programs aimed at 
cooperatives. Most land grant re~earch relating to 
cooperatives is supported by ACS. Direct assistance 
is provided to state Extension specialists by ACS and 
the federal Extension Service. From time-to-time 
special pilot projects have been established by ES to 
assist state specialists in developing educational 
materials. 
What the Program Has Accomplished 
It is difficult to separate the performance of gov-
ernment in regulating and facilitating cooperatives 
from performance of cooperatives themselves. Con-
sequently, this assessment is limited and based pri-
marily on deductive logic and economic theory. 
Facilitating Market Operation 
Cooperative marketing is an extension of the farm 
into subsequent marketing stages. Physical market-
ing practices and channels are not necessarily altered 
when cooperatives replace buyer-seller exchange, but 
vertical coordination is affected. Cooperative bar-
gaining alters the structural interface between farm-
ers and first handlers. Through collective action, 
sellers gain market power relative to buyers. In the 
"competitive yardstick" role, cooperatives form when 
private firms are inefficient or earn excess profits, or 
where performance information is obscure. Numer-
ous examples can be cited in which cooperatives have 
performed the watchdog function by entry into 
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handling or processing. 
Marketing cooperatives increase the number of 
market outlets available to farmers and provide div-
ersity in the type of outlets. The ability to pool 
assets lowers entry barriers at the first handler level. 
However, large cooperative stock purchases or other 
eligibility requirements can, in some cases, be barri-
ers to entry into production. Historically, coopera-
tives have been an outlet for farms which are too 
small for benefits afforded large farms by private 
handlers. However, recently some cooperatives have 
been criticized for discriminating against smaller 
farms. But if cooperatives charge the same price for 
providing the same services to all members and the 
cost of serving large farms is less, the large farm is 
discriminated against. 
Eliminating Unfair Marketing Practices 
Cooperatives protect members from exploitation 
by private firms. A cooperative's nonprofit nature 
implies that above normal profits which would oth-
erwise be earned by private firms are captured by the 
farmer-member. In most cases the cooperative goal 
of maximizing member returns can be shown theo-
retically to yield a higher output level at a lower 
price. However, cooperative behavior is not inher-
ently pure. Cooperative margins are frequently 
retained within the business for years. In addition, 
cooperatives have at times also engaged in unfair or 
discriminatory practices. These instances have gen-
erally become the subject of litigation under antitrust 
laws with the most widely publicized examples 
involving milk. 
Improving Efficiency 
Vertical integration by cooperatives may improve 
coordinating efficiency. For example, cooperatives 
that represent a large share of production may be 
more efficient in performing assembly and surplus 
processing for a milk market. Where efficiency gains 
are divided between producers (in the form of higher 
prices or patronage refunds) and consumers (in the 
form of lower costs), market performance is 
improved. 
More and more producers have turned marketing 
decisions over to their cooperative under a marketing 
agreement. Cooperatives are thereby frequently able 
to raise producer returns through superior marketing 
expertise. Such gains are often derived from better 
timing of marketing decisions or better choice of 
outlets. 
Traditional economic justification for special 
treatment of cooperatives is that they capture profit 
margins of monopolistic firms and return the profits 
to their producer-patrons. The result is a more 
competitive price. In practice, such benefits decrease 
if cooperatives retain net margins over a long period. 
In such a case, the present value to producers 
approaches zero and market performance is not 
changed materially. 
Few cooperatives have accumulated sufficient 
market share and management expertise to adminis-
ter prices through market power. In some cases 
marketing orders may provide support for accumu-
lating such market power. This may be in the public 
interest since there is a history of low producer 
returns. The fact that Section 2 of the Capper-Vol-
stead Act uses the term "undue" price enhancement 
infers that Congress intended for cooperatives to use 
market power, indicating that some price enhance-
ment presumably was considered justified. 
Redistributing Costs and Benefits 
The primary, intended distributional effect of 
cooperative marketing and bargaining is to redistri-
bute profits from the "middleman" to producers. If 
private firms possess substantial market power, 
cooperatives can increase output and reduce con-
sumer prices. However, if they raise prices at the 
consumer's expense, adverse impacts on demand can 
be anticipated. 
Distribution of decision-making authority is 
altered by cooperatives. Decisions are transferred 
from individual producers to boards of directors and 
management. But, by the same token, producers 
would have no control if they sold through private 
firms. 
The Key Issues 
As agriculture and marketing arrangements 
become more complex and diverse, questions 
increasingly arise as to the types of farmers, cooper-
atives and activities that are er.titled to antitrust 
exemption. This issue pervades the public policy 
concerns that affect cooperatives. 
What Is a Cooperative and Its Farmer Member? 
The type of farmer and cooperative originally 
envisioned by the Capper-Volstead Act likely resem-
bles, for example! traditional family dairy farmers 
who jointly organize to assemble and bargain for the 
price of their milk. In an increasingly industrialized 
and diverse agriculture, some farmers and coopera-
tives desiring Capper-Volstead exemption bear little 
resemblance to this original, relatively simple con-
cept. Consequently, a host of questions arise as to 
the membership and organizational form of a coop-
erative. Most of these questions revolve around the 
cooperative's relationship to the proprietary 
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agribusiness sector. 
Who is the farmer in an integrated poultry indus-
try structure'? Is it the grower who works for a piece 
wage in return for his time and investment contribu-
tions? Or is it the integrator who owns the chickens, 
supplies most of the inputs, prescribes management 
practices and markets the end product? The courts 
have decided that it is the grower, except to the 
extent that integrators are actually involved in grower 
functions. Yet as proprietary agribusiness firms 
become increasingly involved in the full scope of 
farming activities, this issue grows in complexity. 
One of the basic tenets of Capper-Volstead inter-
pretation has been that cooperatives cannot combine 
with proprietary corporations to control markets. 
What about increasingly common joint ventures 
between cooperatives and corporations? The answer 
appears to hinge on the purpose and effect of the 
venture in terms of market control. Yet such rela-
tively obscure criteria create the potential for forma-
tion of various structures of "quasi cooperatives" 
organized to obtain cooperative benefits. Such quasi-
cooperative structures are fostered by court rulings 
that broadly interpret the Capper-Volstead term 
"marketing" to include price setting even if that is 
the sole cooperative function. 
How Should Cooperatives Be Treated Under Anti-
trust Laws? 
During the first 50 years following passage of 
Capper-Volstead, there were four major Supreme 
Court cases that narrowed the interpretation of per-
mitted activities under Capper-Volstead Section 1. 
During this growth period within the cooperative 
sector, practices went largely unchallenged. In the 
early 1970s, a new, more critical attitude emerged as 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) challenged such com-
mon practices as full supply contracts, intercoopera-
tive mergers, federations, marketing agencies in 
common and bargaining. Cooperatives were accused 
of monopolization, and USDA was criticized for fail-
ing to actively enforce the undue price enhancement 
provisions of Section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act. 
The fundamental issues relating to cooperative 
antitrust are the nature of the Capper-Volstead mon-
opolization exemption (Section 1) and the appropri-
ate enforcement of Section 2. It has been argued 
that Capper-Volsted Section 1 is, in fact, less an 
exemption than an assurance of equal standing under 
the law -- combinations of farmers have the same 
antitrust status as combinations of corporate stock-
holders. However, a major exception to the "equal 
standing" principle lies in the area of mergers. 
Recent rulings suggest that exempt cooperatives may 
combine to the extent of a monopoly or may fix 
prices among themselves, regardless of whether they 
are organized officially as a marketing agency in 
common. Such combinations surely would be chal-
lenged in the corporate sector. In summary, the fol-
lowing classes of cooperative J.ctivities may be 
defined: 
• Predatory practices and restraint of trade are 
clearly and unequivocally outside the protection of 
Section 1. 
• Bargaining, setting prices, use of marketing agen-
cies in common, intercooperative mergers and use 
of membership contracts and agreements are 
exempt from antitrust laws. 
• Cooperative mergers with non-cooperatives , limit-
ing production , full supply contracts and coopera-
tive monopolies fall into a gray area -- Section 1 
exemption is contingent upon the absence of anti-
competitive effects. 
What Constitutes Undue Price Enhancement? 
Proscription of undue price enhancement is 
unique to the cooperative form of business. An 
interpretation of the term is not available through 
the courts. Some standard is necessary to distinguish 
"due" from "undue." At a minimum, the Capper-
Volstead Act was designed to create a balancing of 
market power between producers and proprietary 
marketing firms -- to raise prices to at least the com-
petitive equilibrium in economic jargon. Was it 
designed to do more? Was it designed to give coop-
eratives more than countervailing power? 
Clearly cooperatives were thought of as a potential 
substitute for farm program assistance in the form of 
price and income support or inventory management. 
Just as clearly, the Capper-Volstead exemption was 
not designed to foster consumer exploitation. The 
dividing line warrants clearer definition than cur-
rently exists. Continued growth, whether through 
intercooperative mergers, federations or joint ven-
tures with non-cooperatives, will intensify public 
antitrust concerns regarding undue enhancement. If 
major issues relating to the secretary of agriculture's 
enforcement of Section 2 are not resolved, then all 
antitrust enforcement responsibility may be trans-
ferred to either the FTC or DOJ. 
Should Further Incentives Be Given to Bargaining 
Cooperatives? 
Under Capper-Volstead, farmers are permitted to 
bargain collectively as cooperative members on terms 
of trade for their products. The key issues revolve 
around rules that affect bargaining associations' abil-
ity to organize and to manage supplies to influence 
trade terms. Five issues appear to be most 
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important: 
• Procedures for dealing wiih discrimination against 
farmers "ho participate in collective bargaining 
acuvuy. Farmers allege that handlers often dis-
criminate against those who actively participate in 
bargaining, making it difficult to form effective 
associations. The Agricultural Fair Practices Act 
makes such discrimination illegal but has been 
ineffective. 
• Rules about the obligations of all growers in a des-
ignated group, whether members of an association 
or not, to participate in bargaining and the sharing 
of costs. This is a free rider problem similar to 
the issue of an agency shop in union bargaining. 
Association members argue that as long as they 
incur costs for arriving at terms of trade, and 
nonmembers can benefit without joining, the 
effectiveness of the. bargaining association is 
unfairly undermined. 
• Rules relaiing to open or closed membership and 
limits on quamity accepted by bargaining coopera-
tives. Bargaining cooperatives might be in a posi-
tion to achieve monopolistic trade terms if they 
could significantly influence total supply of a 
product. Cooperatives with open membership 
would not be in a position to control supply. 
• Rules about the obligation of processing coopera-
tives to bargain with bargaining cooperatives and 
share the costs. Members of processing coopera-
tives frequently avoid the cost of bargaining while 
benefiting from price determinations provided by 
bargaining. Exemption from the obligation to 
bargain is claimed on the grounds that cooperative 
members cannot bargain with themselves. Many 
bargaining association members see this as an 
unfair free ride. Proprietary processors also con-
sider it unfair -- when bargaining with cooperative 
processors who are exempt from the obligation, 
they face costs and obligations not imposed on 
their competition. 
• Rules determining the scope of the bargaining asso-
cwuon. A bargaining cooperative's effectiveness 
generally improves as its control over total supply 
of a commodity increases. Thus federal legislation 
is preferred to state legislation by those who seek 
regulatory assistance for cooperative bargaining. 
How Much Public Support Should Be Provided 
Cooperatives? 
Cooperation among farmers is not a naturally 
occurring phenomenon. The need for cooperation is 
frequently not recognized and preserved from gener-
ation to generation. Cooperative solutions to prob-
lems are not intuitively obvious to farmers whose 
expertise is in production rather than marketing. 
The danger is ever present that a cooperative board 
of directors may be controlle.d or misguided by a 
manager who is more concerned about personal 
interests than members' interests. 
Does the public sector have any special role in 
fostering and preserving an effective cooperative 
structure? The ACS is the focal point for coopera-
tive research and education. Extension and the land 
grant university system represent important cooper-
ating agencies in carrying out this mission. Proprie-
tary firms consistently question public policies that 
singie out cooperatives for special forms of assis-
tance. Farmer and cooperative needs are frequently 
prevented from being openly discus5ed by managers 
and directors who favor status quo strategies. 
Should Programs Be Modified? 
In appraising the social desirability of cooperative 
policy alternatives relative to the status quo, our 
purpose is to identify alternatives and their potential 
consequences. 
Specify Cooperative Qualification Standards 
Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act specifies eli-
gibility requirements for an agricultural marketing 
cooperative, but these requirements are not especially 
stringent. They place no restrictions on which pro-
ducers may become members, what activities cooper-
atives can engage in or what arrangements coopera-
tives might pursue with non-cooperatives. USDA 
could develop specific qualification standards that 
prescribe rules of conduct in terms of generally 
accepted cooperative principles. Ideally, the rules 
would specify the department's position on such 
matters as acceptable farmer and grower membership 
characteristics; cooperative joint ventures, conglom-
eration and involvement in businesses that are only 
tangentially related to food marketing; representa-
tiveness of boards or directors; and membership con-
trol. USDA support and recognition for special 
treatment would be limited to cooperatives meeting 
the standards. 
Transfer Enforcement Responsibility 
An alternative suggested by the Commission to 
Review the Antitrust Laws and Procedures is to place 
Section 2 enforcement responsibility with the FTC or 
the DOJ, which would require a Capper-Volstead 
amendment. This would erase any possible conflict 
of interest inherent in USDA enforcement. How-
ever. enforcement by FTC or DOJ would likely be 
less than sympathetic to the producer interest. The 
legislative history of Capper-Volstead suggests that 
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responsibility for Section 2 was placed in agriculture 
because Congress believed that a broad understand-
ing of agricultural markets and cooperative principles 
was necessary to enforce it properly. 
Expand USDA Surveillance 
Another alternative involves expanded systematic 
enforcement of cooperative activities within USDA. 
An autonomous agency attached to the secretary's 
office and answerable only to him would help assure 
systematic and rigorous USDA enforcement of the 
Capper-Volstead Act. A full-time legal and eco-
nomic staff would be needed to carry out this 
authority. 
The agency's initial responsibility would be to 
develop guidelines for evidence of monopolization, 
restraint of trade and undue price enhancement. 
These could be written in conjunction with coopera-
tive qualification standards. The agency 's responsi-
bilities would include monitoring cooperative activ-
ity for evidence of violations, determining when 
complaints should be served and preparing materials 
for subsequent administrative proceedings. 
Establishing such an agency would serve notice 
that USDA is committed to retaining its enforcement 
authority and might increase public confidence both 
in the department and in cooperatives. Such an ini-
tiative would run counter to current deregulation 
initiatives, and some cooperatives would object to the 
added regulatory burden. However, most coopera-
tives, ha·1ing little or no means of obtaining substan-
tial market power, would be unaffected. 
Increase Bargaining Support 
Increased support for cooperative bargaining 
might be accomplished either by strengthening coop-
erative provisions, curbing unfair or discriminatory 
practices against farmer members or by exclusive 
agency bargaining. The Agricultural Fair Practices 
Act could be strengthened by: 
• authorizing the secretary to investigate discrimi-
nation , on the submission of probable cause, and 
permitting a farmer or association to sue for civil 
damages resulting from discrimination. 
• providing a procedure for accrediting farmer bar-
gaining associations and requiring buyers to bar-
gain in good faith with accredited associations. 
• prohibiting a handler from offering more favora-
ble terms of trade to a farmer, who is not a mem-
ber of the accredited association, than are offered 
to the association. 
• providing for binding arbitration in case of 
impasse between an accredited association and a 
handler. 
Exclusive agency bargaining could be 
accomplished by: 
• defining bargaining units. 
• accrediting farmer associations. 
• requiring good faith bargaining. 
• requiring that an accredited association would 
have exclusive rights to represent all those in a 
defined bargaining unit, members and nonmem-
bers alike. 
• requiring open membership and democratic mem-
ber control of associations. 
Such arrangements are most applicable to contract 
situations where the farmer does not own the prod-
uct that is being produced, such as in poultry. In 
such situations the farmer is inherently in a vulnera-
ble economic position with little or no ability to 
influence trade terms. 
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Expand Research and Education Support 
One of the keys to agriculture's success has been 
the environment within which farmers and agribusi-
ness. firms compete. As farm and cooperative enter-
prises expand, they should be able to internally sup-
port a larger research and educational program. Yet 
studies consistently indicate that cooperatives lag 
behind the corporate sector in support for research. 
The need for education in the cooperative system is 
much greater than in corporate agriculture. 
If public research and education on cooperatives 
were eliminated, the strongest cooperatives would 
likely survive and continue to prosper. Cooperatives 
that face major adjustment problems would find sur-
vival more difficult without public sector assistance 
to provide direction for change. Fewer new cooper-
atives would be formed. 
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Over the years, the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) has been assigned responsibility for 
several laws which regulate trade practices in markets 
for farm products. This paper analyzes three types 
of trade practices regulated by seven laws (Table 1 ). 
Most of these laws were enacted in the 1920s and 
1930s. 
Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation 
Four laws were designed specifically to deal with 
potential antitrust problems in agricultural markets: 
• Packers and Stockyards Act (P&S) 
• Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
(CFTC) 
• Capper-Volstead Act (C-V) 
• Federal Seed Act (FSA). 
The Packers and Stockyards Act was enacted in 
response to a concentration of economic power in 
livestock markets that developed in the late 1800s. 
Meat packers -- referred to as "beef trusts" -- divided 
markets, allocated purchases among competitors and 
conspired to set prices in both the livestock and 
wholesale meat trade. Title II of the P&S prohibits 
discriminatory, collusive or monopolistic pra~tices by 
meat packers when the effect harms a person, 
restrains trade, manipulates price or creates a 
monopoly. Title III regulates stockyards by author-
izing the licensing of marketing agents and dealers as 
Table 1. Statutory intent of the major agricultural trade practice laws. 
Intent P&S 1 I PACA
2 
Reduce concentrations I 
of power, collusive ~ 
I behavior and eliminate unfair practices. 
Increase producer 
bargaining power. 
Assure prompt and 
full payment for ~ 
products marketed. 
1Packers end Stockyards Act (P&Sl 
2 Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) 
3 Capper-Volsteed Act (C-Vl 
~ 
~ 
4 Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) 
6 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTC) 
6 U.S. Warehousing Act (USWA} 
7 Federal Seed Act (FSA) 
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we]) as establishing rule~ that foster more competitive 
market conditions and fair trade practices. The 
Packers and Stockyards Act gives the secretary of 
agriculture the power to regulate poultry markets in 
addition to livestock markets. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act 
was designed to curb such anti-competitive behaviors 
in the futures market as market squeezes, corners 
and manipulations. Initially, the authority ·for 
futures market regulation rested with the secretary of 
agriculture, but in 1974, CFTC was made an inde-
pendent regulatory agency. This move partially 
reflected the inherent conflict between futures trad-
ing in agricultural commodities and the traditional 
role of USDA in supportine farm prices and helping 
expand markets for farm products. In addition, the 
types of items traded in the futures market have 
expanded to also include nonagricultural transactions. 
The Capper-Volstead Act provides a public protec-
tion against undue price enhancement by coopera-
tives. This restricts the potential ability of dominant 
cooperatives to control enough of the suppiy of a 
commodity to raise prices above a competitive mar-
ket price. Section 1 of the C-V Act gives farmers 
and their cooperatives virtually unlimited right to 
join together in cooperatives or associations. 
The Federal Seed Act imposes truth-in-labeling 
regulations on seed moving in interstate commerce. 
It requires that labels contain certain facts about the 
se~d. forbids false advertising of seed and sets stan-
dards for imported and certified seed . 
Bargaining Power for Farmers 
If farmers received the same or similar organiza-
tional rights as labor, processors would be required 
to bargain in good faith with bargaining organiza-
tions that represent agricultural producers. As con-
tracts between processors and growers have been 
used more~ producers have become more interested 
in rules to encourage good faith bargaining. The 
main laws affecting producer bargaining are those 
affecting farmers' rights to organize cooperatives. 
The Capper-Volstead Acr gave marketing coopera-
tives the right to organize even to the extent of cre-
ating a monopoly. However, the act does not allow 
cooperatives to use illegal competitive tactics, such as 
predatory practices and collusion with non-coopera-
tive companies, nor to unduly enhance prices. 
The Agricultural Fair Practices Act (AFPA) was 
intended to prevent discrimination against producers 
by buyers or members of cooperatives and bargaining 
organizations. Discriminatory practices include pay-
ing producers different prices for the same products, 
charging different fees for services or using different 
methods of determining product quality. 
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Prompt and Full-Pay Provisions 
A persistent problem in farm product markets has 
been failure by marketing firms to pay producers 
promptly. In addition, producers frequently have 
had little or no assurance that they would be paid in 
full because of the poor financial condition of buyers. 
Under bankruptcy law, a farmer who sells produce to 
a buyer and does not receive full payment is treated 
as an unsecured creditor. The producer and other 
unsecured creditors must share what assets remain 
after the claims of secured creditors are settled. 
Three laws deal with the prompt and full-pay prob-
lem in quite different ways -- the Perishable Agricul-
tural Commodities Act, the U.S. Warehouse Act and 
the Packers and Stockyards Act. 
The Perishable Agriculwral Commodities Act 
(PACA) made possible iong-distance marketing of 
fresh fruits and vegetables by providing a central 
system for arbritration of disputes about the quality 
of perishable products. PACA basically establishes a 
code of conduct making it unlawful for a merchant, 
dealer or broker to use unfair, discriminatory or 
deceptive practices: reject delivery or fail to deliver 
in accordance with the terms of a contract: destroy 
products received; or make false or misleading state-
ments about a transaction. While this may sound 
like an antitrust-unfair practices law, the most typical 
case under PACA involves failure to pay promptly 
because of disputes about product quality. 
The U.S. \Varehousing Acr 's (USWA) jurisdiction 
is limited to warehouses licensed under the USWA or 
approved for storage of Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion owned or "loaned" commodities. Warehouse 
receipts issued under the USW A are uniform, 
dependable and acceptable in financial circles for 
loans. Surveillance, through unannounced compre-
hensive warehouse examinations, is used to enforce 
the USW A. The act provides an assurance of 
prompt and full payment for agricultural commodi-
ties in storage but does not regulate merchandising 
operations of buyers. 
The Packers and Stockyards Aci includes several 
provisions to assure prompt and full payment. It 
requires payment by check or electronic funds trans-
fer within 24 hours of purchase; it grants USDA the 
power to revoke licenses; and it creates a trust that, 
in effect, gives livestock producers priority over 
secured and unsecured creditors of the buyer in the 
event of bankruptcy. This approach is also used in 
fruits and vegetables and has been suggested for 
grain and cotton. 
The Current Programs 
The current regulatory emphasis under each of the 
seven laws reflects the evolution of regulatory 
activity, the industry structure and its problems. 
Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation 
USDA's regulatory thrust in enforcing the Packers 
and Stockyards Act has consisted largely of respond-
ing to charges by complaintants. In fact, it would 
appear that P&S antitrust surveillance and enforce-
ment activities are largely dormant with few 
resources devoted to this function at a time when 
structure issues are very important. Antitrust 
enforcement focuses mostly on unfair trade practice 
regulation, commercial bribery and discriminatory 
advertising. 
Considerable question exists regarding the viability 
of the P&S antitrust enforcement program. While 
major changes have occurred in the structure of the 
livestock , meat and poultry industries, P&S adminis-
trators have done little but study these changes. 
Efforts to regulate the broiler industry were stifled 
by legal questions regarding USDA authority under 
P&S to regulate anything but "live" poultry markets. 
Recent trends of acquisitions, consolidations and 
integration of beef, pork, and sheep slaughter capac-
ity deserves careful analysis by P&S. At a minimum. 
P&S should be in a position to provide concise 
information on structural developments and their 
economic implications. 
The focus of CFTC regulation is establishment of 
markets and trading rules, and enforcement of those 
rules. Nearly 50 percent of its resources are devoted 
to these activities. On the other hand, only 7 percent 
of its resources are devoted to a surveillance unit, 
which monitors day-to-day performance for manipu-
lation, corners, squeezes and other violations. In 
effect, the surveillance function is the policeman on 
the beat for CFTC. It appears a reexamination of 
priorities regarding the relative importance of sur-
veillance is in order. 
While the USDA has investigated allegations of 
undue price enhancement by cooperatives, it has not 
found any violations in more than 60 years. How-
ever, because USDA has never explicitly defined 
undue enhancement, it may not have known what it 
was looking for. Alternatively, there may never have 
been undue enhancement or the USDA may have 
been protecting cooperative interests. While a moni-
toring unit has been proposed to handle Capper-Vol-
stead enforcement responsibilities within USDA, it 
has never been established. 
Emphasis in the FSA program is placed upon 
complementing whatever seed inspection programs 
exist at the state level. USDA appears to hesitate in 
prosecuting "main line" seed companies for viola-
tions of the Federal Seed Act. It has been recom-
mended by the Agricultural Marketing Service that 
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the Federal Seed Act be repealed, but no action has 
been taken. 
Bargaining Power For Farmers 
· The Agricultural Fair Practices Act, while enacted 
with good intentions, became so watered down in the 
legislative process that it is largely an inactive and 
ineffective piece of legislation. Changes proposed to 
improve the law have not received serious considera-
tion by either USDA or Congress. 
Without question, the most important source of 
bargaining strength for farmers lies in the Capper-
Volstead Act. Through court interpretation, Cappe:-
Volstead has given cooperatives virtually unlimited 
authority to merge -- even to the extent of monopoly 
influence, as long as the monopoly is not accom-
plished by predatory means. If cooperatives develop 
monopoly power and substantially raise prices, they 
can be challenged by the secretary of agriculture; 
however, there has never been such a challenge. 
Prompt and Full Pay 
The key to assurance of prompt and full pay 
under PACA is the immediate arbitration process 
and the threat of license revocation for nonpayment. 
Bonding requirements for firms are generally limited 
to those with a history of slow pay. This has not 
provided adequate protection in the event of insol-
vency. As a result, legislation similar to the protec-
tion accorded livestock producers has been proposed 
for producers of perishable agricultural products. 
The U.S. Warehousing Act regulates approxi-
mately 54 percent of commercial cotton storage 
capacity (70 percent of output) and 43 percent of 
grain storage capacity (30 percent of output). Only 
commodities in storage are covered by the USW A. 
Enforcement activities consist primarily of periodic 
unannounced audits. 
Most bankrupt grain and cotton operations have 
failed because of the effects of speculation and inad-
equate hedging on their merchandising operation. 
Farmer~ receive no prompt and full pay protection 
for "cash" sales to merchants of storable commodi-
ties. Thus, increasingly popular "call" or "delayed 
pricing" contracts are not regulated. Such contracts 
are an extension of unsecured credit by the farmer-
producer. No action has been taken to extend suc-
cessful prompt and full pay regulation used in live-
stock and fruits and vegetables to grain. 
Provisions in the Packers and Stockyards Act 
which changed claim priorities in the event of bank-
ruptcy have become increasingly important in pro-
tecting livestock producers against losses. Claims in 
fruits and vegetables have greatly exceeded expecta-
tions with good results. 
What the Programs Have Accomplished 
The accomplishments of marketing regulation 
appear to have waned as industry structure, technol-
ogy and market procedures have changed. An 
exception is the new protection of prompt and full 
pay programs created under the Packers and Stock-
yards Act and the Perishable Agricultural Commodi-
ties Act. 
Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice Regulation 
The Packers and Stockyards Act played an impor-
tant role in eliminating unfair trade practices and 
thereby ensuring more competitive markets for live-
stock during a period dominated by central livestock 
markets. The result was more efficient market oper-
ation and a redistribution of benefits toward farmers. 
P&S has not dealt as effectiveiy with more recent 
developments such as packer concentration. vertical 
integration, pricing problems in wholesale markets or 
increased concentration of procurement in live cattle 
markets (particular! ~ outside of major production 
areas). It has become a sterile agency in terms of 
structure regulation. 
The regulatory scope of the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission has broadened considerably as 
futures markets expand to encompass more agricul-
tural and nonagricultural commodities. As a result, 
the Commission has facilitated the ability of both 
buyers and sellers to hedge an ever larger number of 
commodities. Unfair practices and market abuses 
have been reduced. Yet, questions remain about 
market manipulation by major market intermediaries 
because of their size, market position and superior 
market information. Little attention has been given 
to these issues. 
Capper-Volstead regulation of undue price 
enhancement has been essentially nonexistent. Pros-
ecution has b-=en left mostly to the Antitrust Division 
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission. Substantial evidence exists that the 
secretary of agriculture has not carried out Capper-
Volstead enforcement responsibilities. 
The Federal Seed Act has provided a broader base 
for more uniform regulation of the quality and iden-
tity of seeds. However, regulation is spotty and tends 
to avoid conflict with major seed suppliers. Such a 
strategy reduces the effectiveness of regulation in 
states where agriculture is less important and pro-
vides a lower level of protection to home gardeners. 
The need for this regulation is in doubt. 
Producer Bargaining Power 
For commodities such as milk, processed fruits 
and processed vegetables, the Capper-Volstead Act 
(in conjunction with marketing orders) has 
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substantially helped farmers gain more marketing 
power. Similar benefits have not occurred for con-
tract growers as a result of the Agricultural Fair 
Practices Act. AFPA cases are now nonexistent, 
mainly because of adverse legal decisions. 
Prompt and Full Payment 
The CS. Warehousing Act offers little protection 
because it lacks full commodity coverage. Its cover-
age of warehouse capacity is limited and its coverage 
of commodities is restricted to those actually in stor-
age. Thus, it omits protection for merchandising 
act1v1t1es. As a result, grain and cotton producers 
tend to look to new forms of protection, like that 
afforded by the P&S and PACA. Provisions for sto-
rable commodity produce (grain) have been added to 
the bankruptcy act to provide priority for farmer-
sellers if the elevator goes bankrupt. 
The Key Issues 
This performance assessment raises the following 
key issues: 
• Is it possible for the USDA to effectively carry out 
antitrust regulatory functions? The USDA record 
on P&S Title II and C-V undue enhancement is 
not good. Questions exist regarding USDA 's 
resolve to enforce regulations, in part because of 
conflicts of interest between regulatory programs 
and other departmental programs and activities. 
The legislative history of commodity exchange 
regulation clearly shows that Congress recognized 
this conflict of interest in futures regulation by 
creating an independent agency. Could steps be 
undertaken to assure greater independence within 
USDA? 
• Should USDA have a uniform, comprehensive 
prompt and full payment policy? The prompt and 
full payment provisions of Packers and Stockyards 
and P ACA appear to be working reasonably well. 
The Warehousing Act represents a different 
problem because of its exclusion of commodity 
merchandising operations. 
• What changes are needed in regulations to deal 
with contractual arrangements? Neither Packers 
and Stockyards, Perishable Commodities, Fair 
Practices nor the Warehousing Act deal effectively 
with contract agriculture. 
• Should regulatory programs be made more self-fi-
nancing and more self-enforcing? The question is 
particularly relevant to Packers and Stockyards, 
Title III (stockyards), the Warehousing Act, Seed 
Act, Futures Trading Commission and possibly 
Capper-Volstead. 
Should the Programs he Modified? 
Intensify Antitrust and Unfair Trade Practice 
Enforcement 
Intensifying antitrust and unfair trade practice 
enforcement implies changes in the Packers and 
Stockyards, Capper-Volstead and Fair Practices Acts, 
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
For Packers and Stockyards, intensification would 
require a substantial shift and augmentation of 
resources to Title II enforcement. In addition , an 
evaluation is needed of why grade and weight sales 
methods have failed to capture a significant market 
share. Grade and yield sales of hogs have been ham-
pered by the multiplicity of incomparable private 
grades and a variety of methods for cakulating the 
carcass price. In Denmark, a combination of elec-
tronic scale and backfat measurement are used uni-
formly to measure leanness, with payments made 
accordingly. It is questionable whether such actions 
would stabilize or reduce strong industry trends 
toward a concentrated-integrated livestock marketing 
system. Intensified enforcement and pricing system 
changes could help maintain an open, competitive 
market for farm products and thus aid the survival of 
small-scale farmer-feeders. 
More intensive enforcement of Capper-Volstead 
would require defining the concept of undue price 
enhancement, assigning enforcement responsibilities 
to a regulatory agency such as the Agricultrual Mar-
keting Service and maintaining the economic exper-
tise needed to analyze possible undue enhancement 
cases. The greatest benefit would accrue to coopera-
tives who regularly serve the public interest, con-
sumers and agribusiness firms. 
The Agricultural Fair Practices Act would need 
strengthening to make it an effective policy tool for 
curbing unfair and discriminatory practices against 
farmers and their cooperatives. This would expand 
the authority of USDA to conduct investigations and 
prosecute violations. It would also clarify the intent 
of the Fair Practices Act. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
needs to increase its resource commitment to sur-
veiJlance activities. Its concern for industry conduct 
and performance would expand beyond simply 
intensifying trade practice detection and enforcement 
act1v1ty. It could, in addition, investigate structural 
problems and advise the Department of Justice on 
antitrust action that might be taken to develop more 
competitive structures and patterns of conduct. 
Remove Antitrust Regulatory Responsibilities from 
USDA 
To overcome possible USDA inhibitions about 
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enforcing antitrust and unfair trade practice laws, 
this responsibility could be removed from the USDA 
entirely. This presumably would involve transferring 
the job to another agencey. such as the Federal Trade 
Commission or the Department of Justice. Regard-
ing Packers and Stockyards, the statute just might be 
repealed. Regulation of livestock, poultry and meat 
markets would then fall exclusively under general 
antitrust laws. This would clarify, for example, who 
has responsibility for monitoring competitive condi-
tions in the meat industry. On the other hand, 
USDA clearly has the greatest expertise on the struc-
ture and operations of the livestock and poultry 
ind us tries. 
Broaden Prompt and Full Pay Coverage 
A number of alternatives exist for dealing with the 
prompt and full pay issue. 
• All buyers could be required to provide the seller 
with a cashiers check, certified check or electronic 
funds transfer upon delivery. If unable to provide 
assured payment, the buyer would at once give the 
seller solvency information. This alternative 
would not protect producers who have products in 
storage or those who sell on contract. Farmers 
whose products are covered by warehouse receipts 
generally do not have problems securing return of 
goods. Farmers who sell on delayed pricing con-
tracts can secure themselves by taking a Purchase 
Money Security Interest in the product sold under 
these contracts. 
• A federal or state assured payment program could 
be established to cover financial losses resulting 
from bankruptcy. Such insurance could be man-
datory, or voluntary where producers who desire it 
could pay a premium. If mandatory, it could be 
financed by merchant license fees, by a checkoff 
from the producers' price or by the government. 
• Producers could be given preferential treatment in 
bankruptcy proceedings. This procedure has been 
effectively used in Packers and Stockyards and 
PACA cases. However, it could undermine bank-
ruptcy laws. It also could lead to higher interest 
rates on marketing firm loans, the cost of which 
likely would be passed on to farmers. 
• The Warehousing Act could be strengthened to 
provide review and protection for merchandising 
and all storage activities. States could also be 
encouraged to adopt comparable procedures. 
Extend Regulation to Contract Agriculture 
Current market regulations did not envision an 
agriculture that involved significant contract trading. 
The exception is the Agricultural Fair Practices Act, 
which has been demonstrably ineffective. Major 
areas where contract coverage is questionable include 
Packers and Stockyards in livestock and poultry, the 
Perishable Commodities Act in fruits and vegetables, 
and the Warehousing Act in grains and cotton. If 
regulation of contract agriculture is determined to be 
unwarranted, at least contracting buyers could be 
required to clearly advise producers of their legal 
status. Such an advisory should include the nature of 
the transaction; each party's rights, duties and obli-
gations under the contract; and a signature indicating 
producer understanding. To avoid arrangements 
becoming laboriously legalistic, USDA could be 
charged with developing acceptable model state-
ments. 
Self-Financing and Self-Regulation 
Concerns about the cost of government programs 
and the increasing number of large-scale farmers 
raise the possibility of farmers and marketing firms 
either paying for the cost of regulation or regulating 
themselves. Self-financing through user fees is being 
adopted more frequently for service programs. In 
the case of regulatory programs, user fees increase 
the risk that those who pay the cost of regulation will 
have undue influence on the nature and extent of 
regulation. Self-regulation has the greatest potential 
when it is in the collective interest of the industry. It 
does not work well when conflicts of interest are 
involved (farmer bargaining power) between buyers 
and sellers. Of the four general areas examined, 
self-~egulation probably has the most potential for 
truth in trading. Self-regulation of antitrust would 
clearly not work. 
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Safe food supplies are desired by consumers, pro-
ducers and food processors. Safe means the absence 
of risk or hazard. Absolute safety is probably too 
costly to achieve in most areas of our lives. Rather, 
there is a cost-benefit trade-off between safety and 
some acceptable level of risk. 
Determination of "safe" food does not necessarily 
imply zero risk but rather a personal and societal 
judgement about the ievel of acceptable risk. The 
basic economic problem in food safety is one of bal-
ance between acceptable risk in our food supply, in 
terms of health consequences, and cost. 
The health hazard or saf et_ of a particular food 
item is expensive and nearly impossible for an indi-
vidual to determine. The major reasons for govern-
ment intervention in the area of food safety are the 
high costs of individual consumer information, 
destroyed products and health care due to morbidity 
and mortality resulting from ingestion of unsafe 
food. GoYernment regulations and agencies, rather 
than individual consumers, must determine, measure 
and monitor food supp lies for level of hazard or 
safety. 
Current Food Safety Legislation 
and Programs 
The intent of major food safety legislation gener-
ally is to regulate food processing to prevent adulter-
ation, prot.ect public health, prevent degradation of 
food products over time and promote truthful label-
ing and information about food product ingredients. 
Thousands of specific regulations have been issued to 
accomplish the broad legislative intent. Some of the 
initial legislation was passed early in this century. 
Early Legislation 
In 1906 Congress passed the Pure Food Act and in 
1907 the Meat Inspection Act, both as a response in 
part to publication of l.Jpton Sinclair's The Jungle. 
The book detailed unsanitary conditions in the 
nation's major meatpacking houses. 
Though these early laws represented a policy 
breakthrough. they were weak compared to current 
food and drug laws. For example. drug provisions 
were restricted to prohibitions against misbranding 
(specifically false and misleading claims). In dis-
putes. the burden of proof was on the government, 
not food manufacturers using the drug or those pro-
ducing· the drug. 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) 
In 1938, the current foundation of food safety leg-
islation was passed in the form of the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act. The Act contains provisions 
relating to food and animal feed and to human and 
animal drugs. It also defines adulteration and condi-
tions of contamination of food by other substances. 
According to Section 402 of the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act as ammended, food is adulterated 
if it contains substances potentially injurious to 
health; any added poisonous or deleterious substance; 
any unprocessed agricultural commodity with unsafe 
pesticide residues; or any filthy, putrid or decom-
posed substances. In addition, the legislation covers 
any food prepared, packed or held under unsanitary 
conditions; the product of a diseased animal or one 
that died other than by slaughter; unsafe packaging 
materials; radiation; and confectionery products. 
The Act prohibits adulterated or misbranded 
products in interstate commerce. It provides the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with power to 
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inspect products and establishments to monitor com-
pliance with the law. Among other powers, FDA has 
authority to establish tolerance levels for contami-
nants and to mandate safety testing prior to licensing 
a product for distribution by company. FDA may 
require a product's withdrawal from the market if 
evidence indicates lack of safety. If violators are 
found , FDA can take various actions, ranging from 
warnings, product recall and publicity to recommen-
dations to the Justice Department fo r legal action. 
State laws regulating food products in intrastate 
commerce are often not as rigorous. 
Important amendments have expanded food safety 
law over the years. The cumulative body of food 
safety laws are: the Food , Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA), Meat Inspection Act , Poultry Products 
Inspection Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). These laws contain 
provisions concerning eight categories of food subs-
tances: 1) food additives, 2) color additives, 3) ani-
mal feed and drug additives, 4) pesticide residues, 5) 
food substances generally recognized as safe (GRAS), 
6) prior sanctioned substances, 7) naturally occurring 
substances, and 8) environmental contaminants. 
Along with the eight categories of food substances, 
the law prescribes five safety standards. Safety stan-
dards define when a substance should be prohibited 
and rules for licensing. 
In 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1967, important amend-
ments expanded the original Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act. Several of these amendments have 
important implications for food safety. 
The 1958 Food Additives Amendment 
The 1958 amendment requires that any substance 
added to food must be proven safe by the manufac-
turer. This law, in terms of food additives, is similar 
to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act for prescription 
drugs. It shifts the burden of proof of safety from 
government to private industry. In a sense, the 
amendment legitimizes the role of chemical technol-
ogy in producing and processing food. Included are 
intended additives, natural and synthetic additives 
and elements of packaging which may become part 
of food. 
Exemptions from 1958 Amendment 
The 1958 amendment also defines exemptions. 
Not included under the definition of food additives 
are substances which accidentally enter or become 
part of the food supply. Accidental additives include 
environmental contaminants and some cleaning solu-
tions. These may be permitted in food, despite clas-
sification as poisonous or deleterious substances, if 
occurrence is below specified tolerance levels. 
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Those substances "generally recognized as safe" 
(GRAS) are also exempt from the food additive 
amendment. The category includes two groups. 
Some fall under a grandfather clause which accords 
GRAS status to substances commonly used in food 
before January 1, 1958. GRAS substances not 
grandfathered require expert evaluation of scientific 
records for confirmation of safety. 
Pesticide chemicals which contaminate unpro-
cessed agricultural products. primarily fresh fruits 
and vegetables, do not conform to the food additive 
amendment. They are exempted under the general 
adulteration portion of the Act unless they occur in 
quantities above tolerances set by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
The Delaney Clause 
A clause added to the 1958 Food Additive 
Amendment states that no additive is safe if found to 
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if 
found , after appropriate tests , to induce cancer in 
man or animal. This simple clause is known as the 
Delaney Amendment. Ironically, the controversy 
surrounding this clause exceeds its actual use. It 
rarely has been applied in food safety decisions 
although the influence of Delaney is considerable. 
Even if the Delaney clause were eliminated, it 
appears enforcement would not change materially . 
A 1960 Color Additives Amendment contained a 
second statement of the Delaney Clause, pertaining 
to substances added to food to enhance color. 
Another amendment passed in 1962 also required 
that drugs be proven effective as well as safe. In 
addition to evidence of safety and efficacy, the law 
requires manufacturers to submit descriptions of 
manufacturing, processing and packaging procedures; 
proposed labeling: and proposed tolerance to FDA. 
The section on animal drugs states that a drug 
inducing cancer but intended fo1 use in animals may 
be approved under the condition of use specified. 
Also, the drug cannot adversely affect the animal for 
which it is intended and no residue of such drug may 
be found in any edible portion of such animals after 
slaughter. 
Agency Structure 
Agencies that administer federal programs for 
food safety include the: 
• Food and Drug Administration of the Department 
of Health and Human Services 
• U.S. Department of Agriculture 
• Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
• Departments of Commerce and Interior 
• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
In addition to these agencies, the Department of 
Defense assumes responsibility for food safety for all 
military personnel. Even the State Department may 
become involved in food safey issues. This recently 
occurred with regard to DES and meat exports from 
the United States. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has primary 
responsibility for inspection of red meats, poultry 
and egg products. The Environmental Protection 
Agency and FDA share responsibility for the inspec-
tion of fresh fruits and vegetables. The EPA sets 
standards on pesticide tolerance for fresh fruits and 
vegetables while FDA actually enforces the toler-
ances established by EPA. 
What the Programs Haye Accomplished 
Food safety laws and regulations in the United 
States have achieved remarkable success in removing 
the "immediate" health risk from ingestion of food. 
Consumers may choose from a wide variety of food 
and be reasonably sure their next meal will not pose 
any serious threat to their health. Unfortunately, the 
effects of continually ingesting some foods, which 
contain substances at current legal levels, over long 
periods of time are still uncertain. From this stand-
point, the food safety programs have been effective 
in reassuring consumers who, for the most part, feel 
they are protected. There are some, however, who 
feel skeptical about the level of protection. 
Facilitating Marketing 
Food safety programs regulate food additives and 
provide for inspection and enforcement. This assures 
all consumers that food meets or exceeds some level 
of safety. This assurance allows potential buyers, 
when making their purchase decisions, to concentrate 
on other product attributes such as nutritional value, 
appearance or convenience. 
Food safey programs also sustain a lower-cost food 
distribution channel by alleviating wholesalers and 
retailers of the fear of reprisals for the sale of harm-
ful products. Safety regulations also reduce infor-
mation costs, allowing exchange of items without the 
necessity of buyers personally inspecting and testing 
individual products. 
Redistributing Costs and Benefits 
The costs and benefits of food safety regulations 
do not fall evenly on all consumers and business 
firms. However, it is difficult to determine the pre-
cise impacts on various income classes of consumers 
and sizes of business firms. For example, the 1967 
Wholesome Meat Act imposed federal standards, 
which were higher than existing standards in most 
states, on all meat processing firms. It is believed 
this caused small-scale firms to suffer relatively more 
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than large-scale firms because of higher compliance 
costs. Several small-scale firms are believed to have 
been forced out of business because of these 
increased compliance costs. 
The cost of food safety programs to consumers is 
imprecise at best. If expenditures for inspection and 
enforcement are paid from general tax revenue, the 
costs are distributed in the same manner as the tax 
burden. However, not all the costs are borne directly 
by taxpayers; some costs are borne by food firms 
which pass them on to consumers in the form of 
higher prices for products. On balance, the distribu-
tion of costs probably falls more heavily on lower-in-
come consumers than upon the more wealthy. 
Another cost is the removal of food deemed 
unsafe for human consumption. By removing such 
products, safety programs prohibit consumers from 
trading off safety against price, assuming such food 
would be offered at lower prices. This diminished 
availability may, in the long-run. raise average food 
prices and have relatively more impact on low-in-
come consumers. In this instance, benefits have to 
be weighed against costs. 
Government regulation may require some food 
processors, especia11y smaller volume ones, to main-
tain a higher level of food safety in their products 
than they would without regulation. This forces 
them into a narrower market segment. raising their 
costs without expanding demand for food. Large 
manufacturers typically exceed legally mandated 
safety levels. Processors probably experience signifi-
cant economies of size in complying with regulation. 
Thus, when safety levels are imposed or increased 
oyer time, small volume processors are adversely 
affected more than large ones, which may lead to 
fewer but larger firms . This tends to concentrate 
processing over time within a few large companies. 
The Key Issues 
Evaluation of current food safety programs and 
procedures raises three key policy issues: 
e framework for governmental decisions. 
• definition of "safe" and public health. 
• agency coordination and policy implementation. 
Framework for Governmental Decisions 
Some observers and analysts argue that food safety 
policy be based on risk/benefit assessment. This 
would involve judgemental decision-making about 
the trade-off between estimated hazard potential and 
the possible benefit of a particular food substance. 
Scientists could theoretically measure risks associ-
ated with many different additives and contaminants. 
These risks are usually stated as some percent chance 
of one additional disease occurrence per 1,000 
persons from use of particular substance. However, 
the translation of this risk into a cost, or value in the 
case of risk avoidance, either to society or to individ-
uals, lacks precision. 
Additional difficulty with the risk/benefit frame-
work is encountered with valuing of human life. 
Lives and risks to life are not traded in conventional 
markets. No observations of various consumers' 
willingness to pay to avoid risk can be made. Thus, 
if risk/benefit calculations attempt to incorporate the 
value of human life, subjective judgments are neces-
sary. 
The core issue is whether or not an explicit 
accounting of positive and negative aspects of food 
additives should be attempted, given the acknowl-
edged imprecision and subjectivity of such calcula-
tions. Some argue it is the only rational policy 
framework for decisions. Others argue that because 
the calculations would be imprecise and subjective, a 
decision framework should not depend on such 
methods. 
Definition of "Safe" and Public Health 
A legislative definition of safe has been an issue vir-
tually since passage of the 1958 Delaney Amend-
ment. The definition of safe is essentially a policy 
question and must be decided in the political arena. 
The current Delaney Clause presumes that addi-
tives which prove to be carcinogenic in laboratory 
animals are not safe for human consumption. Toler-
ance or permissible levels of some additives would be 
permitted in the food supply if a legal restriction 
such as Delaney were absent. This would represent a 
significant shift in the current definition of safe. 
Some suggest changes in wording that would ban a 
substance when it is shown to be carcinogenic to 
humans, not just animals. 
Agency Coordination and Policy Implementation 
The current regulatory agency structure can lead 
to different treatment of identical risks and inconsis-
tency in food additive classification -- both within 
agencies and across agencies. Some argue that 
agency responsibility should be changed sufficiently 
to produce simplified and uniform treatment of 
substances that have identical risks. 
FDA and USDA coordination is a related issue. 
The problem is mostly one of improving the consis-
tency of regulations affecting processors and manu-
facturers, regardless of which federal agency has 
authority. Differing regulatory philosophies can vary 
from cooperation to policing. Increased coordination 
may accomplish more effective and efficient policy 
implementation. 
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Should Legislation and Programs 
Be Modified? 
The issues raised suggest some broad alternatives 
to current food safety programs. The suggested 
alternatives, in no particular order, are: 
• greater reliance on market forces to provide safe 
food supplies. 
• extend coverage of the Delaney clause. 
• shift legal and regulatory framework to acceptable 
risk. 
Greater Reliance on the Market 
This alternative abandons the Delaney Clause and 
allows market forces to operate more fully in the 
provision of various levels of food safety to consum-
ers. 
Some argue that the private sector could provide 
·consumer information about the risks and relative 
safety of various products. No particular level of risk 
would be banned from the market by legislative or 
regulatory edict. Presumably, different levels of food 
safety would be available and consumers would be 
free to choose among them , given adequate informa-
tion to do so. 
Providing safety information to the consumer 
presents some difficulties, however. Would informa-
tion originate from food product suppliers or inde-
pendent sources? Could consumers believe informa-
tion compiled by suppliers? Because of the 
suppliers' financial interest in their products, close 
inspection of their product information would be 
required. This could increase government regulation 
or the time consumers spend sifting through infor-
mation. 
Alternatively, an independent testing service, 
either public or private, could determine a product's 
risks to health or safety and supply this information 
to consumers. While such information might have 
more credibility, it also would require a system of 
sampling, testing and publication of results. The 
problem with this approach is that quality and safety 
of food products fluctuate greatly from item to item 
or even from day to day in production. The amount 
of information necessary would be vast. Meat, milk, 
fruits and vegetables sold by a single processor may 
come from hundreds of producers. The consumer is 
unlikely to find information about the average risk of 
a product very helpful. 
A significant disadvantage in these situations is the 
burden placed on the consumer to process the infor-
mation that is presented. Data about risks to health 
and safety are often difficult to understand without 
advanced training and experience in subjects such as 
toxicology, epidemiology and statistical inference. 
Even if such information were put in "layman's 
language," it is doubtful that consumers could 
understand the health implications of their consump-
tion. In addition to understanding the information, 
processing the information would be a considerable 
task. Weekly food purchases for a typical family 
include scores of items. Each item would need to be 
checked to verify that it presented an acceptable level 
of risk. The time and cost required to process the 
available information means many consumers would 
not regularly use the information. This could cause 
more frequent occurrence of adverse health effects, 
even deaths , with their attendant costs to individuals 
and society. 
Individual consumers generally do not consider 
societal impacts of food risks. For example, certain 
types of food contamination may have unnoticeable 
effects fo;- several years or generations, but then 
cause a seeming explosion of genetic disorders or 
other problems in the population. This "time bomb" 
effect would be difficult for most consumers to factor 
into price and other quality characteristics of a prod-
uct. Also , the individual's preferences for incurring 
such risk may place a significant burden on society at 
a future time. It can be argued that decisions about 
acceptable food risks should be made only from a 
society-wide perspective, and resolved through the 
scientific and political decision process. 
The advantage of this alternative is that it attempts 
to minimize public sector costs for food safety and 
maximize consumer choice. Private costs of proces-
sor compliance with government regulation could be 
reduced under this alternative. Individual consumer 
costs with regard to food safety would increase. 
Retail food prices, on the average, may be less if 
processor or distributor cost-savings from "deregula-
tion" were passed on to consumers and if "less safe" 
but lower cost food were supplied at retail. Govern-
ment or private firm costs of evaluating safety, mon-
itoring food manufacturing and distribution, and dis-
seminating information may not be reduced much 
from the current situation. 
Extension of Delaney-Type Coverage 
A second alternative to current food safety pro-
grams is to extend Delaney-type coverage to a wider 
range of health concerns, such as heart disease or 
high blood pressure, and broaden the extent of pub-
licly funded information on food safety. A corner-
stone of this alternative would be a total ban on 
additives suspected of carcinogenicity in man or ani-
mal. No risk/benefit framework would be part of 
this food safety policy. 
The Delaney alternative would include increased 
public funding for toxicological and basic biological 
research. In addition, budgets for FDA, USDA and 
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other agencies currently possessing regulatory 
responsibility would be increased. These agencies 
would bolster their monitoring activities and provide 
additional food safety information and regulation for 
consumers. Whatever regulations necessary would be 
implemented to move the available food supply as 
close as possible to zero risk in terms of public 
health consequences, both present and future, 
regardless of cost. 
The costs of this alternative could be much higher 
than current food safety programs. The objective of 
this alternative would be to come as close as possible 
to providing the nation with food at zero risk . The 
burden of processing information and monitoring 
supplies would be placed mainly on government. 
Implementation would be through FDA, USDA and 
other appropriate agencies. Individual consumer 
costs for processing information likely would be less 
but public cost via taxes would be greater. Also , 
food prices would rise to the extent that processors 
and distributors pass on higher compliance costs to 
consumers. 
Acceptable Risk Framework 
The performance of the system now in place must 
be given high marks for effectiveness. Fine tuning 
current laws and agencies seems more appropriate 
than restarting implementation of food safety policy. 
This alternative would entail an acceptable risk 
framework for food safety decisions rather than a 
zero risk framework. Some food safety decisions 
already are made on the basis of risk/benefit calcula-
tions, but these are not really systematic and explicit. 
This alternative would explicitly mandate a sys-
tematic risk/benefit approach to food safety regula-
tions and policy decisions. This approach recognizes 
that most food safety decisions involve some risk to 
at least some people. There is no option that gives a 
truly zero level of risk. Shifting to the risk/benefit 
approach would keep consumers and governmental 
decision-makers aware of the risk involved. It would 
change the decision from "Is the product safe?" to 
"What is the acceptable level of risk and to whom?" 
Keeping the decision explicit would permit more 
realistic thinking about the risks and a constant reali-
zation that efforts should be made to reduce risks. 
Current food safety laws and regulations would 
still hold except for the Delaney-zero risk objective. 
Established regulatory responsibilities would remain 
virtually unchanged . Mechanisms for this approach 
already exist within FDA and USDA, so actual 
implementation of this alternative would be simpli-
fied. 
This framework is far from perfect. Particular 
cases would require judgements, especially where the 
hazards and benefits cannot yet be measured in com-
mon terms. As previously mentioned, a significant 
unresolved issue is the appropriate method for eval-
uating risk to human life and health. Nor do we 
have the methodology to assess risk in all cases. The 
extent to which public and private costs of an alter-
native would be increased , as compared to the cur-
rent system, is unknown . 
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!vlost of the federal agricultural marketing pro-
grams discussed in these leaflets were initiated in the 
fast half of the 20th century. Since then, agriculture 
has changed tremendously and is moving rapidly 
toward an industrialized system like that of the rest 
of the economy. Strategies for updating and chang-
ing agricultural marketing programs are needed. 
Economic changes have created more specializa-
tion and interdependence among participants in agri-
cultural markets. This industrialization of agricul-
ture has led to demands for new forms of 
coordination. For txample, many trading arrange-
ments have shifted from the spot market to the con-
tract market, thus increasing interest in bargaining. 
Products purchased from farmers by contract must 
meet quality factors specified by buyers, who fre-
quently modify official grades and standards. Con-
sumers often desire that even more stringent stan-
dards be placed on food safety; that the composition 
of highly processed foods be identified; and that 
explicit nutrition information be provided. 
As structural change occurs, support for marketing 
policy initiatives also changes. Large. complex cor-
porations in the industrialized marketing system are 
less open to public scrutiny and more secretive about 
their operations. This is partly because these firms 
have more at stake. Because they have advanced 
information systems, they have fewer requirements 
for public information and therefore, are less con-
cerned about cooperating to make public information 
systems accurate. Thus, the clientele makeup for 
marketing programs may gradually shift from large, 
commercial entities to less influencial market partici-
pants and the general public. 
Adjustments in marketing programs are being 
made continuously in response to changing market 
structure, new market mechanisms and new demands 
on the food and fiber system. However, as demon-
strated in this series of articles, these changes are just 
the tip of the industrialization iceberg. We need to 
prepare for even more radical change in the future. 
It is hoped these articles will foster thought about the 
evolving marketing system, how federal marketing 
programs must adjust and how desired changes may 
be sought. 
The Key Issues 
The authors have evaluated how well existing fed-
eral agricultural marketing programs meet four cri-
teria identified by Breimyer. 
• Does a program faciliiate market operations or 
induce desirable changes in market structure? 
• Does a program eliminate unfair marketing prac-
tices in order to protect weaker participants in the 
marketing system from abuse or exploitation? 
• Does the program improve 1echnica/ or pricing 
efficiency in marketing? 
• Does the program redistribuce costs and benefits 
borne by and received by market participants in 
an acceptable manner? 
Using these criteria, the evaluations have identi -
fied a number of key issues associated with each pro-
gram area (see Tables 1 and 2). While the programs 
cover a broad spectrum of marketing activitles. the 
key issues are surprisingly similar in several pro-
grams. 
For nearly two-thirds of the programs, questions 
have been raised about whether the program operates 
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in the public interest. This reflects increasing public 
concern about the industrialization of agriculture. 
public expectations regarding performance of the 
food system and conflict~ between the public interest 
and special interests within agriculture. Public inter-
est questions are, therefore, deeply rooted in several 
contemporary concerns regarding marketing pro-
grams -- perhaps the most deeply rooted of any of 
the key issues. Interest groups outside of agriculture 
are becoming more important constituents of mar-
keting programs. Special interests within agriculture 
are relaiii ely !ess important and they sense it. 
Much of the concern about marketing programs 
and the public interest has arisen from doubt that the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is commit-
ted to regulating in the public interest. Thb question 
was raised about both regulatory programs and ser-
vice programs such as advertising and promotion. 
The question reflects the fact that USDA is charged 
with regulating the very same industry that gives it 
political support. The origin of the issue lies in pub-
lic expectations, conflicts of interest, the special 
interest nature of the political process and the reality 
that the secretary of agriculture is more responsible 
to the president than to agricultural clientele inter-
ests. 
The private sector 's ability to perform government 
functions was raised as a key issue for two-thirds of 
the programs. With structural and technological 
change occurring in agriculture and related indus-
tries, increased possibilities exist for the private sec-
tor to perform services such as providing market 
information, grading and advertising. In addition, 
questions arose about whether the evolution of larger 
cooperatives makes marketing orders unnecessary for 
some commodities and markets. The answers to 
these questions are not clear -- that is what makes 
them a public policy issue. 
The need for mandatory compliance was identified 
as a priority concern in four service programs. For a 
number of commodities. marketing orders are used 
to gather information. require minimum grade stan-
dards, and fund. Refund provisions in some research 
and advertising checkoff programs remain contro-
versial. Bargaining cooperatives would like a man-
datory, good faith bargaining requirement for agri-
culture comparable to that for organized labor. 
Once again the root cause of these issues is largely 
one of structural change and reaction to competitive 
forces. For example, milk producers established the 
national milk promotion program to meet the com-
petition of highly advertised products such as Coke, 
Maxwell House or Parkay. Conflicts of interest 
become apparent when firms decline to voluntarily 
provide information or allow their products to be 
graded. 
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Table 2. Contemporary concerns giving rise to the key issues. 
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Cost-benefit comparisons are becoming more 
important for half the programs. While most people 
would be willing to admit some benefits from mar-
keting orders, many suspect that offsetting consumer 
costs are higher. Many also recognize that advertis-
ing programs may expand demand, but possibly at 
the expense of consumption of other commodities. 
In food safety, the question is whether cost-benefit 
analysis has any role. Public expectations and con-
flicts of interest play a key part in making program 
cost-benefit analysis a viable issue. Yet, difficulty 
exists in quantifying benefits where public good5 are 
involved. 
The consequences of deregulation are receiving 
increased attention. Public interest advocates see 
deregulation as a means of removing what they 
believe are adverse impacts of programs such as 
marketing orders. Those who are regulated question 
how they would fare in a free market environment, 
particularly where regulations have helped shape the 
current industry structure and marketing system. 
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maintain the number of producers, marked 
adjustment would occur if the orders were discontin-
ued. 
Self-financing is viewed as an alternative to dere-
gulation because it reduces direct costs to taxpayers. 
While self-financing makes sense for service pro-
grams, it may adversely affect regulatory programs. 
For instance, if the Packers and Stockyards Act or 
meat inspection regulations were fully self-financing, 
would the integrity of the system be sacrificed? 
Would regulators be captives of the meat packers and 
auction markets? 
It is argued some programs simply are outdated --
they no longer have a role in the public sector. 
These range from programs such as price reporting, 
in which the private sector might readily become 
more involved, to Packers and Stockyards regulation, 
where the industry has changed so radically that 
some current forms of regulation may no longer be 
needed, and to the Federal Seed Act which either 
needs to be strengthened or eliminated. 
Table 3. Marketing poliq alternatives by program area. 
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PolicJ Options 
The policy options mirror the issues. They range 
from a return to an unimpeded market (deregula-
tion) to even higher levels of control. Within this 
range, eight distinct policy options were identified 
and applied to different programs by the authors 
(Table 3). 
Agricultural markets are changing so rapidly that 
continuous program review. evaluation and modern-
ization is necessary just to keep pace. Regular pro-
gram review and modernization was a policy alterna-
tive discussed for every program analyzed. In each 
program, the basis for this policy was relatively 
unique. Regarding market information there is a call 
for contract reporting, utilization of modern infor-
mation technology and reporting of quantity in addi-
tion to price information. As for marketing orders, 
there is a need to provide greater recognition of the 
public interest as well as better adjustment to changes 
in the basic structure of industries involved. In the 
trade practice regulation area, there is a need to 
modernize the Packers and Stockyards Act and 
expand producer protection against marketing firm 
insolvency. 
Deregulation or discontinuance of a program was 
identified as an option for more than half of the 
programs. This does not constitute an endorsement 
for such a strategy. In each case, this option can 
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However, if for some reason none of the other 
options are pursued, deregulation or discontinuauce 
could become quite viable. 
The need to increase supervision and enforcemem 
of existing laws was also identified as an option for 
more than half of the programs. The public wants 
assurance that its interest is being reflected in mar-
keting program administration. Operating programs 
in the public interest does not mean they would be 
operated to the detriment of producers. In fact, 
even-handed administration of marketing orders, 
advertising, trade practice regulation and coopera-
tives may well be crucial to the continuation of these 
programs. 
The signal for marketing programs is not always 
one of cutting back. A substantial clientele would 
have government provide more services in areas such 
as price reporting, grading, trade practice regulation 
and cooperatives. However, many of the opportuni-
ties for increased marketing services are associated 
with potential conflicts of interest which, combined 
with budget constraints, have kept services from 
being initiated. 
Many marketing prograi;ns, such as grading and 
marketing orders, are already se(f-financing. Others 
are regulatory in nature and would raise conflict of 
interest questions if they were made self-financing. 
Yet, there is continuing interest from some quarters 
in expanding the requirement for fees from 
beneficiaries of government programs. 
Questions about the USDA's ability to administer 
regulatory marketing programs have resulted in sug-
gestions to Lr ans.fer functions to another agency. The 
Packers and Stockyard Act and the Capper-Volstead 
undue enhancement regulations have been the pri-
mary targets of such suggestions, though the USDA 
has the greatest expertise to administer these pro-
grams. Nevertheless, programs have been transferred 
from USDA when lack of rigorous enforcement was 
suspected. An example is the creation of the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission from the Com-
modity Exchange Authority, a USDA agency. 
Despite the trend toward deregulation, arguments 
were made for niaking twu programs mandatory. In 
an industrialized agriculture, the pricing system may 
function better with mandatory price reporting. 
Likewise, the use of official grades possibly should be 
mandatory. with uniform nomenclature. 
The use of cost benefit analysis has become 
increasingly common as a tool in making public pol-
icy decisions. A variation of this procedure is the 
official use of risk-benefit analysis in making food 
safety decisions. This policy option may be a practi-
cal alternative to controversial Delaney-type zero 
tolerance approaches. 
Changing Agricultural Marketing Programs 
As agriculture becomes more industrialized, its 
need for marketing programs does not diminish. The 
need may be for a different type of program and may 
involve a different clientele, but it still exists. The 
problem is one of determining future needs, and fol-
lowing strategies to achieve necessary program 
changes. The ability to meet that challenge will 
determine the scope of future agricultural marketing 
programs. 
Needed and desired program changes will not 
occur spontaneously. People must, and probably 
will, organize to seek these changes. What strategies 
might or can they take? 
Sources of Agency Discretion 
Marketing programs are products of a legislative 
struggle marked by deadlines, lack of detailed indus-
try knowledge uncertainty, competing interes1s and 
recognition of the need for administrative flexibility. 
As a result, the program mandates enacted by Con-
gress are not self-executing nor explicitly directive. 
Operating objectives, implementation and how to 
balance various interests are subject to interpretation 
by agency administrators. 
For example, Section 202a of the Packers and 
Stockyards Act dec!ares that it is unlawful for meat 
packers to "engage in any unfair, unjustly 
5 
discriminatory or deceptive practice or device." The 
meaning of "unfair,'' "deceptive" and similar terms is 
open to agency interpretation. Similarly, Section 
2(2)(a) of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
requires the secretary of agriculture to "protect the 
interest of the consumer," while Section 2( 1) charges 
the secretary with establishing parity prices for farm-
ers. While the Act clearly requires a balancing of 
conflicting interests, the relative emphases are left 
open to the administrative process to determine. 
The greater the number of objectives, the more 
conflicts with which an agency must deal. However, 
a broad agency mandate may not be matched ade-
quately with appropriated resources. As a result, an 
agency must exercise discretion in ranking objectives 
and allocating attention to the most pressing prob-
lems. 
The characteristic vagueness and broadness of 
program mandates, as well as the limited resources 
available for carrying them out, create three impor-
tant sources of discretion for agencies: 
• Agencies have discretion in interpreting program 
objectives and how statutory provisions apply in 
different cases. 
• They have discretion in balancing competing 
interests. 
• They have discretion in allocating effort. 
The type and degree of discretion given to adminis-
trative agencies differ among marketing programs. 
Programs designed to facilitate competitive, mar-
ket-oriented agriculture include public price report-
ing, food and agricultural commodity grading and 
advertising. Changes in these programs can increase 
direct costs to taxpayers or market participants, 
depending on how the changes are financed. Thus, 
agency discretion is limited. If new services or pro-
gram initiatives are sought, the agreement of those 
who would pay must be sought. However, these 
agencies can determine the effectiveness of their 
program services and impose some indirect costs on 
private parties, depending on how the agencies set 
standards. 
Public interest protection programs include !rade 
practice regulation and food safety programs. These 
programs can create indirect costs and benefits for 
certain classes of individuals. For example, trade 
practice and food safety regulations may cause higher 
production costs or foregone profit opportunities for 
some parties while giving other parties the benefits of 
new market opportunities, increased income, lower 
prices or increased product quality. Since such regu-
latory programs can redistribute wealth, the statutory 
language of their authorizing mandates is susceptible 
to negotiation during the legislative process. Con-
sequently, the provisions of these mandates are often 
broad and ambiguous, calling for substantial agency 
discretion. 
Where the authorizing statute allows substantial 
agency discretion, agencies may change program 
emphases by issuing new regulations, adjudicating 
cases and redesigning program activities. As a result, 
the amount and distribution of indirect costs and 
benefits of these programs are likely to be the subject 
of struggle between affected industry segments as 
well as between different levels within the marketing 
system. For example, the stringency of marketing 
order regulations has variable effects on producers 
facing different production costs. It also affects ben-
efits to producers relative to costs imposed on con-
sumers. 
It is important to understand the sources of agency 
di~cretion in order to determine how an agency's 
interpretation of its mandate may be changed. How-
ever, it is also important to realize that agency dis-
cretion is limited. Statutory language enacted by 
Congress determines what an agency must, may or 
may not do. Any change sought in an agency's 
interpretation of its mandate must be within these 
bounds. If the change exceeds these bounds, the 
appropriate avenue for seeking change in a market-
ing program is legislative or judidal. 
Interest Groups 
When programs and the agencies that implement 
them are created, external interests in the programs 
also are created. Some of these interests receive net 
benefits from a program while others incur net costs. 
Of course, the way an agency interprets its mandate 
affects the size and distribution of program benefits 
and costs. So any change sought in interpretation 
will also change those benefits and costs, and thus 
determine external support for and opposition to the 
program change. 
Different patterns of support and opposition may 
occur for different programs and different issues 
within programs. The differences depend on the 
amount of benefits or costs that various parties 
expect from programs and the costs of organizing 
support for, or opposition to, policy changes among 
those parties. For exampie, if the parties that receive 
the benefits of a program are numerous and diverse. 
the benefits received by any one individual within the 
group may be relatively small. Furthermore, the 
larger the group receiving benefits, the more difficult 
it is for the group to organize support or opposition 
to policy changes. Members of a large group have an 
incentive to "ride free," hoping to receive a share of 
the benefits while letting others bear the burden of 
organmng. The interests of individuals within the 
group are likely to be heterogenous, leading to 
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disagreements about what changes should be sought. 
In contrast, if the group receiving program ben-
efits is relatively small. the gains to individuals within 
the group are less diluted by tlie size of the group. 
Having more to gain. individuals in the group are 
less likely to "free ride ." The interests of individuals 
in the group also are more likely to be similar. Con-
sequently, organizing support for, or opposition to, 
policy changes is easier in smaller groups, and indi-
viduals are likely to commit greater resources to 
org3nization efforts. 
The same principles apply to parties who bear the 
program costs. The larger the group, the smaller the 
proportion of total cost that is borne by any given 
individual. There is less incentive to organize and 
the costs of organizing are greater than those experi-
enced by smaller, more concentrated groups. 
Table 4 summarizes the differences that can occur 
in the external political structure surrounding differ-
ent programs and issues. The table predicts the type 
of support and opposition that can be expected, 
depending on the way program costs and benefits are 
perceived by affected parties. 
Each of these structures can be illustrated by dif-
ferent marketing programs. For example, the hen-
efits of most market-facilitating programs are 
directed at a relatively well-defined group of agricul-
tural interests, while the costs of these programs are 
spread out over a large number of taxpayers or 
passed through the marketing system indirectly to 
consumers. Thus, there is generally weak opposition 
to market-facilitating programs, but strong support 
fo r them. 
Regulations which impose costs on, or obtain ben-
efits for, a segment of the food industry do not uni-
formly affect agricultural interests. Relatively few 
firms might benefit. Other groups , which are also 
concentrated, see the benefits to the first segment as 
a cost to them. However, as in the case of bargaining 
legislation, change will occur slowly in the face of 
struggle between opposing, concentrated interests. 
ln contrast, some programs, such as those in food 
safety, provide indirect benefits diffused among many 
consumers and producers. Indirect costs, on the 
other hand, are imposed on a concentrated, smaller 
group of marketing participants. Increasing those 
benefits and costs results in weakly organized support 
and strongly organized opposition. 
Although concentrated interests are more effective 
in marshaling support for or opposition to policy 
changes, weak groups still have an impact on policy 
choices. There are several strategies that groups with 
fewer political resources and less organized support 
can use to increase their effectiveness. They can 
conserve resources by standardizing responses to 






strong support Concentrated 
objections from opposing groups. They can also 
raise objections which are costly for the other side to 
rebut or they can appeal to the press , which may 
"subsidize" the cost of lobbying for them. Further-
more , because the marginal impact of lobbying 
declines as lobbying activity increases , the political 
support within government for strong groups will 
likely peak or grow slowly. 
Two important implications foilow from this dis-
cussion of interest groups. First, different programs 
and issues evoke different patterns of support and 
opposition and therefore. require different strategies 
for seeking change. Second, the benefits received by 
some groups are limited by the opposition of other 
groups. The greater this opposition, the greater the 
limitation on gains. To effectively seek change 
within programs, the structure of external political 
pressures surrounding a program must be understood 
and anticipated. These structures not only include 
members of privately organized groups. but other 
agencies and bodies of government as well. Repre-
sentatives of groups which stand to lose from pro-
gram changes will try to thwart attempted changes. 
Groups who stand to gain must be made aware of the 
opportunity. The strength of these groups and the 
tactics they use determine how easy or difficult it 
may be to change the way an agency interprets its 
mandate. 
Internal Characteristics of Agencies 
Agency actions do not always perfectly mirror 
external interest group pressures, due to special 
characteristics of the decision-making mechanism 
employed in interpreting the agency mandate. Thus, 
the effectiveness of groups seeking program changes 
also depends on the rules which govern agency deci-
sionmaking. Three basic types of decision mecha-
nisms can be used, either individually or in some 
combination -- bargaining, voting and hierarchy. 
Bargaining processes. These are typified by open 
forum debates, such as public comment procedures 







to program decisions . The final decision of the 
agency must be based on evidence produced in the 
forum. Participation in such forums may be expen-
sive, incurring costs for travel and information col-
lection. Consequently, it is difficult for unorganized , 
diffuse parties to participate or to be as effective as 
more organized groups. Interested individuals may 
participate, but their views are not likely to carry 
much weight unless they can demonstrate that their 
views represent those of a larger group -- often an 
expensive task. 
When bargaining is the primary decision process, 
the outcome reflects the existing distribution of 
resources among market participants and the implied 
distributional consequences of the decision outlined 
in Table 4. The most organized groups are most 
influential but they do not necessarily achieve all 
their goals because the agency's mandate may require 
a balancing of interests. Jn other words, the winners' 
gains are limited by the opposition and the losers' 
losses are less than they would be if the agency 
favored only one group. 
Voting mechanism. Agencies or programs which 
have elected officials, or officials appointed on the 
basis of representation , employ a form of voting 
mechanism. Direct voting by constituents in refer-
enda also occurs in some programs such as marketing 
orders and advertising and promotion programs. 
Voting mechanisms assign decision-making authority 
in the form of nontransfer<lble voting rights. Thus, 
most market-related resources are not relevant except 
insofar as lobbying influences voters. In this case, 
diffuse groups may prevail because they are larger 
than concentrated groups and because the cost of 
voting is less than the cost of organizing for bargain-
ing. However, the extent to which they prevail 
depends on whether the cost of voting is less than the 
gain that individuals expect to receive. Then there is 
still the problem of informing voters of their poten-
tial gain. Furthermore, voting outcomes will depend 
on the type of ballot proposals presented to voters. 
These must be designed carefully, taking into account 
heterogeneity of interests and the problem of meet-
ing majority levels required for adoption. 
Hierarchy system. The third type of decision 
mechanism is characterized by policy decisions in 
which public preferences may be overruled by other 
decision-making criteria. For example, the extent of 
economic impact or the health consequences of pol-
icy change may be the decision-making criteria 
required by a program mandate. In this case. objec-
tive or expert evidence provided in hearings may 
overrule the preferences of groups even if the groups 
are concentrated and well organized. Under the 
hierarchy decision process, expert knowlecl ge and 
formal position within the agency administering the 
program are the basis of decision authority. In its 
pure form, preferences of authorities and experts are 
substituted for preferences of private sector partici-
pants. However, as with bargaining mechanisms. 
influence is not equally distributed among decision-
making participants. Groups which can develop 
expert information relevant to an agency's decision-
making criteria may have greater influence than 
those which can not. 
Most programs involve more than one of the three 
decision mechanisms. so each must be considered in 
determ ining how to seek change in an agency's 
interpretation of its mandate. Different types of 
resources are important in the different decision-
making processes. Groups who seek change must 
possess those resources. 
Strategies for Change 
Formulating a strategy for change requires finding 
a receptive route and anticipating the source and 
strength of resistance. 
Step 1. Examine whether the change that is 
sought is consistent with the existing mandate of the 
program or whether new authorization by Congress 
is necessary. An agency's discretion is limited by its 
authoriz.ing act and other related statutes, such as the 
Administrative Procedures Act, so these must be 
examined. For example, expending effort to improve 
price reports or to evaluate the effectiveness of 
advertising is certainly in line with existing mandates 
to provide market-facilitating programs. Similarly, 
reexamining both the grades and standards programs 
and the approaches used under marketing orders is 
feasible. On the other hand, changing the orienta-
tion of food safety laws to require the "acceptable 
risk" criterion would call for congressional action , as 
wouid the elimination of programs, or their reorgan-
ization and consolidation. 
Step 2. Examine the area of discretion involved 
and who would stand to gain or lose from proposed 
changes. If highly organized and influential groups 
will benefit, they must be informed, mobilized and 
involved. If those who will benefit are unorganized 
and diffuse, possibilities for coalition building among 
existing groups and their allies in government should 
be examined . Forming such coalitions requires care-
ful documentation of changes in program costs and 
benefits and strategies for obtaining the changes. 
Potential opposition must be gauged as well. If 
opposition will likely be strong, tactics for overcom-
ing the opposition must be developed. 
Step 3. Develop an understanding of the decision 
processes of an agency. While bargaining is likely to 
be involved, special voting rules or expert criteria 
used by the agency must be examined. For example, 
agencies may be required to assess the economic or 
environmental impact of proposals for change. Sim-
ilarly, some proposals may require new appropria-
tions which must be estimated and justified. 
Approval of congressional oversight, authorization 
and appropnat1ons committees should also be 
assessed and sought if programmatic changes will 
entail new costs or shifts in objectives. The agency 
administering the program may not be the only 
potential ally in government. Other agencies which 
are likely to be affected by change should also be 
consulted. Sometimes they can turn out to be more 
influential in obtaining a change than the adminis-
tering agency itself. 
Motivating enough interest and creating optimism 
about change among affected parties and within gov-
ernment is a major task. Overcoming program iner-
tia, providing capable lobbying efforts and getting the 
attention of decisionmakers is a continual challenge. 
Federal marketing programs have a long history; 
they have administrative precedents which shaped the 
current program; and they have many vested inter-
ests. It is important for those who seek specific 
changes to thoroughly understand a program's pur-
pose, history and participants. Only then can they 
work effectively to achieve change. 
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